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This thesis examines some of the legal philosophical issues that are 
implicated in the problem of outcome luck. In the context of criminal law, the 
problem asks whether we should hold agents criminally liable for the 
consequences of their actions given that those consequences are never 
wholly within anyone’s control. I conclude that outcomes should matter to an 
agent’s liability and punishment, and I make this argument indirectly by 
examining some of the foundational questions in legal theory.  
 
The thesis begins by considering a current trend in some areas of 
philosophy. This trend involves attempts to address philosophical problems 
surrounding luck by doing conceptual analyses on the nature of luck. 
Chapter 1 critically examines modal theories, which conceptualize luck, as 
well as the related concept of risk, in terms of close possible worlds rather 
than probabilistic likelihood. I argue that not only are modal theories 
uninformative, but conceptual analyses on luck are unhelpful in addressing 
philosophical questions surrounding luck. Chapter 2 then returns to the 
traditional notion of luck as lack of control, and focuses on the relationship 
between luck, risk, and culpability. Some theorists argue that culpability, for 
any offence, is in part a function of the degree of risk the agent imposes on 
others. In the context of criminal law, degrees of luck and risk can both be 
understood in terms of degrees of control, so the suggestion that culpability is 
a function of the level of risk imposed (and thus of the degree of control an 
agent exercises) is attractive for insulating culpability judgments from luck. 
However, I argue that this view is mistaken because culpability is only 
sensitive to risk in reckless actions, but not in purposeful actions.   
 
The problem of outcome luck may raise different questions for reckless 
actions and purposeful actions. Chapter 3 looks at the mens rea element of 
criminal attempts, which is crucial for understanding the problem of luck in 
the context of purposeful actions. I discuss a variation of what are sometimes 
referred to as impossible attempts, which have helped shape current English 
law. I argue that the current doctrine is largely correct, and that perhaps with 
the exception of few paradigm sexual offences, the mens rea element for 
attempts should require a direct intention as to the consequence element of 
an offence, and knowledge or belief as to the circumstance element of that 
offence.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 then look at normative justifications of criminal 
punishment. In order to understand whether outcomes should matter for 
punishment, we must first understand whether and why punishment is an 
appropriate response to criminal offending. Here, I defend a communicative 
theory, where punishment is a communicative process between the offender, 
the political community, and the victim. What punishment communicates is 




offender’s wrongdoing. And in doing this, it publicly recognizes the wrong that 
has been committed by the offender. Chapter 4 offers a detailed explanation 
of this account, and argues that the political community’s recognition of 
wrongdoing is a valuable aim of communication. Chapter 5 then takes up a 
crucial challenge against communicative theories of punishment, which is 
that such theories fail to take crime prevention seriously. Against this 
criticism, I will show that general prevention can in fact be an essential part of 
communicative punishment. And I will show that it is specifically the political 
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Somewhere in the world right now, a few people are about to leave a pub, 
restaurant, or party and drive themselves home after having had too much to 
drink. Some of these people will make it home without any incidents. At most 
they will be caught for impaired driving, an offence that is typically punishable 
with a fine and perhaps a temporary license suspension.1 Others won’t be so 
lucky. Unable to react in time, they will get into an accident and cause death 
or serious injury to other drivers or pedestrians. If convicted, they will typically 
receive a prison sentence.2 Elsewhere in the world, a few people are plotting 
to partake in some kind of criminal activity. Some of these people will 
succeed and others will fail. If caught and convicted, the ones who succeed 
will most likely be given a harsher sentence than those who have failed.3 
 Many of us, upon first glance, may not object to discrepancies in the 
severity of punishment for merely reckless drivers and reckless drivers who 
cause harm, or between successful criminals and failed attempters. Perhaps 
we think that those who have caused harm—be it reckless agents or 
purposeful actors—have committed a more serious offence than those who 
have not caused harm, and are thus deserving of harsher punishment than 
their respective counterparts.4 But, irrespective of the occurrence or non-
occurrence of harm, each pair of reckless agents or purposeful actors are 
equally culpable. Differences in the outcomes of their actions are, to some 
extent, beyond their control and do not add to or detract from the level of fault 
we can attribute to an agent. Had the unlucky drivers decided to take a 
different route or leave a few minutes later, they might not have found 
themselves at a busy intersection and might have been able to get home 
without an accident.5 And had the successful criminals done something even 
slightly different during the course of their criminal activities—e.g. aim the 
                                                     
1
 See Duff (2016). 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 See Feinberg (1995).  
4
 See Cornford (2011).  
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gun slightly to the left or burgle a different house—they might not have 
succeeded. 
 The problem of outcome luck is a problem about what we ought to do 
upon the realisation that, like most aspects of our lives, the consequences of 
our actions are, to some extent, always a matter of luck.6 This problem arises 
out of a conflict between our initial acceptance of two intuitive and 
independently plausible principles.7 On the one hand, we normally adhere to 
the Control Principle, which is roughly that agents should be held responsible 
only for what is within their control. But on the other hand, we seem to accept 
the fairly widespread practice of holding agents criminally liable for the 
consequences of their actions, which are never wholly within anyone’s 
control. In light of this conflict, should we adhere strictly to the Control 
Principle and consider outcomes irrelevant for liability, or should we abide by 
existing legal tradition and admit some degree of luck in the criminal law? 
Many foundational questions in law and philosophy are implicated in 
the problem of outcome luck. This thesis offers an examination of those 
issues, particularly in the context of criminal law. The discussions here 
should help shed light on some of the questions that must be answered in 
order for us to address the problem of outcome luck, but it also leaves many 
questions unanswered. As such, my discussion should not be treated as an 
attempt to offer any kind of “solution” to this problem, but rather as an attempt 
to answer some key legal philosophical questions, which would concern 
anyone who cares about the influence of luck in the criminal law.  
▪ 
The problem of luck is not specific to legal philosophy. In ethics, the problem 
of moral (outcome) luck is almost identical, except questions about 
responsibility concern moral rather than legal responsibility. In epistemology, 
the truth or falsity of our beliefs may be down to luck, but luckily true beliefs 
are thought to be incompatible with knowledge.8 Legal theorists have gained 
valuable insights by looking at the philosophical debate on moral luck, but 
                                                     
6
 See Duff (1996), chapter 12. 
7
 See Greco (1995); Nagel (1979). 
8
 See Pritchard (2005). 
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significantly less attention has been paid to discussions in epistemology, 
which have had a lot to say about the notion of luck in recent years. This 
thesis begins by looking at epistemologists’ attempts to deal with the problem 
of epistemic luck in order to see whether legal theory can gain anything from 
discussions in epistemology. 
▪ 
The problem of (veritic) epistemic luck goes like this. Suppose my clock 
reads midnight and, based on this evidence, I form the belief that it is 
midnight. It is in fact midnight, but unbeknownst to me, the clock has stopped 
the previous day and it was by luck that I formed a true belief. Had I looked at 
my clock an hour earlier, my belief that it is midnight would have been false. 
Even though my belief is true, I do not know that it is midnight. This is known 
as the anti-luck platitude in knowledge; that in order for a subject S to know a 
proposition p, it must not be the case that S’s belief in p is true as a matter of 
luck. In other words, knowledge is thought to exclude luck.9 
 Contemporary epistemology has produced a great deal of work on 
luck, much of which is concerned with giving us a descriptively accurate 
definition of the concept. The motivation behind this work is the belief that in 
order for us to address various philosophical problems that arise out of this 
concept, it would be helpful first to have a precise definition of luck.10 For 
example, in what are referred to as anti-luck theories of knowledge, we see a 
two-step process for defining knowledge. The first step involves conceptual 
analysis on luck; it involves an attempt to understand the nature of the 
phenomenon and to specify its defining features. The second step then goes 
on to use our understanding of the concept to specify the sense in which 
knowledge must exclude luck.11 
This kind of approach is contrary to traditional philosophical 
discussions of luck in a couple of ways. First, rather than using the concept of 
luck in a loosely defined manner, anti-luck epistemology has given us a 
                                                     
9
 Ibid., chapters 5 & 6.  
10
 Ibid., chapter 5. 
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plethora of nuanced and sophisticated definitions of luck.12 Second, rather 
than taking the concept to be synonymous with lack of control, many 
epistemologists have convincingly argued that lack of control, by itself, is not 
sufficient for luck. 13 For instance, if luck is merely the absence of control, 
then an event such as the sun rising every morning would, counterintuitively, 
be a matter of luck. The fact that we do not typically consider sunrises to be 
matters of luck suggests that something else—perhaps in addition to lack of 
control—is necessary for luck.14 
Many have argued that this something else is the notion of 
chanciness, or the notion that matters of luck are in some sense unlikely to 
occur. For instance, what makes a paradigmatic event, such as winning the 
lottery, a matter of luck is that it is typically an unlikely event. The specific 
sense in which matters of luck are unlikely is the subject of debate between 
those who favour a probabilistic conception of luck and those who favour a 
modal conception of luck.15 A probabilistic account holds roughly that an 
event E is a matter of luck if and only if E is probabilistically unlikely. And a 
modal account holds roughly that an event E is a matter of luck if and only if 
E occurs in this world but does not occur in a specified range of close 
possible worlds.16 
Recently, this disagreement has also extended to the related concept 
of risk. Some have argued that luck and risk are essentially the same 
concept, except our judgements about luck are made ex-post while our 
judgements about risk are made ex-ante.17 Quite often, the degree to which 
an event is a matter of luck is determined by the degree of risk that surrounds 
the event. For instance, if subject S is at high risk of developing cancer, then 
S would be very lucky if he does not develop cancer. But if S is at low risk of 
developing cancer, then we would not typically use the language of luck to 
describe S if he does not develop cancer. 
                                                     
12
 See Chapter 1.  
13
 See e.g. Latus (2000); Pritchard & Smith (2004); Pritchard (2005, 128). 
14
 See Latus (2000). 
15
 See Chapter 1.  
16
 The precise formulation of the modal account of luck will be articulated in Chapter 1.  
17
 See Pritchard (2014). 
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Some proponents of a modal conception of luck have also articulated 
a modal conception of risk.18 They argue that, instead of conceptualising risk 
in terms of probability, we should measure risk in terms of counterfactual 
closeness. An unwanted event E is a high risk event if the possible world in 
which E could occur is very similar to our actual world. Conversely, E is a low 
risk event if it could only occur in a possible world that is very dissimilar to our 
actual world. 
Chapter 1 takes a detailed look at the disagreement between modal 
theorists and probabilistic theorists about the concepts of luck and risk. Both 
of these concepts are relevant to the problem of outcome luck and the legal 
philosophical issues that it implicates. The scope of Chapter 1 is limited to 
conceptual analyses of these concepts, rather than a commentary on the 
significance of different conceptions of luck and risk for epistemology or legal 
theory. In my view, before we can appreciate the extent to which conceptual 
analyses on luck and risk can inform deeper philosophical questions, we 
must engage in conceptual analysis first. It may be the case that conceptual 
analysis will not help shed any light on the problem of outcome luck. But in 
order to know whether that is the case and why that may be the case, it 
would be helpful for us to engage with the debate, to understand why such 
disagreements matter to epistemologists, and to consider the differences 
between the problems that luck raises in law and in epistemology. 
▪ 
As we will see in Chapter 1, I offer a detailed criticism of modal conceptions 
of both luck and risk. With respect to luck, I argue that modal accounts of luck 
are unnecessary because they are reducible to probabilistic accounts of luck, 
and that when it comes to risk, modal conceptions of risk are either 
unnecessary or trivial, especially if we already know the probability of a risk 
event. Chapter 1 concludes with a negative account of luck and risk; that 
neither of these concepts are modal concepts. I hint that probabilistic 
conceptions of luck and risk are superior, but I do not offer positive accounts 
of either concept. The reason for this is that, at least in the legal context, it is 
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not clear what we can gain by having a precise definition of luck. I am 
skeptical that conceptual analysis on luck can inform deeper philosophical 
issues, especially in relation to the problem of outcome luck in law.19 
 Recall that proponents of chanciness conceptions of luck argue that 
the notion of chanciness, rather than lack of control, is better suited to 
capture our intuitions about luck. In this way, chanciness accounts of luck are 
descriptively accurate while control accounts are not. This is what the sunrise 
example is meant to show. Admittedly, the nature of luck extends beyond 
mere lack of control. But legal theorists are not particularly interested in the 
nature of luck or genuine matters of luck, such as winning the lottery. The 
problem of outcome luck is specifically about the alleged incompatibility 
between legal responsibility and lack of control, and legal theorists are only 
interested in luck to the extent that luck connotes lack of control.20 Within 
legal philosophical discussions about outcome luck, we can replace talk of 
“luck” with talks of “accident” or “chance”, as long as we know that these 
terms are used to convey the absence of control.21 
 Proponents of chanciness conceptions of luck also argue that the 
notion of chanciness can easily capture degrees of luck, which is often 
neglected when we equate luck with lack of control.22 For instance, if we 
equate luck with lack of control, then it is a matter of luck when a skilled 
marksman hits his target and it is a matter of luck when he misses his target. 
The marksman lacks complete control over the outcome of his shot. But, as 
chanciness theorists about luck will point out, surely the two outcomes are 
not matters of luck to the same extent. It is more of a matter of luck when he 
misses. Given that he is highly skilled, the chances of him missing the shot 
are reasonably low.  
This point about degrees of luck is relevant for the legal context and, if 
true, would give legal theorists good reason to at least take note of 
                                                     
19
 But see Peels (2015) where a modal conception of luck has been applied to the problem 
of moral luck. 
20
 See Enoch & Marmor (2007). 
21
 For instance, as Hart (2008, 131) puts the question of outcome luck: “why should the 
accidental fact that an intended harmful outcome has not occurred be a ground for punishing 
less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally wicked?” 
22
 See Pritchard (2014). 
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chanciness conceptions of luck. However, as we will see in Chapter 2, this 
point is false. In the legal context, where luck is stipulated to mean the 
absence of control, degrees of luck can be accounted for in terms of the 
degree of control that is exercised by an agent.23 Skilled shooters have 
greater control over their shots and, compared to novice shooters, impose a 
greater risk of harm on their intended targets or victims. When skilled 
shooters miss their target, their failed attempt is more of a matter of luck 
compared to the failed attempt of a novice shooter. 
▪ 
Traditionally, the problem of outcome luck concerns the significance of 
outcomes for liability; that is, whether an agent can be liable for the outcomes 
of his actions. If not, then successful criminals and failed attempters should 
receive the same level of punishment, as should reckless drivers who cause 
harm and those who do not.24 But once we take note of degrees of luck, we 
realize that the same outcome can be more or less of a matter of luck for 
different agents depending on the level of risk an agent imposes. The same 
harmful outcome is less of a matter of luck for the agent who unleashes a 
high risk of harm and more of a matter of luck for the agent who unleashes a 
low risk of harm.  
 In Chapter 2, I will explain the relationship between luck, risk, and 
control, and how we can account for degrees of luck and risk by accounting 
for degrees of control. An agent may not have complete control over 
anything, but he does have some control over the risks that his actions 
unleash. The level of risk an agent unleashes speaks to his culpability, and, 
in Chapter 2, I will consider the extent to which culpability can be sensitive to 
the degree of risk an agent imposes. 
 Some legal theorists—most notably Alexander and Ferzan—have 
argued that culpability is in part a function of the level of risk an agent 
(knowingly) imposes on others.25 And for Alexander and Ferzan, rather than 
giving weight to outcomes, liability is grounded solely in an agent’s 
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 See Duff (1996), chapter 12. 
24
 See Feinberg (1995). 
25




culpability. If we are concerned about the influence of luck in criminal law, 
then given what I have said thus far, their theory of culpability is attractive for 
insulating culpability and liability judgements from degrees of luck. The 
reckless driver who imposes a greater risk of harm on others is more 
culpable than another who poses a lower risk of harm. While their account of 
culpability is attractive for being sensitive to degrees of luck, especially in the 
context of reckless actions, I argue that it fails to give us a proper account of 
culpability for purposeful actions. I will show that while degrees of risk are 
relevant for the culpability of reckless actions, the same is not true for 
purposeful actions. 
▪ 
Some theorists have noted that the problem of outcome luck may be different 
for reckless actions and purposeful actions.26 Chapter 3 looks at the 
influence of luck in the context of purposeful actions. A crucial part of the 
debate here concerns the mens rea element for criminal attempts and what 
that should require. In attempts, the intention is the principal ingredient of the 
offence; an attempt requires an intention to commit an offence even if 
intention is not required for the completed offence.27 Chapter 3 offers a 
detailed discussion on what the mens rea element should require. The point 
of controversy has to do with whether recklessness as to a circumstance 
element of the offence is sufficient for intention. I argue that, typically, it is 
not. 
 I will discuss this issue against the backdrop of a problem which is 
sometimes associated with the problem of outcome luck for purposeful 
actions—i.e. the problem of impossible attempts. In so-called impossible 
attempts, an agent sets out to commit an offence and does everything he 
believes is necessary for the successful completion of the offence.28 But 
given the objective state of affairs, it is impossible for the agent to commit the 
intended offence. For instance, suppose an agent intends to appropriate 
what he believes is another’s property. The offence of theft requires that the 
                                                     
26
 See Duff (2016). 
27
 See Simester & Sullivan (2016), chapter 9. 
28
 See Duff (1996), chapter 3.  
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property in question belongs to another person. But unbeknownst to the 
agent, the property that he tries to appropriate is actually his own. And given 
that the property actually belongs to him, it is impossible for him to commit 
theft by taking his own property. 
 Allegations of impossibility have never been enough to exempt an 
agent from criminal liability.29 Despite the fact that external factors are such 
that it was impossible for the agent to succeed, he can still be blamed for 
trying to commit an offence. This has to do with the fact that, in attempts, the 
focus is on whether the agent acted with intention to commit an offence. If the 
agent had acted with an intention [to take another’s property] then he did act 
with an intention to commit theft. Not only did this agent intend merely [to 
take property] or [to take that thing], he also acted with intention to the 
circumstance element—i.e. that it is another’s property. 
 The cases that concern us in Chapter 3 are ones in which the agent 
acted with an intention [to take that thing] and was reckless about whether 
the thing belonged to another person. When the thing in question turns out to 
belong to the agent himself, it is sometimes thought that the agent has 
committed an impossible attempt. The key rationale behind this thought is 
that the agent did act with an intention to commit theft when he acted with 
recklessness as to ownership of the property. If this is true, then we can very 
well think of such cases as cases of impossibility. 
 However, I argue that recklessness as to circumstance is not sufficient 
for intention, and that the mens rea element for attempts should require at 
least knowledge or belief as to the circumstance elements of an offence. I will 
proceed on the assumption that criminal attempts are a species of attacks. 
That is, a failed attempt to commit theft is a failed attack on another person’s 
property interests. As I will explain, attacks are in contrast to acts of 
endangerment.30 In attacks, the agent aims to harm some protect interest, 
whereas in endangerments, the agent merely risks harm to that interest. In 
the case where an agent acted with an intention [to take that thing] and is 
reckless about ownership of the thing, I argue that he has not attacked, but 
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 See Chapter 3 for possible exceptions to this rule.  
30




rather endangered, another’s property interests. The discussion in this 
chapter should help shed light both on debates surrounding how we should 
deal with instances of impossibility, as well as the mens rea requirement for 
criminal attempts more generally. 
▪ 
Finally, in Chapters 4 and 5, I turn my attention to the issue of punishment. 
The problem of outcome luck is, to a large extent, a problem about how we 
should punish two similarly culpable agents, one of whom has caused harm 
while the other has not.31 In order to make progress on this issue, we must 
address the question of why punishment is an appropriate response to 
criminal wrongdoing, a question that takes us to the debate on the 
justification of punishment. 
  In these last two chapters, I will focus on what I consider to be the 
most plausible accounts of punishment: instrumentalist justifications of 
punishment and communicative theories of punishment. Instrumentalists 
have typically argued that punishment is primarily justified in terms of its 
preventive functions.32 If our penal institutions proved to be an ineffective 
deterrent against criminal offending, then we would have good reason to 
abolish it. Communicative theories, on the other hand, are a species of 
expressivist theories of punishment, which takes the expression or 
communication of censure to be the central justifying aim of punishment. For 
these theorists, we punish offenders in order to express or communicate to 
them the moral criticism they deserve for their offence. 
The aim of Chapters 4 and 5 is to defend a communicative account of 
punishment against an important criticism from instrumentalist critics, which 
is that communicative punishment fails to take crime prevention seriously. In 
order to address this criticism, I will begin in Chapter 4 by giving a detailed 
overview of Antony Duff’s communicative account of punishment. On Duff’s 
view, punishment is a communicative process between the offender, the 
victim, and the political community to which they belong. The message of 
communication is one of censure, where the offender receives the level of 
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 See Feinberg (1995). 
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 See Tadros (2011). 
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moral criticism that is appropriate in response to his offence. In censuring the 
offender, the political community recognizes the wrong that he has committed 
against the victim. I argue that recognition can be valuable for the victim 
regardless of any instrumental effects it may have, but I do not argue that the 
value of recognition is enough to justify our penal institutions. 
 Throughout Chapters 4 and 5, I proceed on the assumption that 
instrumentalists are right about the normative significance of crime 
prevention. In Chapter 5, I argue that communicative punishment does in fact 
have an essential preventive dimension. However, communicative theorists 
like Duff aim for a different type of prevention than instrumentalists. As I will 
show, communicative punishment entails general prevention, where the 
mode of prevention is one of moral dissuasion. This can be differentiated 
from the mode of prevention that is prevalent in the literature on punishment, 
which concerns general deterrence through prudential disincentives. 
Communicative theorists can take crime prevention seriously, or so I argue, 
without aiming for the latter kind of prevention. 
 By the end of Chapter 5, we will see that, if we care about crime 
prevention, there are unresolved questions about the limits of pursuing a 
communicative account of punishment. These questions point to further work 
that needs to be done on this topic. Nonetheless, Chapters 4 and 5 constitute 
a serious attempt to address an important challenge that has been raised 
against communicative theories. It may not be enough to convince 
instrumentalist critics, but I hope it will shed some light on how we might 
advance the debate surrounding punishment.  
▪ 
In the Conclusion to this thesis I will make some brief suggestions about how 
we should punish similarly culpable agents who cause different degrees of 
harm. My suggestions will be tentative since, as I mentioned earlier, there are 
still important questions that need to be addressed in relation to the problem 
of outcome luck.33 For now, let us begin by turning to the debate on the 
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 For example, this thesis has not touched on the debate between subjectivists and 




nature of luck and risk, and what epistemologists have had to say about the 

















































What’s Wrong with Modal Conceptions of Luck and Risk 
 
The modal account of luck has become very popular and influential in the 
past decade. More recently, some of its proponents have also put forth a 
modal account of risk and argued that we ought to apply it to problems both 
in and out of philosophy.1 Here, I try to show that such conceptions are 
mistaken.2 I start, in section 1, by arguing that modal conceptions of luck are 
parasitic on the probability of the event in question. I clarify some key 
components of modal accounts of luck and show how such accounts 
ultimately reduce to probability. Then in section 2, I consider some existing 
discussions surrounding so-called “lucky” true beliefs in lottery style 
scenarios. I argue that contrary to some modal theorists’ suggestion, lottery 
scenarios do not show that luck is a modal notion. Finally, in section 3, I turn 
to the modal account of risk. Here I argue that modal theorists have offered 
us no reason to be concerned about modal risk. Depending on the level of 
probabilistic risk in question, modal theorists’ approach to risk assessment 
and reduction is either unnecessary or trivial. 
 
1 Probability within the Modal Account of Luck 
Winning a fair lottery with long odds is a paradigmatic instance of luck. It is a 
matter of good luck if the win confers significant benefits upon the winner and 
it is a matter of bad luck if the “winner” has been selected to meet some 
dreaded fate. Most accounts of luck contain a significance condition such that 
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 The most prominent proponent of modal accounts of luck and risk has been Duncan 
Pritchard, and I focus primarily on his articulation and defence of such accounts here. See 
also Whittington’s manuscript on risk.  
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 There has been a plethora of conceptual analyses on luck and risk within the past decade, 
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an event is a matter of luck only if it is of some value for some specified 
being.3 In addition to a significance condition, different theories will account 
for luck with either a chanciness condition or a lack of control condition. 
Proponents of a lack of control account argue that matters of luck are 
significant events that are also beyond an agent’s control.4 And those who 
endorse a chanciness account argue that matters of luck are significant 
events that are also in some specified sense unlikely to occur. This paper is 
not concerned with the significance condition or lack of control accounts of 
luck. The focus is on competing notions of chanciness—i.e. on the 
differences between modal and probabilistic accounts of luck. 
According to probabilistic accounts, lottery wins are matters of luck 
roughly because they are significant events that are probabilistically unlikely.5 
The chances of winning a national lottery is so probabilistically farfetched and 
stacked against any given ticket that it is far more likely for one to lose than it 
is for one to win. Given different odds (e.g. 0.9), winning the lottery may not 
be considered a matter of luck—or it would be less of a matter of luck—
because the event is more likely or almost guaranteed to occur. 
When we talk about the probability of winning the lottery, we typically 
talk about objective chance rather than epistemic probability or subjective 
credence. Objective chance refers to features of the world and is 
independent of our beliefs about the event in question.6 In contrast, epistemic 
probability refers to the evidence we have in support of a particular 
proposition, whereas credence measures our degree of belief in a proposition 
irrespective of our evidence for that proposition.7 Our beliefs can track 
objective chance, but the objective probability of winning a national lottery is 
probabilistically farfetched regardless of our beliefs about its likelihood. 
Modal accounts of luck appear to offer a different explanation for why 
some events are matters of luck, but the explanation do not differ, in 
                                                     
3
 But see Pritchard (2014) who argues against the necessity of a significance condition. 
4
 Riggs (2009); Broncano-Berrocal (2015).  
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 McKinnon (2013); Rescher (2014); Steglich-Peterson (2010).  
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 In talking about objective probability, I make no commitments to any of the different 
interpretations of objective probability (e.g. frequency or propensity), though I will limit my 
discussion to the frequentist account.  
7
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essence, from the explanation offered by probabilistic accounts. Consider 
Pritchard’s (2005) initial formulation of the modal condition on luck:  
“If an event is lucky, then it is an event that occurs in the actual 
world but which does not occur in a wide class of nearest 
possible worlds where the relevant initial conditions for that 
event are the same as in the actual world.”8 
To see why the modal account does not differ meaningfully from the 
probabilistic account of luck, we need to begin with a clear understanding of 
the modal condition on luck. 
Crucially, two sub-conditions make up the modal condition on luck. 
The first sub-condition has to do with the notion of modal distance, which 
concerns degrees of similarity between possible worlds and the actual world. 
Call this sub-conditionD. The second sub-condition has to do with the notion 
of modal frequency, which refers to the prevalence of an event across a 
specified set of close possible worlds. Call this sub-conditionF. An event is 
modally robust if it occurs across a wide class of specified close possible 
worlds, and it is modally fragile if it occurs across a limited number of 
specified close possible worlds. Together, sub-conditionD and sub-conditionF 
make up the modal condition on luck. Sub-conditionD specifies the relevant 
set of possible worlds that we are interested in (e.g. nearest possible worlds), 
and sub-conditionF specifies the proportion of those worlds in which an event 
must not occur (e.g. a wide class of those nearest possible worlds). On the 
modal account of luck, lottery wins are matters of luck because they are 
modally fragile across the set of possible worlds where we participate in the 
lottery.  
 Notice that the notion of modal distance (i.e. sub-conditionD), by itself, 
tells us nothing about luck. It simply measures the extent of the similarities 
between possible worlds and the actual world.9 For instance, a possible 
world in which the glass of water on my desk is five inches closer to me than 
it actually is at this moment is closer to the actual world than another possible 
world in which I am a barrister. And the possible world in which I am a 
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barrister is closer than another possible world in which Edinburgh has 
switched places with Montreal.10 Both winning and losing the lottery are 
modally close events since not much has to change about the actual world in 
order to bring about the respective counterfactual events. 
With respect to assessments of luck, the notion of modal distance is 
only relevant within sub-conditionD, where we pick out a set of close possible 
worlds that are relevantly similar to the actual world. For instance, consider 
Pritchard’s (2007b) later formulation of the modal condition, where “an event 
is lucky iff it obtains in the actual world but does not obtain in a wide class of 
near-by possible worlds”.11 The only difference between the 2005 and 2007 
formulation is the relevant set of possible worlds that we need to specify—i.e. 
nearest vs. nearby possible worlds. Once we have picked a relevant set of 
possible worlds, we still need to apply sub-conditionF and assess whether an 
event is sufficiently infrequent across those possible worlds so as to count as 
a matter of luck.  
 Sub-conditionF is a key part of the modal condition on luck. Without it, 
a modal account would be over-inclusive. For instance, suppose an employer 
is hiring new employees on the basis of a lottery and John has been 
selected. The possible event of John not being selected is modally close. But 
the fact that the counterfactual event is modally close does not tell us 
anything about whether the actual event is a matter of luck. On a modal 
account of luck, it would be a matter of luck for John to be selected iff there is 
a sufficient number of close possible worlds where he is not selected (i.e. the 
event is modally fragile or infrequent). If five people are selected from a pool 
of one-hundred applicants, then presumably John has not been selected in a 
wide class of relevantly close possible worlds. However, if ninety-five people 
are selected from a pool of one-hundred applicants, then presumably John 
has been selected in a wide class of close possible worlds. This is exactly 
how a modal account of luck is able to explain lottery wins. What makes an 
instance of winning the lottery a matter of luck is not that the counterfactual 
event is modally close, but that there is a sufficient number of close possible 
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 Pritchard (2015, p. 443). 
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 Pritchard (2007b, p. 279), my emphasis.  
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worlds where the counterfactual event obtains instead. This is the concern of 
sub-conditionF; it specifies the frequency of the counterfactual event within a 
set of possible worlds. Without sub-conditionF, lottery losses would, counter-
intuitively, be counted as matters of luck since the counterfactual event of 
winning the lottery is modally close. 
 There can, of course, be disagreements amongst modal theorists over 
the correct formulation of sub-conditionF—i.e. the requisite modal frequency 
or fragility of matters of luck.12 However, some formulations of sub-conditionF 
(and sub-conditionD) are clearly too vague and too wide to offer an accurate 
account. For instance, in Pritchard’s latest (2014) articulation of the modal 
condition, he writes that “what makes an event lucky is that while it obtains in 
the actual world there are—keeping the initial conditions for that event 
fixed—close possible worlds in which this event does not obtain.”13 This 
formulation differs from earlier formulations in that the relevant set of close 
possible worlds (sub-conditionD) has widened from nearest possible worlds 
(2005) to nearby possible worlds (2007b) to close possible worlds (2014). 
Additionally, the proportion of these possible worlds in which the actual event 
must not occur in order for the event to count as a matter of luck (sub-
conditionF) has narrowed from a wide class of nearest or nearby possible 
worlds (2005, 2007b) to presumably at least one or two close possible worlds 
(2014). The (2014) formulation of sub-conditionF is clearly too wide since on 
this formulation, not only are lottery wins a matter of luck, but lottery losses 
are also matters of luck, assuming there are one or two close possible worlds 
in which the losing ticket is the winner.14 
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 Pritchard (2014, p. 599).  
14
 Pritchard has suggested that all lottery events are a matter of luck, including lottery losses 
(personal communication, February 16, 2016). I think we should reject this suggestion. While 
we would not hesitate to use the language of luck to describe lottery wins, it would be odd to 
say to someone who has lost the lottery that his loss was a matter of (bad) luck. Of course, 
there can be negative lotteries, where a winner is selected to meet some dreaded fate. We 
would consider the “winner” of this lottery to be extremely unlucky, and we would also 
consider the “losers” of this lottery to be lucky. However, what explains this judgment is not 
that all lottery outcomes are a matter of luck, but that whether an outcome is a matter of luck 




 Notwithstanding any vague formulations of the modal condition on 
luck, the problem I want to raise is more fundamental and concerns sub-
conditionF in particular. Suppose modal theorists agree on the formulation of 
sub-conditionD; i.e. a relevant set of close possible worlds from which to 
apply sub-conditionF. In order for modal theorists to offer an account that 
differs meaningfully from probabilistic accounts of luck, they need to explain 
how we can judge whether an event is modally (in)frequent without knowing 
the probability of that event. How can we judge whether an event obtains in 
any portion of relevantly close possible worlds if not by some kind of (implicit) 
reference to its probability? In other words, how can modal theorists apply 
sub-conditionF without reference to probability? 
For example, compare the following two lottery events. In the first 
lottery, six numbers are randomly drawn from a pool of 49 numbers. Any and 
all tickets that match all six numbers will win the jackpot. In the second 
lottery, only one number is randomly drawn from a pool of 49 numbers. Any 
and all tickets that match the selected number will win the same amount of 
money as the winner of the first lottery.15 Holding the value of the lottery 
prizes fixed, surely winning the first lottery is more of a matter of luck than 
winning the second lottery. Probability theorists about luck can explain this in 
terms of the probability of winning each lottery. It is more of a matter of luck 
to win the first lottery (where the probability of winning is 1 in 14 million) 
because, compared to the second lottery, the chances of winning are much 
lower, probabilistically speaking. But how might a modal theorist explain this 
without reference to, or knowledge of, the probability of winning each lottery? 
With respect to the second lottery, there is, presumably, a large portion of 
close possible worlds where the actual winners do not win the lottery. But, 
presumably, there is a substantially larger portion of close possible worlds 
where the actual winners of the first lottery do not win the lottery. Why should 
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 We can assume that the winnings are fixed so the pot does not need to be split between 
multiple winners.  
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we not think that our judgements about modal frequency is inferred from and 
ultimately reduces to judgments about probabilistic likelihood?16 
The problem with modal accounts of luck is this. A descriptively 
accurate modal account must include sub-conditionF, otherwise the account 
would be over-inclusive. But it appears that our judgements about the modal 
frequency of events are guided by our judgments about probability.17 This is 
the sense in which the modal account of luck is parasitic on the probabilistic 
account of luck. What is wrong with modal accounts of luck is that we would 
not be able to apply sub-conditionF unless we already have some judgment 
about the probability of an event. But why should we not think that our 
judgements about probability are enough to tell us whether the event is a 
matter of luck? 
This challenge leads us back to sub-conditionD—i.e. the need to 
specify a relevant set of possible worlds, which modal theorists could argue 
is crucial for accurate ascriptions of luck. Assuming that this is true, this line 
of argument still fails to differentiate a modal account from a probabilistic 
account in any meaningful way. Ironically, on some interpretations of 
probability, this step can make a modal account look more like a probabilistic 
account of luck. For instance, a popular interpretation of objective probability 
is frequentism, where probability expresses the frequency of an event relative 
to the size of a specified reference class. Modal theorists’ concern with 
relevant sets of possible worlds resembles frequentists’ attempt to situate 
events within appropriate reference classes. And when modal theorists 
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 A reviewer has pointed out that this argument might be turned around. How can we 
determine the probability of E if not by appealing to modal considerations? For instance, on 
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disagree about which sets of possible worlds are relevant, their 
disagreements resemble disagreements between frequentists over the 
appropriateness of various reference classes. 
For example, suppose we want to determine the extent to which 
finding a buried treasure is a matter of luck. Different modal calculations 
using different sets of possible worlds will yield different verdicts, just as 
different probabilistic calculations using different reference classes will yield 
different verdicts. If modal theorists only consider nearby possible worlds, 
where the treasure is buried in the same spot and where the subject digs for 
treasure in that spot, then the event would not be a matter of luck because it 
occurs in most of the specified worlds. But if we consider all possible worlds, 
including ones where the treasure has not been buried, then the event would 
be a matter of luck since it only occurs in a small portion of all possible 
worlds.18 Probabilistically speaking, if frequentists situate the event within the 
reference class of individuals who look for treasure in the particular spot 
where the treasure is buried, then we might think that the event is not a 
matter of luck since it has a probability of 1. But if we situate the event within 
the reference class of all individuals (including those who have never looked 
for treasure), then we would get a significantly different verdict. And if we 
situate the event within the reference class of individuals who look for 
treasure on that island, we may get a different answer still. 
So, on some interpretations of probability, the modal account of luck 
looks like a probabilistic account of luck in disguise, where the disguise 
comes from sub-conditionD. But the question of how modal theorists can 
apply sub-conditionF without reference to probability is meant to reveal a 
fundamental problem for the modal account of luck. If modal theorists must 
rely on probability judgments in order to apply half of their account (while the 
other half of their account can arguably be accommodated by some versions 
of a probabilistic account), then it is unclear why we need a modal account of 
luck at all, especially when probabilistic accounts are more intuitive and 
easier to apply.  
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2 Lottery Propositions and the Modal Account of Luck 
In response to my line of criticism, Pritchard points to one instance of luck in 
particular which he claims can only be accounted for by a modal conception 
of luck. Suppose a subject has purchased a ticket to a fair lottery with long 
odds—fourteen million to one. The draw has been made but the subject has 
not heard the winning numbers and so has no idea whether her ticket is a 
winner or a loser. In one variation of this scenario, the subject knows the 
odds of winning this lottery and on this basis forms the (accidentally) true 
belief that her ticket is a loser. In a second variation, the subject does not 
know the odds but reads the winning numbers in a reliable newspaper and 
thereby forms the true belief that her ticket is a loser.19 Here, Pritchard’s 
argument for the modal account of luck goes as follows: 
 
(1) The first subject does not know that her ticket is a loser. 
(2) The first subject does not have knowledge because her belief is true 
as a matter of luck.20 
(3) A modal account of luck counts the first subject’s true belief as a 
matter of luck. 
(4) A probabilistic account of luck does not count the first subject’s true 
belief as a matter of luck. 
(5) Therefore, luck is a modal (rather than probabilistic) notion.21 
 
The soundness of this argument depends on premise (2). It depends on 
whether subject one’s true belief is a matter of luck, and I will show that it is 
not.  
 To see why it is not an instance of luck, we need to begin by 
separating questions about luck from questions about knowledge. The 
intuition we are supposed to have in this scenario is that the first subject does 
not possess knowledge whereas the second subject does. What makes our 
judgments about these two subjects puzzling, allegedly, is that 
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probabilistically speaking, it is extremely likely for the first subject to form the 
true belief that she has lost the lottery and yet we do not think she possesses 
knowledge. On the contrary, assuming that even reliable newspapers are 
subject to misprints, it is less likely, probabilistically speaking, for the second 
subject to form the true belief that she has lost the lottery, and yet we think 
she does possess knowledge. If our intuitions are correct, it would seem that 
knowledge is not merely “a straightforward function of the strength of one’s 
evidence, probabilistically conceived”.22 So far, so good.  
Now, we must note that our judgments about knowledge should not 
affect our judgments about luck. If a subject does not possess knowledge, it 
does not necessarily mean that the truth of her belief is a genuine matter of 
luck. Surely, our judgments about luck should be made independently of our 
judgments about knowledge. This point concerns a broader issue that is 
relevant to those who discuss luck in relation to other philosophical 
questions. Pritchard, for instance, undertook an analysis of luck with the aim 
of developing a theory of knowledge known as anti-luck epistemology. 
According to him, the first step in developing such a theory is to offer an 
account of luck; that is, a descriptively accurate, metaphysical account of the 
phenomenon of luck. Equipped with such an account, the next steps are to 
specify the sense in which luck is incompatible with knowledge, and to 
develop an anti-luck condition on knowledge that captures this specific 
incompatibility.23 
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If, like Pritchard, one’s aim is to offer a descriptively accurate account 
of luck before using it to better understand knowledge, then the first step of 
doing conceptual analysis on luck must be an isolated inquiry, independent of 
our preconceived understanding that some conditions might be incompatible 
with knowledge. This is to ensure that said conditions do not end up in our 
account of luck unless they are genuine defining features of luck. For 
example, suppose knowledge is incompatible with the truth of one’s belief 
being an accident. Whether the quality of [being an accident] is a feature of 
luck is a question that must be addressed independently of considerations 
relating to its incompatibility with knowledge. Otherwise, we risk assuming a 
specific notion of the phenomenon of which we are trying to give a 
descriptively accurate account. 
 With this in mind, we can turn to the issue of luck. Unlike the paradigm 
case of luck I discussed earlier—that of [winning a fair lottery with long 
odds]—here, the matter in question is [the truth of a subject’s belief] with 
respect to her ticket.24 Intuitively, we think [winning a fair lottery] is a genuine 
matter of luck, but do we really think that about [the truth of subject one’s 
belief]? Pritchard seems to think so, and some epistemologists might readily 
agree. But why should we think this? Obviously, the answer cannot be 
because her belief could have easily been false, or that her belief is false in a 
sufficient portion of relevantly nearby possible worlds. This response merely 
presupposes the modal account of luck that is under scrutiny. In order for 
Pritchard’s argument to be sound, what is meant by “luck” in premise (2) 
must reflect an ordinary or colloquial understanding of the term luck. This is 
because (our understanding of) the nature of luck is tied to how we would 
ordinarily use the concept. 
Here is the fallacy in Pritchard’s argument. On the one hand, the 
meaning of “luck” that is familiar to epistemologists is that some 
characteristics of the subject’s belief formation process is incompatible with 
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knowledge. On the other hand, the ordinary or colloquial meaning of “luck” is 
not necessarily equivalent to whatever characteristics that make a true belief 
incompatible with knowledge. In arguing for his modal account of luck, 
Pritchard equivocates on these two different meanings. The conclusion in (5) 
concerns an ordinary, colloquial notion of luck because Pritchard’s account is 
meant to be a descriptively accurate account of the phenomenon. But the 
notion of luck that is in play in premise (2) is not an ordinary, colloquial 
notion. There, “luck” is a stipulated term, which merely conforms to 
epistemologists’ rough understanding of the concept prior to any conceptual 
analysis. Subject one’s true belief is a matter of luck merely in the sense that 
her belief is true in some way that is incompatible with knowledge. Outside of 
some discussions in contemporary epistemology, we would not ordinarily 
describe subject one’s true belief as a matter of luck.25 For instance, consider 
this parallel example. 
Suppose I possess a big book of Edinburgh phone numbers. The book 
lists phone numbers from Edinburgh only, without any indication as to whom 
each number belongs. Suppose I randomly select a number from this book 
and try to determine whether it belongs to Pritchard. Given that this book 
contains hundreds of thousands of phone numbers, the likelihood that I just 
happen to have selected Pritchard’s number is probabilistically unlikely, 
though modally close. Based on the probability alone, I form the belief that I 
have not selected Pritchard’s number. If my belief turns out to be true, we 
would not say that my true belief is a matter of luck. For why would we say 
such a thing? What else should we expect? Given the odds, we should 
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expect my belief to be true.26 On the other hand, if my belief turns out to be 
false, that I have in fact selected Pritchard’s number, then we would say that 
my belief is a matter of (bad) luck. And it would be appropriate to say such a 
thing, given that it was extremely unlikely for my belief to be false. 
The same thing can be said about subject one’s belief in the lottery 
ticket scenario. Why should we say that her true belief is a matter of luck 
when that is exactly what we should expect?27 Pritchard’s methodology, one 
of taking ordinary ascriptions of luck to be good evidence for the 
phenomenon, can get us a descriptively accurate account of luck only when 
the ascription is in fact an ordinary or colloquial ascription. The lottery ticket 
scenario is a paradigmatic instance where the acquisition of a true belief is 
incompatible with knowledge, and it is appropriate for epistemologists to say 
that “subject one’s true belief is a matter of luck” if “luck” is used as a 
stipulated term. But we cannot take epistemologists’ use of “luck” as 
evidence for the nature of luck. At best, what we can say about subject one’s 
true belief is that reasonable people can disagree about whether it is an 
instance of luck. However, if subject one’s true belief is not an instance of 
luck, then what the lottery ticket scenario illustrates, contrary to Pritchard’s 
claim, is not that luck is a distinctively modal notion. What it illustrates is that 
the probabilistic account of luck gets us the right result here precisely 
because it does not count subject one’s true belief as a matter of luck.28 
 
3 What’s Wrong with Modal Conceptions of Risk 
Recently, modal theorists about luck have turned their attention to risk, and 
anti-luck theories of epistemology have turned into anti-risk epistemology. 
This transition is partly motivated by the suggestion that luck and risk are 
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essentially the same concept, except judgments about luck are made ex post 
while risk assessments are made ex ante.29 If this suggestion is sensible, it is 
sensible to the extent that the matter of luck in question involves some 
degree of risk. However, since matters of luck do not always involve risk—
e.g. finding money on the side of the road—at best, we can only get a partial 
understanding of luck from an account of risk.30 In the rest of this paper, I will 
show that a modal approach to risk assessment and reduction is either 
unnecessary or trivial. Before I explain why this is the case, I want to highlight 
a difficulty for modal theorists who think we can understand luck in terms of 
risk and vice versa. 
Recall that the modal condition on luck has two sub-conditions: sub-
conditionD and sub-conditionF. The modal account of risk, however, appears 
to include only sub-conditionD. According to Pritchard, there is a high risk that 
a potential negative event E will occur if E is modally close, and there is a low 
risk if E is modally far off.31 The notion of modal frequency is missing from 
this formulation of risk, where modal distance alone is meant to tell us 
whether or not E is risky. Earlier, I argued that the frequency condition is 
indispensable to a modal account of luck because the account would be 
over-inclusive without it. But if the frequency condition is not essential to a 
modal account of risk, then it is unclear how modal conceptions of luck and 
risk are related to each other. 
Modal theorists can either amend the modal condition on risk to 
include a sub-conditionF, or forfeit their claim that luck and risk are basically 
the same concept. The first option would make their account of risk 
vulnerable to the same criticism I levied against the modal account of luck—
i.e. their account would be parasitic on a probabilistic account of risk. The 
second option allows the modal account of risk to remain as it is, where 
degrees of risk are measured in terms of modal distances. I will explore the 
second option here since it deals with the modal account of risk as it has 
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been formulated by its proponents. As we will see, depending on the level of 
probabilistic risk involved, the modal approach to risk assessment and 
reduction is either unnecessary or trivial. 
 To begin, we can understand the modal account of risk by contrasting 
it with the familiar probabilistic way of thinking about risk. Typically, we 
understand and express degrees of risk in terms of our evidential probability. 
A potential unwanted event E carries a high risk if its probability is close to 1, 
and E carries a low risk if its probability is close to 0. For instance, the risk of 
being selected to meet some dreaded fate in a typical national lottery style 
lottery is very low, at roughly one in fourteen million. In contrast, the risk of 
losing a typical national lottery is very high, at roughly close to one. For 
modal theorists, the risk of E does not depend (solely) on its probability but 
also on its modal distance to the actual world.32 E is a high risk event if it is 
modally close, and it is a low risk event if it is modally far off. Accordingly, all 
lottery events are high risk events for modal theorists since not much has to 
change about the actual world in order for a winner to become a loser and 
vice versa. 
 In many cases, probabilistic likelihood will match modal distance, but 
probability and modality can come apart. Here are the possibilities:  
 
(1) E is probabilistically unlikely but modally close (e.g. being selected 
in a national lottery) 
(2) E is probabilistically unlikely and modally far off33 
(3) E is probabilistically likely and modally close (e.g. not being 
selected in a national lottery) 
(4) E is probabilistically likely but modally far off 
 
I will discuss scenarios (1) and (2) before turning to (3) and (4). 
 If we are following probability, we will think that the risk of E is 
extremely low in both (1) and (2). Modal theorists, on the other hand, claim 
that the risk in (1) is much higher because the event is modally close and, in 
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that sense, could easily occur. The probability of E can be identical across (1) 
and (2), but modal theorists would still believe we should be more worried 
about scenario (1).34 Note that modal theorists are advancing two theses 
here. First, there is a descriptive thesis regarding our judgements about risk. 
Here, modal theorists believe we judge (1) to be more risky than (2), and that 
generally speaking, our judgements about risk tend to track counterfactual 
closeness rather than probability.35 Second, there is a normative thesis about 
what we should do. Modal theorists tell us we should be significantly more 
concerned about (1) than about (2), and that we should add safeguards to (1) 
in order to make E modally far off. 
For the purpose of this paper, I will assume that the descriptive thesis 
is true. The problem I want to raise for modal theorists concerns their 
normative thesis. In scenario (1), where the probabilistic risk is low, it is 
unnecessary for us to make E modally far off. There is no need for us to 
make (1) look more like (2) because it is unclear why we should be 
concerned with the modal distance of a risk event. Probability expresses the 
frequency with which we can expect E to occur. And if E is sufficiently 
infrequent, why should we care that E is modally close? For modal theorists, 
a modally close event is one that could easily occur. But for those who are 
inclined to follow probability, the counterfactual language in the modal 
account of risk in unpersuasive. After all, in a perfect world, if we conduct the 
lottery fourteen million times, only one of those fourteen million draws will 
result in an explosion. 
In response to this point, modal theorists will often refer back to their 
descriptive claim and reiterate the point that people do in fact care about 
counterfactual closeness in their judgements about risk. But given that the 
descriptive claim is simply about people’s perception of risk, it cannot lend 
any support to the normative thesis. The mere fact that we tend to follow 
modality in our judgements about risk does not show that we should follow 
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modality.36 In fact, what is interesting about the descriptive thesis is precisely 
the suggestion that people tend to ignore probability, a framework which we 
think is efficacious and should be followed. Until modal theorists offer a better 
explanation for why we should care about counterfactual closeness in our 
risk assessments, we have no reason to think that scenario (1) is more risky 
than scenario (2). And until modal theorists explain why (1) is more risky than 
(2), it is unnecessary to try to make (1) look more like (2), especially when 
the probability of E is already very low.  
We can now consider scenarios (3) and (4), where the initial risk is 
high probabilistically speaking. 
 
(3) E is probabilistically likely and modally close (e.g. not being 
selected in a national lottery) 
(4) E is probabilistically likely and modally far off.37 
 
Here, probability theorists and modal theorists would agree that the 
level of risk is high in both (3) and (4). Modal theorists may argue that we 
should be concerned with the modal distance of a risk event, but they do not 
argue we should therefore disregard probability.38 If the probability of E is 
identical across (3) and (4), a modal theorist would argue that (4) is less risky 
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than (3), but given that E is probabilistically likely, we would still want to 
reduce the probabilistic risk involved in both (3) and (4).  
 To reduce the risk in (3) and (4), probability theorists would implement 
safeguards to reduce the probability of E. Presumably, modal theorists would 
agree with this, except they would also implement safeguards to make E 
modally far off. As I mentioned earlier, modal closeness will often match 
probabilistic likelihood so that when we decrease the modal risk of E, we also 
decrease its probabilistic likelihood. However, modal risk and probabilistic 
risk may go in different directions. To see why the modal approach to risk 
reduction is trivial, consider the following options:  
 
(a) We can increase modal risk and decrease probabilistic risk. 
(b) We can decrease modal risk and increase probabilistic risk. 
(c) We can decrease modal risk and decrease probabilistic risk. 
 
It might look as if we ought to favour option (c) since it decreases both modal 
and probabilistic risks. But which option we implement should surely depend 
on the extent to which probabilistic risk can be reduced. 
Suppose the initial probability of E is 0.7, and suppose that options (a), 
(b), and (c) will bring the probability of E to 0.5, 0.9, and 0.1 respectively. 
Under option (b), we would implement a number of safeguards, all of which 
would have to fail in order for E to occur, but the probability of failure is quite 
high. Surely, this would offer us no comfort. Between options (a) and (c), it 
seems quite clear that we should favour (c). Of course, option (a) would 
involve implementing something like a lottery-style safeguard, where E would 
only occur if a certain set of numbers came up in the national lottery. This 
makes E a very close possibility. But surely this has nothing to do with why 
we would favour option (c). We would go with (c) because it is more effective 
at reducing probabilistic risk than (a), regardless of its effect on modal risk. If 
we modified option (a) so that it now reduced the probability of E to 0.0001, 
then we ought to favour (a), even if it means implementing a lottery style 
system. In situations where the initial (probabilistic) risk is high, the modal 
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approach to risk reduction is trivial because our decisions are ultimately 
guided by probability rather than the modal distance of a risk event.39 
 This raises a question for modal theorists. They believe that the modal 
approach to risk assessment and reduction should supplement the 
probabilistic conception of risk, but how is this to be done in practice? 40 
Counterfactual reasoning certainly plays a key role in our judgments and 
deliberations, but it rarely plays a decisive role. Modal theorists have argued 
that if the probability of a risk event is identical across two scenarios, then the 
notion of modal closeness is able to determine which scenario poses a 
greater risk. Their approach seems to get the deliberative process 
backwards.41 In practice, we often use counterfactual reasoning to identify 
several options—i.e. we think about what could happen if we did such and 
such. We think about different preventive measures that can be adopted in 
order to create a situation where the risk event would not easily occur. 
However, aside from policy considerations, whether we choose to adopt any 
of these measures ultimately depends (and should depend) on whether the 
measure is effective at reducing the probability of the risk event. 
Counterfactual thinking might help us identify possible measures to adopt, 
but modal considerations should not be the final arbiter when it comes to 
adopting any such measures. 
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Luck and Culpability 
 
In the previous chapter, I offered a detailed discussion of what luck is not. It 
is not a modal concept, which we can understand with reference to close 
possible worlds. Although I have hinted that luck may be a probabilistic 
notion, I will not try to offer a positive view either in this thesis or elsewhere. 
As I suggested earlier, I am skeptical about the extent to which a positive 
account of luck can inform various problems in philosophy.1 And given the 
amount of discussion that has already been had on this topic, it is not clear to 
me that much more need to be said about it. In this chapter (and the rest of 
this thesis), I will proceed on the basis that “luck” is a stipulated term in legal 
philosophy.2 And that, when it comes to the problem of outcome luck, we are 
interested in luck to the extent that it connotes lack of control since the legal 
philosophical problem concerns the alleged incompatibility between liability 
and lack of control. 
 In this chapter, I explore the problem of outcome luck against a point 
which arose in the previous chapter. From the discussion on lottery cases, 
we see that luck is not a binary concept. Not only can outcomes be matters 
of luck, but outcomes can be matters of luck to varying degrees. Traditionally, 
the problem of outcome luck concerns the relevance of outcomes for 
liability.3 If outcomes are subject to luck, then one way to insulate the criminal 
law from luck is to ground liability solely in terms of an agent’s culpability or 
fault. But once we recognize degrees of luck, we will see that luck can also 
come from the level of culpability. I do not mean to point out that there is luck 
with respect to the choices that an agent makes (although our choices, much 
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like the consequences of our choices, are to some extent also a matter of 
luck).4 What I mean by luck at the level of culpability is that the degree to 
which an outcome is a matter of luck can be determined by factors that are 
relevant to an agent’s culpability. And the topic of this chapter is to explore 
the extent to which culpability can be sensitive to degrees of risk.  
 I begin in section 1 by introducing the problem of outcome luck in 
criminal law and by explaining the sense in which liability is thought to be 
incompatible with lack of control. Then in section 2, I offer some examples to 
show how outcomes can be matters of luck to varying degrees and identify 
the factors that affect degrees of luck. As we will see, degrees of outcome 
luck are dependent on the degree of risk we impose on others, which is 
something that speaks to our culpability. So in addition to making outcomes 
irrelevant for liability, we can further insulate criminal law from luck by making 
culpability sensitive to degrees of risk. Alexander and Ferzan have argued for 
a theory of culpability which does just this. On their view, culpability is in part 
a function of the level of risk an agent (knowingly) imposes on others. In 
section 3, I will show that this view of culpability is attractive for being 
sensitive to luck, especially in the context of reckless actions. However, this 
view is also problematic because, as I will argue, when it comes to 
purposeful actions, degrees of risk are irrelevant for culpability. The 
implications of what I have to say here is that, in the context of purposeful 
actions, it is, in one sense, acceptable for the criminal law to admit some 
degrees of luck. I will say more about this in section 4. 
 
1 Outcome Luck and Control 
The problem of outcome luck arises out of a conflict between two 
independently plausible principles.5 On the one hand, we find great intuitive 
appeal in the Control Principle, which roughly is the idea that agents should 
be responsible only for what is appropriately within their control. On the other 
hand, we also appear to accept the long-standing legal tradition where 
                                                     
4
 See Ohana (2007). 
5
 Greco (1995); Nagel (1979).  
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criminal liability and punishment are graded in proportion to the actual 
amount of harm caused, which is never wholly within anyone’s control.6 
Suppose D shoots at V intending to kill her. D does everything he 
believes necessary to kill V—e.g. positioning himself for a clear shot at V; 
taking aim at her; pulling the trigger, etc. Even if D manages to do everything 
he believes is necessary to kill V, his success in killing V still depends on 
various events that are beyond his control. A stray bird may fly in front of V 
and block the bullet; V may be wearing a bulletproof vest; V may move 
suddenly; D’s shot may miss. Should V survive D’s murderous attempt, this 
fact is likely, all else being equal, to result in a lesser sentence for D than if V 
had not survived. However, why should V’s survival, which is not to D’s 
credit, be a ground for imposing a lesser punishment on D? He intended to 
kill V and tried to kill her by shooting at her; that he failed to accomplish what 
he intended to do is external to him and does not detract from his culpability. 
Those who deny that outcomes should matter for criminal liability 
argue that liability should be determined by an agent’s culpability only. And 
culpability, in turn, should only be determined by what is (and can be) within 
an agent’s control.7 These theorists deny that we are able to exercise control 
over the outcomes of our actions, and argue that to allow outcomes to 
influence our liability is to subject criminal liability and punishment to “luck”.8 
Instead, culpability and liability should be based on matters that are within an 
agent’s control, such as his choice to act in a certain way.  
There is plenty of room for disagreement among legal theorists about 
whether we can exercise control over the outcomes of our actions (or 
anything at all).9 Some would argue, for instance, that if I pick up my glass of 
water, intending to drink from it and I do drink from it, then surely I have 
control over the outcome of my action, which is to drink water from my glass. 
We may not have control over all of the outcomes of our actions, but that 
does not mean we cannot have control over some outcomes of our actions.  
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 One of the things we need to clarify within this debate is the kind of 
control that is required for legal responsibility, and what different theorists 
mean when they talk about lack of control. For starters, we can differentiate 
between restricted control and unrestricted control. Restricted control is 
satisfied if the agent has the ability to bring about an event and to prevent its 
occurrence.10 For instance, at this moment, I have the ability to either get up 
or remain seated. If asked, I can demonstrate my control over my bodily 
movements by getting up (if I am asked to get up) or remaining seated (if I 
am asked to remain seated). I enjoy control over this matter, but the kind of 
control I enjoy is, in a sense, restricted. My control over getting up or 
remaining seated is restricted by numerous other events which I cannot 
control. I cannot control, for instance, whether I will be asked to demonstrate 
my ability to get up or remain seated, which action(s) I will be asked to 
demonstrate, or whether I would be inclined to cooperate with the 
demonstration. Furthermore, suppose the postman knocked on my door at 
this moment. I would, out of habit, decide to get up and answer the door. And 
if a fire was breaking out, I would, quite sensibly, get up to try to put out the 
fire. These events, which would make me get up from my seat, are all 
beyond my control. 
 Here, we can begin to see the difference between restricted and 
unrestricted control. An agent has unrestricted control over an event E when 
he is able to exercise restricted control over both E as well as all other events 
on which E’s occurrence or non-occurrence is contingent.11 In the example I 
just described, I may have restricted control over the act of getting up or 
remaining seated, but I do not have unrestricted control over either event 
since I do not have restricted control over all other events on which these two 
events are dependent—e.g. which action I will be asked to demonstrate, the 
absence of the postman, fire not breaking out in my office, etc. 
 Among those who deny that we have control over the outcomes of our 
actions, some deny that we have unrestricted control.12 They argue that not 
                                                     
10
 See Zimmerman (1987). 
11
 Moore (2009, 20-33); Zimmerman (1987). 
12
 See Levy (2011). 
45 
 
only do we lack unrestricted control over the outcomes of our actions, but we 
also lack unrestricted control in everything we do. We do not have restricted 
control over all the events that determine the way our actions turn out, nor do 
we have restricted control over all the events that determine the choices that 
we make. For anyone who argues that outcomes are irrelevant for liability 
because we lack unrestricted control over outcomes, they must explain why 
legal responsibility should require this kind of control. If criminal responsibility 
requires unrestricted control, then not only can we not be responsible for the 
outcomes of our actions, but we can never be responsible for our choices 
either. Furthermore, we can never be responsible for anything since our 
choices, characters, and dispositions are always beyond our unrestricted 
control.13 
 Legal theorists seem to agree that this notion of control is too stringent 
for legal responsibility. For instance, suppose D exercises restricted control 
over his decision to shoot V, as well as numerous other events on which the 
outcome of his shot depends. That is, D has positioned himself to get a clear 
view of V; he has practiced the shot many times in order to maximize his 
chances of success; he has cleared the area in which he plans to shoot V of 
any birds that might interfere with his shot. Despite all this, D still lacks 
restricted control over whether or not V is wearing a bullet proof vest. If it 
turns out that V is not wearing a bullet proof vest and D successfully kills V, it 
is rather implausible to hold that D lacks control over V’s death.14 
 This leads us to a further differentiation among those who take legal 
responsibility to require restricted control. What I have just said reflects the 
views of theorists like Duff and Moore, who would argue that D had control 
over V’s death; that we can have some (e.g. restricted) control over the 
outcomes of our actions. Others like Alexander and Ferzan take a position 
that I mentioned earlier, which is that D had (restricted) control over his 
choice to kill V, but that D does not have control over V’s death. So for 
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Alexander and Ferzan, we have restricted control over our choices but not 
the outcomes of those choices.15 
 This disagreement stems from the kinds of things over which we can 
exercise restricted control. For Moore, when we exercise control over our 
choices, we also control the outcomes of our chosen actions (assuming that 
we chose to bring about those outcomes).16 For instance, I exercise 
restricted control over where to work this afternoon. I have the ability to work 
from my office, and I have the ability to work elsewhere. I exercise restricted 
control over my choice to work from my office and, in acting on that choice, I 
also exercise restricted control over what I choose to do—i.e. that I am 
working from my office this afternoon.17 In contrast, Alexander and Ferzan 
endorse a reason responsiveness view, which holds that we can only 
exercise (restricted) control over things that are capable of responding to our 
reasons. It is our choices, and only our choices, which in virtue of being 
reason responsive, that are within our control. The consequences of our 
choices cannot be within our control since they are not the sort of things that 
can be reason responsive.18  
 When it comes to outcome luck, whether an outcome is a matter of 
luck depends on the kind of control that we are talking about. If we are talking 
about unrestricted control, then outcomes are always a matter of luck since 
we never have unrestricted control over anything.19 It is a matter of luck 
whether D kills V, just as it is a matter of luck whether D chooses to kill V, just 
as it is a matter of luck what any of us chooses or does.20 But if we are 
talking about restricted control, then outcomes may or may not be a matter of 
luck depending on the kind of things that we think can be within our restricted 
control. For theorists like Duff and Moore, some outcomes may be matters of 
luck while others may not. But for those like Alexander and Ferzan, outcomes 
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are always a matter of luck since they are not the sort of things that can be 
within our control.21 
 Without taking a stance on whether or not we have restricted control 
over the outcomes of our actions, we can say with respect to both camps that 
the way we have been talking about outcome luck is incomplete.22 In addition 
to talking about whether an outcome is a matter of luck, we can often talk 
about the degree to which an outcome is a matter of luck. For those like 
Alexander and Ferzan, who argue that outcomes are always a matter of luck, 
we can always ask about the degree of luck that is inherent in a particular 
outcome. In the next section, I will elaborate on this point and show how 
degrees of luck can come from the level of culpability. As we will see, the 
degree to which an outcome is a matter of luck is the degree to which it is 
beyond the agent’s control. From this, we will see that degrees of luck are 
tied to the degree of risk an agent imposes through his action.  
 
2 Luck as Lack of (Degrees of) Control 
I mentioned in the introduction that, from this chapter onwards, when we talk 
about outcome luck in the law, I will simply take “luck” to mean lack of 
control. One of the supposed disadvantages of talking about luck only in 
terms of lack of control is that we would not be able to capture degrees of 
luck.23 Once again, consider the example of winning a fair lottery with long 
odds. Typically, we are able choose whether we want to participate in any 
given lottery, but participants of a lottery lack control over the outcome of the 
draw; they lack control over whether they win or lose the lottery.24 If luck is 
merely the absence of control, then both winning and not winning the lottery 
would, counterintuitively, be a matter of luck since both outcomes are beyond 
the agent’s control. But even if we accept that both winning and losing are 
matters of luck, we must still admit that there is a higher degree of luck 
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involved in winning than there is in losing, something that the notion of 
control is unable to capture. 
 Those who defend chanciness conceptions of luck can easily capture 
degrees of luck, for instance, by considering the ex-ante probability of the 
matter of luck in question. So the degree to which an event is a matter of luck 
would depend on the ex-ante likelihood of that event. It is more of a matter of 
luck to win the lottery than it is to lose the lottery given that the chances of 
winning are much lower than that of losing. We can certainly account for 
degrees of luck through probability, but surely we can account for the 
probability of some events through the level of control we have over those 
events. In the lottery case, suppose we have control over the number of 
tickets that we can purchase (including the means to purchase them). The 
more tickets we purchase the higher chances we have of winning. There is 
less luck involved if I win the lottery after having purchased more than half 
the tickets, compared to if I had only purchased one of thousands of tickets.  
 Agents can exercise varying degrees of control when they engage in 
the kind of conducts that concern the criminal law. This is true even if we 
suppose, in agreement with Alexander and Ferzan, that whatever an agent 
sets out to do—whether he intends to cause harm or whether he risks harm 
through recklessness—the outcome of his action is always beyond his 
control. Agents may not have complete control over the outcomes of their 
actions, but they do exercise some control over what they choose to do, 
which affects the degree to which the outcome is a matter of luck. I will 
illustrate this point in relation to reckless actions first, before moving on to 
purposeful actions.  
 Consider two reckless agents—S and R—both of whom decide to 
drive home after having enjoyed a few too many drinks. Each agent is aware 
of the fact that his blood alcohol level is above the prescribed legal limit and 
that he should not operate a motor vehicle. S and R each have two routes 
available to them. They can take a well-populated route through the city 
centre or take a much quieter detour. Driver R, who is prone to taking risks, 
decides to take the populated route and Driver S, who is typically a safe 
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driver, decides to take the quiet detour. It is beyond each agent’s control 
whether he encounters other drivers or pedestrians on his chosen route, but 
it is within each agent’s (restricted) control which route he chooses to take 
and when he chooses to take it. 
In choosing to take the quite route, Driver S runs a lower risk of 
encountering anyone on his drive home, whereas Driver R runs a higher risk 
by going through the city centre.25 We could suppose, in agreement with 
Alexander and Ferzan, that the drivers lack control over the presence of 
other drivers and pedestrians on the road, and thus lack control over whether 
or not they will get into an accident. But these drivers surely exercise some 
control over the likelihood that they will encounters someone on the drive 
home in virtue of the route they decide to take. This means that even if the 
drivers lack control over the outcomes of their actions, they do not lack 
control over the likelihood that a particular outcome will occur.  
 Now suppose that Drivers S and R meet the same fate; either they 
both make it home safely or they both get into an accident and cause serious 
injury or death to other drivers or pedestrians. We could accept that, for each 
driver, either outcome would be a matter of luck, but surely it would be more 
of a matter of bad luck for Driver S to get into an accident than it is for Driver 
R, and surely it would be more of a matter of good luck for Driver R to make it 
home safely than it is for Driver S.26 Again, the probability of getting into an 
accident is higher for Driver R than it is for Driver S, so it is more of a matter 
of luck when S gets into an accident compared to R. Conversely, the 
probability of making it home safely is higher for Driver S than it is for Driver 
R, so it is more of a matter of luck for R to get home safely compared to S. 
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 There is disagreement among legal theorists regarding the kind of risk—i.e. objective or 
subjective risk—that should ground culpability. Subjective risk refers to the agent’s 
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What accounts for differences in degrees of luck has to do with 
differences in the probability of a particular outcome for a particular driver—
i.e. the level of risk a driver imposes on others.27 And agents can exercise 
some degree of control over the level of risk they impose through their 
actions. So even if we think that outcomes are wholly beyond our control, the 
level of risk we unleash (and thus the likelihood of bringing about a particular 
outcome) is not wholly beyond our control. This is true in the context of 
reckless actions when agents have some control over the means with which 
they carry out a potentially harmful conduct, such as choosing which route to 
take when driving intoxicated. The same is also true in the context of 
purposeful actions.  
 Consider a pair of shooters—Competent Shooter and Incompetent 
Shooter—both of whom decide to commit murder by shooting at their 
respective victims from atop abandoned buildings. Competent Shooter is an 
Olympic shooting champion and Incompetent Shooter is someone who has 
never fired a fun before. Upon seeing their victims, both shooters take aim 
and pull the trigger. Nothing gets in their way; their victims stand still; the 
agents execute their shots. Alexander and Ferzan would argue that, 
whatever the outcome may be for each agent, that outcome is beyond the 
agent’s control and thus a matter of luck. But like the case of the reckless 
drivers, surely the same outcome is not equally a matter of luck for both 
shooters.  
 Presumably, compared to Incompetent Shooter, Competent Shooter 
has greater control over his shot in virtue of his abilities as a skilled 
marksman. Competent Shooter is able to impose (purposely) a higher risk on 
his victim than what Incompetent Shooter is able to do.28 If both shooters 
succeed, surely success is more of a matter of luck for Incompetent Shooter 
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than it is for Competent Shooter. The latter has greater control over his shot, 
and thus greater control over the outcome of his attempt. There is a higher 
chance of success for Competent Shooter compared to Incompetent 
Shooter. Conversely, if both shooters fail, surely failure is more of a matter of 
luck for Competent Shooter. Given his chances of success, it was more likely 
than not that he would succeed. 
 Again, even if both Shooters lack control over the outcomes of their 
attempts, they do have some control over the level of risk they impose on 
their respective victims, and thus some control over the probability that the 
intended outcome would occur. The degree to which an outcome is a matter 
of luck for a particular shooter, just as it is for a reckless driver, depends on 
the level of risk his action imposes on others, which is tied to the level of 
control that he has over his actions. I mentioned earlier that the level of risk 
an agent imposes is something that speaks to his culpability. So factors that 
affect culpability can affect the degree to which an outcome is a matter of 
luck. We might then think that in order to insulate criminal liability from luck, 
culpability needs to be sensitive to varying degrees of risk.  
 This is a departure from the way that the problem of outcome luck has 
typically been framed in the legal philosophical debate. For one thing, we do 
not typically think that there is a connection between luck and culpability. For 
another, in our discussion about outcome luck, we explicitly stipulate that the 
culpability of two agents is identical in order to examine the relevance of 
outcomes for liability. In the next section, I discuss the issue of culpability in 
light of what I have just said about luck, risk, and control. The main question 
has to do with whether and when degrees of risk are relevant to culpability. I 
will begin by discussing culpability for reckless actions, and why degree of 
risk is thought to matter for recklessness, before moving on to discuss 
culpability for purposeful actions.  
 
3 Risk and Culpability 
For offences that are committed recklessly, it is easy to appreciate why 




his action. Consider again the example of the two reckless drivers from 
earlier. All else being equal, we think badly of Driver S, who imposes an 
unjustifiable risk on others by driving drunk, but we think even worse of Driver 
R, who imposes an even greater risk on others by driving drunk on a 
populated route. Similarly, we think badly of a reckless driver who drives 
twenty kilometres over the speed limit, but all else being equal, we would 
think even worse of another reckless driver who drives forty kilometres over 
the speed limit. 
While both drivers are at fault for driving over the prescribed speed 
limit, the one who drives forty kilometres over the speed limit is more at fault 
than the driver who drives twenty kilometres over the speed limit. And while 
Driver R and Driver S are both at fault for driving while intoxicated, Driver R is 
more at fault than Driver S because R’s conduct exposes more people to the 
dangers of drunk driving. The actions of both S and R display insufficient 
concern toward others in virtue of the unjustifiable risks that their actions 
create.29 All else being equal, a reckless action that unleashes a greater risk 
on others displays a greater lack of concern for their interests and wellbeing 
than a reckless action that unleashes a lesser risk. 
 Matters are different in cases of purposeful actions, or so I argue, 
where an agent acts with an intention to cause harm. Consider the pair of 
shooters from earlier: Competent Shooter (who is an Olympic shooting 
champion) and Incompetent Shooter (who has never used a gun prior to his 
attempt). Competent Shooter skilfully aims at his victim and, in doing so, 
imposes a very high risk on his victim’s life. Incompetent Shooter clumsily 
aims at his victim and, in doing so, imposes a low risk on his victim’s life. 
Suppose that each shooter knows, before he fires the shot, the level of risk 
he is about to impose on his victim. We think badly of Competent Shooter for 
acting on his intention to commit murder, but do we not think just as badly of 
Incompetent Shooter for acting on the same intention? Both shooters are at 
fault for acting on their intention to commit murder, but is Competent Shooter 
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really more at fault than Incompetent Shooter for imposing a higher level of 
risk on his victim? 
  Alexander and Ferzan would argue that Competent Shooter is more 
culpable than Incompetent Shooter in virtue of the risks they impose on their 
victims. Before I get to their argument, it would be useful to clarify the issue 
here. For reckless actions, it is intuitively plausible that an agent’s culpability 
is sensitive to the level of risk he imposes on others. But for purposeful 
actions, it is not so intuitive that the level of risk an agent imposes matters for 
judgments about the agent’s level of fault.30 The issue here is that either the 
intuitive view is mistaken (and that culpability for both reckless and 
purposeful actions are sensitive to risk), or there is something significant 
about purposeful actions that makes risk irrelevant to culpability. In the rest of 
this section, I argue that risk is irrelevant to the culpability of purposeful 
actions because culpability here has to do solely with the agent’s reasons for 
action, rather than degrees of risk imposed. To see why this might be the 
case, we can begin by considering arguments for the opposing view—i.e. 
that culpability for any offence is sensitive to degrees of risk.  
 On Alexander and Ferzan’s theory of culpability, they take the four 
culpable mental states in the Model Penal Code—i.e. purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence—and collapse them into one mental state, 
namely recklessness.31 Recklessness (and culpability) in turn is a 
straightforward function of two factors: the level of risk an agent believes he 
imposes on others and his reasons for imposing that risk. A reckless agent 
who imposes a high risk might be less culpable than another reckless agent 
who imposes a low risk if the former agent’s reasons for imposing that risk 
are better (e.g. more justifiable) than the latter’s. The same goes for agents 
who commit crimes purposely since, on Alexander and Ferzan’s view, 
purpose is merely a form of recklessness. Specifically, they argue that 
purpose is a special form of recklessness where the agent’s reasons for 
imposing risks on others are presumptively unjustifiable.32 An agent who 
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purposely imposes a certain level of risk on others is presumptively more 
culpable than a reckless agent who imposes the same level of risk because 
the former acts on reasons that are presumptively worse than the latter’s. 
However, if two agents act on identical reasons then culpability is graded 
according to the level of risk they each impose on others.  
 An important aspect of Alexander and Ferzan’s theory, which helps to 
explain why they believe culpability is sensitive to degrees of risk imposed for 
any culpable action, is their notion that culpability is determined by the risk(s) 
an agent believes he imposes and his reasons for imposing that particular 
level of risk. Returning to our pair of shooters from earlier, if Competent 
Shooter and Incompetent Shooter attempt to commit murder for identical 
reasons, then according to Alexander and Ferzan, Competent Shooter is 
more culpable than Incompetent Shooter since the former imposes a greater 
risk than the latter.33 Assuming that both shooters know the level of risk they 
impose on their victims, Alexander and Ferzan would argue that Competent 
Shooter is more culpable because he chose to impose a higher degree of 
risk, and Incompetent Shooter is less culpable because he chose to impose a 
lower degree of risk. They argue that Incompetent Shooter could have 
imposed a higher risk, for example, by shooting his victim up-close, or by 
taking shooting lessons before attempting to commit murder. For Alexander 
and Ferzan, the fact that Incompetent Shooter did not choose (but 
presumably could have chosen) a means that could increase his chance of 
success is a factor that affects his culpability, even if only minutely.34 
 Here is the problem with their view of culpability for purposeful actions. 
The fact that a purposeful actor could have imposed (but did not actually 
impose) a greater/lesser risk than the one he actually imposed is irrelevant to 
his culpability.35 For example, suppose I intend to damage your delicate 
vase. I can throw the vase to you from across the room, believing there is a 




 Ibid., 38-9.  
35
 Note that if the purposeful actor chose to shoot his victim from afar (thus giving her a 
higher chance of survival) rather than from up-close because he wants her to survive, then 
there are questions about half-hearted attempts, and whether they are less culpable than 
whole-hearted attempts. This point is not relevant here though, where I stipulate that the 
purposeful actors are wholeheartedly committed to their intended course of action.  
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good chance you will not be able to catch it in time, or I can simply throw the 
vase on the floor, believing it will shatter upon hitting the floor. I impose a 
higher risk on your vase by throwing it on the floor since there is a small but 
significant chance that you will catch it if I were to throw it to you. However, if 
I try to damage the vase by throwing it to you, still believing and hoping that 
you will not catch it in time, then the fact that I could have thrown the vase on 
the floor, thus almost guaranteeing that I would damage your vase, should be 
irrelevant to my culpability. In order to see why this might be the case, it will 
be useful to discuss culpability for reckless actions first, and to explain why 
culpability is sensitive to risk in such cases.  
 Reckless actions create substantial and unjustifiable risks to protected 
interests. Those who act recklessly are culpable because they fail to respond 
to the right kind of reasons; that is, they have reasons against imposing 
substantial risks on others and they are at fault for disregarding those 
reasons.36 In the case of Driver S (who takes the quiet detour) and Driver R 
(who takes a populated route), neither driver intends to cause harm to other 
people. Their purpose is to drive home, though they realize that by choosing 
to drive in their intoxicated states, they create a substantial risk to other 
drivers and pedestrians on the road. They have reasons not to drive, which 
include the risks they would impose on others by driving drunk. They 
undoubtedly have other reasons for driving home, such as not wanting to 
take a taxi or not wanting to leave their cars behind. However, should they 
choose to drive, these reasons do not justify or excuse their actions, and they 
would be at fault for not responding to the reasons they have against driving 
drunk. 
 Drivers S and R, like any other agent who acts recklessly, can 
minimize the risk they create despite the fact that their actions impose some 
substantial and unjustifiable risk on others. There is room, within reckless 
actions, for agents to act with greater caution even if such agents choose to 
act in ways that would impose unjustifiable risks on others.37 And when 
reckless agents fail to minimize the risk their actions create, their culpability 
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increases in accordance with the level of risk they impose on others. For 
instance, it is possible for Drivers S and R to drive home drunk and, at the 
same time, do it cautiously. Each driver can try to minimize the risk his action 
creates by avoiding well-populated routes and by opting for quiet routes 
instead. Should a driver choose to take the least populated route, his choice 
would be compatible with the successful pursuit of his aim, which is to drive 
home safely. Given that his aim does not include harming others, there would 
be no inconsistencies within his action should he choose to take the least 
populated route. In fact, there are good reasons for the drivers to opt for quiet 
routes even if they disregard any reasons against drunk driving; that is, 
taking a quiet route would decrease the number of pedestrians and other 
drivers they would encounter on the road, thereby decreasing their chances 
of being involved in an accident with other drivers and pedestrians.  
Driver R, who decides to take the well-populated route, fails to 
respond to the right reasons more often than Driver S, who decides to take 
the quiet route. Driver S’s action reflects a disregard for reasons against 
drunk driving, but it appears to respond to other reasons that are relevant to 
him. Driver R’s action likewise reflects a disregard for reasons against drunk 
driving, but it further reflects a disregard for reasons he has for taking care 
even though he decides to drive drunk. The differences in the risks these 
drivers impose are relevant to their culpability because each driver could 
have imposed a different risk, and whether or not they do impose a different 
risk speaks to the set(s) of reasons their actions are responding to. Driver R 
is more culpable than Driver S because the former’s action reflects a greater 
lack of concern for others and a greater disregard for the range of reasons he 
should respond to.38 
 In reckless actions, Alexander and Ferzan’s formula for culpability 
seems to capture the right idea; that an agent’s culpability depends on his 
imposition of this level of risk for these reasons. Matters are different, 
                                                     
38
 Even if there are no quiet routes available to driver R such that he must take a well-
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however, when we turn to purposeful actions where an agent’s aim is to bring 
about a prohibited harm. Like reckless actions, purposeful criminal actions 
(typically)39 impose substantial and unjustifiable risks on protected interests. 
However, those who try to cause harm are not at fault for failing to respond to 
the right reasons, but are rather at fault for acting on the wrong reasons.40 
Those who commit crimes purposely are at fault because they are acting on 
reasons which they should not follow.41 Consider again the example of 
Competent Shooter and Incompetent Shooter. Their purpose is to kill their 
respective victims, and each agent attempts to commit murder by shooting at 
his victim from atop an abandoned building. Undoubtedly, they have reasons 
for their actions—e.g. they hate their victims and want them dead—but those 
are not the kind of reasons that the agents should follow and act on. 
 Unlike those who commit crimes recklessly, the pair of shooters (as 
well as any other agent who tries to cause harm purposely) cannot minimize 
the risk their actions create.42 This is not to say that the shooters lack the 
capacity to minimize the risk they unleash, since they can purposefully take a 
bad shot or refrain from shooting altogether. It is rather that, if the shooters 
are trying to kill their victims, then it is not logically possible for them to try to 
minimize the risk they unleash on their victims. There is no room within 
purposeful actions for agents to act with greater caution if they intend to 
cause some particular harm.43 When an attacker tries to minimize the risk his 
action imposes on his intended victim(s), it is questionable whether he is 
wholeheartedly committed to his attack. His culpability may decrease if he is 
not wholeheartedly committed. But if he is committed to his attack, then 
taking steps to minimize the risk his action imposes on an intended victim is 
incompatible with his action as an attack. 
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 The pair of shooters cannot pursue their intended aim, which is to kill 
their respective victims, by trying to fire shots that would kill their victim on 
the one hand, and by trying to fire in such a way that would minimize the risk 
they create for their victims on the other hand. An attacker, insofar as he 
aims to inflict harm, cannot carry out an attack that deliberately tries to 
minimize the level of risk involved.44 An agent who attacks property cannot 
try to minimize the risk of damage to property by deliberately starting a fire 
with insufficient fuel; and an agent who attacks the physical wellbeing of 
another person cannot try to minimize the risk of wounding by deliberately 
throwing a light punch. 
 Alexander and Ferzan would disagree with what I have said about 
purposeful actions thus far. Presumably, agents can choose to execute their 
attacks in different ways, all of which would create different levels of risks, 
and an agent can choose to execute his attack in a way that creates a very 
low risk. For Alexander and Ferzan, should an agent choose a low risk 
means of carrying out an attack, this choice should be relevant to his 
culpability. In the case of the shooters, Competent Shooter’s attempt is likely 
to succeed since he is a very skilled and his shot will most likely hit and kill 
his victim. Incompetent Shooter’s chances of success, on the other hand, are 
much lower. Instead of trying to shoot his victim from afar, Incompetent 
Shooter can approach his victim and try to shoot him from up-close, which 
would significantly increase his chances of success. Incompetent Shooter 
might have a variety of reasons against choosing this alternative. He might 
be a coward and would rather make his attempt from far away; he fears 
being caught by the victim’s bodyguards; he fears he might have a change of 
heart from up close.45 Although these reasons may figure in Incompetent 
Shooter’s decision to try to shoot his victim from afar—i.e. they are relevant 
to his decision to take a particular course of action—they are irrelevant to his 
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culpability. These reasons help to explain why Incompetent Shooter does not 
choose a means that would increase his chances of success, but they do not 
detract from other reasons that are guiding his action. The other reasons are 
that Incompetent Shooter hates his victim and wishes to see him dead, 
reasons that he should not act on. What makes the shooter culpable is that 
he does act on these reasons. His reasons against shooting his victim from 
up close are different from his reasons to commit murder; they do not detract 
from his purpose nor from the unjustifiability of his intended aim, which is 
what speaks to his culpability. 
 So far, I have argued that culpability is sensitive to degrees of risk in 
reckless actions but not in purposeful actions. The action of the reckless 
driver who creates a higher risk reflects a greater lack of concern for the 
wellbeing of others and is thus more culpable than a reckless action that 
creates a lower degree of risk. But in purposeful actions, an agent is culpable 
because his action stems from the wrong reasons, which the agent should 
not follow.46 Incompetent Shooter is just as culpable as Competent Shooter 
despite the fact that the former’s action imposes a lower risk since both 
actions, and the risk they create, are equally unjustifiably or guided by 
equally bad reasons. The degree of risk their actions create, as well as the 
reasons they have against imposing a higher or lower risk, are irrelevant as 
long as they are committed to bringing about the intended harm. Differences 
in the level of risk they impose do not detract from or add to the wrongfulness 
of their actions. 
 
4 Outcome Luck, Risk, and Fair Impositions of Liability 
In the preceding sections, I have argued that we can account for degrees of 
luck in terms of the level of risk an agent imposes (which in turn can be 
accounted for by the level of control an agent exercises over his action). I 
have also argued that degrees of risk are irrelevant for the culpability of 
purposeful actions. So while Alexander and Ferzan’s theory of culpability is 
attractive for insulating criminal liability from degrees of luck, we should 
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nonetheless reject their view on the grounds that it gives us a problematic 
view of culpability for purposeful actions. What I have said thus far has 
implications for fair assignments of liability. If degrees of luck are attributable 
to degrees of risk, but degrees of risk are irrelevant for culpability, do we not 
face the problem of subjecting criminal liability for purposeful actions to the 
influence of luck? 
 In order to address this point, we must clarify the language of luck and 
its role throughout different points of the outcome luck debate. That is, we 
must identify the various issues that “luck” is meant to be tracking. First, there 
is luck in outcomes; that is, the outcome of a culpable action or omission can 
be a matter of luck.47 It was a matter of luck that Driver R made it home 
safely, and it was a matter of luck that Competent Shooter failed to kill his 
victim. Here, the language of luck is meant to be tracking the issue of control. 
As in, if Competent Shooter tried but failed to kill V, his failed attempt is a 
matter of luck to the extent that it is beyond his control. In addition to luck in 
outcomes, there is also luck in holding an agent responsible for the outcomes 
of his actions. If the consequences of an agent’s actions are to some extent a 
matter of luck, then it is also to that extent a matter of luck to be held 
responsible for those consequences. Here, the language of luck is again 
tracking the issue of control, but what agents lack is complete control over 
the extent of their liability for the outcomes of their actions. This leads us to 
another way in which the language of luck is used. It is used to track issues 
of justice and fairness in the way that we assign criminal liability.48 If 
Competent Shooter tries but fails to harm his victim, is it fair for him to 
receive a more lenient sentence for his failed attempt than if he had 
succeed?49 The failed attempt does not properly reflect the shooter’s 
intentions and desires, so is it acceptable for the shooter to be punished 
less—if he is punished less—for an outcome that is to some extent beyond 
his control? 
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 The issue of luck in outcomes and in holding agents responsible for 
those outcomes—i.e. the issue of lack of control—opens up questions about 
justice and fairness in the way that we assign criminal responsibility. But 
while the extent to which an outcome is a matter of luck necessarily affects 
the extent to which being held responsible for that outcome is a matter of 
luck, neither of these issues necessarily affect the question about fairness. 
For instance, if it is unfair or unjust for an agent to be liable and punished for 
a particular outcome, it does not mean that the outcome was necessarily a 
matter of luck. Conversely, if an outcome (and being held responsible for that 
outcome) is to some extent beyond an agent’s control and thus to some 
extent a matter of luck, it does not necessarily mean that it would be unfair 
(i.e. unlucky) for that agent to be liable and punished for the outcome. It 
would be fair, for instance, to be held responsible for outcomes if the exercise 
of some (as opposed to complete) control is sufficient for criminal liability, 
and if we are capable of having some control over outcomes.  
 The problem of outcome luck is a question about the extent of the 
connection between control and fair assignments of responsibility. To say 
that an outcome is to some degree a matter of luck is not yet to admit that it 
would be unfair to be held responsible for that outcome. Going back to the 
discussion on purposeful actions, there may be degrees of luck that come 
from the level of culpability. But given that degrees of risk is irrelevant for 
culpability here, it would not be unfair for the agent’s culpability to be 
insensitive to risk (and therefore to the influence of luck). For subjectivists like 
Alexander and Ferzan, who argue that liability should be grounded in an 
agent’s culpability only, there is nothing unfair about imposing the same level 
of punishment on Competent Shooter and Incompetent Shooter, even though 
the same outcome is more of a matter of luck for one of them. 
 There is still the question of whether it would be fair to hold agents 
responsible for the outcomes of their actions, something that I have not 
commented on throughout this chapter. Attempts to resolve this debate 
requires discussions on the justification of punishment, which I will offer in 




subjectivists and objectivists about criminal liability, which I do not offer in this 
thesis. I will say something about the relevance of outcomes for liability in the 
conclusion of this thesis. For now, I want to turn our attention to a problem in 
the philosophy of criminal law, that of impossible attempts. The next chapter 
will illuminate some foundational issues in the mens rea requirement for 
criminal attempts. These issues are particularly relevant when it comes to the 



























Recklessness and Circumstances at the Attack–
Endangerment Divide 
 
When we consider the influence of luck on the criminal law, the problem of 
impossible attempts inevitably surfaces. These are cases in which, given the 
actual state of affairs, it is impossible for an agent to commit the intended 
crime.1 For instance, it is impossible for D to commit murder given that, 
unbeknownst to D, the would-be victim is already dead. Similarly, it is 
impossible for D to damage V’s property, given that, unbeknownst to D, the 
property in question belongs to D and not to V. And it is impossible for D to 
commit the crime of adultery given that, unbeknownst to D, adultery is not a 
criminal offence. In these examples, what makes the attempt impossible—
e.g. the status of the victim, the ownership of the property, and the legality of 
the intended act—are to some extent a matter of luck. Had D found V a few 
minutes earlier, V would still have been alive and D might have committed 
murder. And had D decided to damage another piece of property, he might 
have actually damaged something that belonged to V. And had D been in a 
different jurisdiction, one that criminalized adultery, D would have committed 
an offence. 
 In Canada2 and the United Kingdom3, impossibility alone does not 
preclude criminal liability. However, there is wide agreement that cases of 
“legal impossibility” should be exempt from liability. And, in practice, cases of 
“inherent impossibility” are typically exempt as well. Legal impossibility 
occurs where the intended act is not prohibited by the criminal law. Given 
that what is criminalised in criminal attempts are attempts to commit other 
offences, cases of legal impossibility are exempt from liability simply because 
it is not an offence to attempt to commit acts which have not been 
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criminalised. In other words, there is no offence with which to charge an 
agent who has merely committed what he believes is a criminal offence. 
Inherent impossibility describes cases where the manner with which an agent 
tries to commit an offence is utterly misguided and inherently doomed (e.g. 
murder by voodoo or arson by incantations).4 Normally, these cases are 
either not prosecuted because it not in the public’s interest to hold such 
hopelessly misguided criminals to account, or they would be left unreported 
given the absurdity of what the agent tried to do. 
 Other types of impossibility generate much more controversy. And 
even when legal theorists agree on how the criminal law should treat a 
particular instance or type of impossibility, there is nonetheless disagreement 
over the rationale for treating the case in that way. This chapter will look at a 
variation of “attempts” which are thought to be impossible of success given 
that a relevant circumstance element of the completed offence is missing. 
For instance, suppose that D tries to damage V’s property or that D tries to 
rape V. The completed offence of criminal damage requires D to damage 
property that belongs to another person.5 And the completed offence of rape 
requires that D sexually penetrates V who is non-consenting.6 Given these 
requirements, it is impossible for D to commit criminal damage by damaging 
property that does not belong to another person, and it is impossible for D to 
commit rape by sexually penetrating a person who is actually consenting. But 
the fact that, unbeknownst to D, the property does not belong to another 
person and that V is actually consenting does not detract from his culpability 
nor (as some would argue) should it exempt him from criminal liability.  
 Before I say anything about liability, we need to distinguish two 
variations of the examples that I just described. In one variation, D acts with 
an intention [to damage V’s property] or [to have non-consensual intercourse 
with V].7 Here, D intends both the consequence element of the offence (e.g. 
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to damage property or to have intercourse8) and the circumstance element of 
the offence (e.g. that the property belongs to V, or that V does not consent to 
intercourse). That is, D does not merely intend [to damage property] or [to 
have intercourse with V], but he also intends that the property in question 
belongs to V and that V does not consent to intercourse. 
This chapter will not be concerned with the variation of impossibility 
that I have just described. Instead, I will focus on another variation where D 
acts with an intention to the consequence element of the offence, but only 
with recklessness as to the circumstance element of that offence.9 Here, D 
intends [to damage property] or [to have intercourse], but he does not intend 
that the property belongs to another person, nor does he intend that the 
person with whom he is having intercourse is non-consenting. Nonetheless, 
he foresees that there is a risk that the property belongs to another person, 
or that the other person may not consent. And he acts with recklessness as 
to these circumstances when he acts with an awareness of the risks 
involved. 
Under English law, the mens rea requirement for criminal attempts has 
become somewhat confusing in recent years. Many substantive or completed 
offences can be committed either intentionally or recklessly, but the mens rea 
for attempt requires an intention to commit the completed offence.10 The 
precise meaning of acting with an intention to commit a completed offence is 
open to interpretation. There is consensus that D acts with an intention to 
commit an offence when he intends both the consequence and circumstance 
element of an offence. But it is contentious whether D acts with intention 
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when he intends the consequence element but acts with recklessness as to 
the circumstance element of an offence.  
In 1990, the Court of Appeal ruled in Khan—a case in which D tried 
but failed [to have intercourse with V] while aware of the risk that V may not 
consent—that recklessness as to consent would suffice for intention.11 The 
Court noted that, given that V was actually non-consenting, D would have 
committed the completed offence of rape had he succeeded in having 
intercourse with V. It would not be in the interest of public protection to 
absolve D of liability, so the Court ruled that the mens rea requirement (at 
least) for attempted rape should not depart too much from the requirement 
for the completed offence.12 
Then, in 2014, the Court of Appeal considered Pace, a case where D 
purchased goods which he suspected were stolen, but were, unbeknownst to 
him, not stolen (since they belonged to the police who had set up the sting 
operation). Here, the Court ruled that the mens rea for attempts required 
intention as to every element of the offence.13 In other words, in order for D 
to be liable for an attempt, he had to intend the goods to be stolen. But the 
court also argued that knowledge or belief that the good are stolen would 
suffice for an intention that the good be stolen.14 In making this ruling, it 
appears as though the Court has contradicted its earlier decision in Khan, but 
the decision in Khan was not overruled in Pace.15 
 In light of the decisions in Khan and Pace, one way to interpret the 
mens rea requirement for attempt under English law is that, for certain 
offences such as rape, D must act with intention as to the consequence (or 
conduct) element of the offence and recklessness as to the circumstance 
element of that offence (assuming that recklessness as to circumstance 
suffices for the completed offence). But, also, that for certain other offences 
such as converting stolen property, D must act with intention as to the 
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consequence element of the offence and with knowledge or belief as to the 
circumstance element of that offence. Under this doctrine, D is liable for an 
attempt to convert stolen property if he tries but fails [to convert property] with 
knowledge or belief that the property is stolen. But D would be guilty of 
attempted rape when he tries but fails [to have sexual intercourse] and is 
merely reckless about V’s lack of consent. 
This chapter argues that, with respect to some cases, such as criminal 
damage or crimes involving bodily harm, the ruling in Pace is correct; that 
knowledge or belief as to circumstances is required for an attempt. However, 
the offence of rape may or may not be an exception to this rule. It is possible 
that recklessness as to consent would suffice for attempted rape. The aim of 
this chapter is to explain why knowledge or belief as to circumstance is 
required for an attempt to commit some offences, and to explore why 
attempted rape may have a lower culpability requirement. The discussion on 
rape will be exploratory, but if we have principled reasons for the ruling in 
Pace, then at least with respect to some offence, we will be able to deal with 
some types of “impossible attempts” in a more straightforward manner. 
Before I outline the structure of this chapter, it would be useful to list 
the range of cases that will be discussed throughout. 
 
(1) D1 intends [to damage property]; D1 is reckless as to ownership of the 
property; the property belongs to V1; D1 damages the property. 
(2) D2 intends [to damage property]; D2 is reckless as to ownership of the 
property; the property belongs to V2; D2 tries but fails to damage the 
property. 
(3) D3 intends [to damage property]; D3 is reckless as to ownership of the 
property; the property belongs to D3; D3 damages the property. 
(4) D4 intends [to damage property]; D4 is reckless as to ownership of the 
property; the property belongs to D4; D4 tries but fails to damage the 
property. 
 
For all of these cases, we can substitute property damage and ownership of 




again, we should distinguish these cases from ones in which D intends [to 
damage V’s property] or [to have non-consensual intercourse].16 
 Scenario (1) is a case of criminal damage, which, like many completed 
offences, can be committed either intentionally or recklessly. There is no 
controversy that D1 is guilty of criminal damage. Some theorists, most 
notably Duff, have argued, contrary to the decision in Pace, that scenario (2) 
amounts to a case of attempted criminal damage.17 For Duff, recklessness as 
to circumstances suffices for an attempt, whether the offence attempted is 
rape or criminal damage (again assuming that recklessness as to 
circumstances suffices for the completed offence). Scenarios (3) and (4) are 
sometimes considered to be “impossible attempts” since it is impossible for D 
to commit criminal damage by damaging his own property. Note that, if we 
think (2) is an attempt, we have reason think the same about scenarios (3) 
and (4). The only difference between (2) and (4) has to do with ownership of 
the property in question. And the only difference between (4) and (3) has to 
do with whether D succeeds in damaging the property. Both ownership of the 
property and D’s success are, to some extent, matters of luck.  
 In Duff’s writing on this, he argues that (2) amounts to an attempt, but 
denies that (3) and (4) should be seen as attempts.18 On the face of it, this 
certainly appears to be a rather odd view since there do not appear to be any 
principled differences between (2), (3), and (4). And once we admit that these 
differences can be (and often are) a matter of luck, there is a strong prima 
facie case for judging D3 and D4 to be guilty of an attempt if we hold D2 liable 
for an attempt. I share Duff’s view that D3 and D4 should be acquitted of an 
attempt, but unlike Duff, I am not committed to holding D2 liable for an 
attempt. Assuming that D3 and D4 should be acquitted of an attempt, those 
who defend Duff’s view face the difficult task of explaining why they should 
be acquitted, especially when D3 and D4 are just as culpable as D2, and it is 
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not immediately obvious what principled reasons we have for exempting D3 
and D4 from liability if D2 is liable for an attempt. 
 In this chapter, I argue that part of the difficulty lies in Duff’s analysis of 
(2). If (2) amounts to an attempt, then the task of drawing a coherent and 
principled line between scenario (2) on the one hand and scenarios (3) and 
(4) on the other hand will be difficult. But, as I will argue, we should not see 
(2) as an attempt, but rather as a case of non-consummated endangerment. I 
begin in sections 1 and 2 by restating Duff’s distinction between attacks and 
endangerment, and by reiterating his view that we should see the law of 
attempts as a law of attacks. Then in section 3, I explain Duff’s rationale for 
seeing (2) as a failed attack before offering my argument, in section 4, for 
seeing (2) as a case of non-consummated endangerment. Once we clarify 
why (2) amounts to an instance of endangerment, we can easily explain why 
the defendants in (3) and (4) should be exempt from criminal liability. Lastly, 
in section 5, I explore a possible exception to my argument. In the case of 
rape, it is not clear to me whether a defendant attacks or endangers 
another’s sexual integrity if he intends [to have sexual intercourse] and is 
reckless as to the other person’s consent. Much of this discussion will be 
exploratory as I try to identify relevant questions for further research.  
 
1 Attacks and Endangerments 
Attacks and endangerments mark out different kinds of moral wrongs. The 
distinction between these kinds of wrongs turns on the intentional structure of 
an agent’s action (or omission) and the attitude he takes towards the 
prospect of harm.19 An attack on a legally protected interest requires an 
intention on the part of the attacker [to cause harm], which is prohibited by 
the criminal law. D attacks V’s property if he purposely damages or 
appropriates her property, and D attacks V’s life if he purposely kills her. The 
attacker’s attitude towards the interests or people he attacks is one of 
practical hostility. His action (or omission) is guided by a direct intention to 
cause harm and it is directed against the object or subject that the agent 
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intends to harm.20 An attacker would only count his endeavour a success if 
the intended harm occurs, and he would count it a failure if the harm does not 
occur.21 
 While attacks require a direct intention to cause harm coupled with an 
action or omission that executes the harmful intention, endangerments 
merely require the creation of a significant risk of harm to a person or 
interest.22 For instance, D endangers V’s car if he takes it to a race track 
thereby creating a risk that V’s car will be damaged. And a hunter endangers 
another’s physical wellbeing if he absent-mindedly fires his rifle in the woods 
thereby creating a risk that other hunters will be injured by a stray bullet. The 
paradigm fault element for endangerment is recklessness, where the agent 
consciously disregards a significant and unjustifiable risk that his action 
unleashes on others. Unlike attacks, the attitude of someone who recklessly 
endangers the rights or interests of others is not one of practical hostility, but 
one of practical indifference. His action or omissions displays an unjustifiable 
willingness to risk harm to others, but the action is not aimed at harming a 
protected interest.23 
 Many consummated offences can be committed either as an attack or 
as an endangerment.24 Under English law, a defendant is guilty of assault 
occasioning bodily harm whether he intentionally or recklessly causes bodily 
injury to his victim.25 The defendant attacks his victim if he acts with an 
intention to cause injury, but the defendant endangers his victim if he is 
reckless as to the risks he creates against the victim’s bodily integrity.26 
Similarly, a defendant is guilty of criminal damage whether he intentionally or 
recklessly damages another’s property.27 The defendant attacks another’s 
property if he acts with an intention to damage her property, but the 
defendant endangers another’s property if he is reckless as to the risks he 
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creates against her property. An attacker, in deliberately (and unjustifiably) 
trying to harm a protected interest, is acting for the wrong reasons.28 As Duff 
puts it, his action is essentially harmful since the causation of harm is intrinsic 
to his action, and he ought not to be guided by whatever reasons that 
motivate him to harm others.29 In the context of endangerment, an agent, in 
carrying out a risky action, may be pursuing legitimate ends. The risk of harm 
his action creates is not the object but rather a side-effect of his action; he 
would not count his endeavour a failure if the potential harm does not 
occur.30 However, by disregarding the unjustifiable risks his action creates 
against others, he is failing to respond to reasons against imposing 
unjustifiable risks on others.31 Unlike attacks, endangerments are potentially 
harmful since the threat of harm is not intrinsic, but incidental, to the action. 
 These differences between attacks and endangerments do not imply 
that attacks are necessarily more culpable than endangerments. An agent 
who endangers others may be (and often is) less culpable than an attacker, 
but an agent who is extremely reckless as to the wellbeing of others may be 
as culpable as another who attacks others’ wellbeing. All else being equal, an 
attack may or may not be more culpable than an act of endangerment. I will 
not dwell on this issue here,32 but I mention it in order to clarify a point that is 
relevant to my main argument later in this paper. Specifically, when I argue 
that the defendants in (1)—(4) endanger (and harm) the property of others 
when they act with an intention [to damage property], I do not suggest that 
these cases are necessarily less culpable than clear cases of attacks, where 
the defendants act with an intention [to damage another person’s property]. 
The attack and endangerment distinction is significant not because it marks 
differences in degrees of culpability, but because it marks different kinds of 
moral wrongs. When I argue that an agent endangers another’s property 
interests when he acts with an intention [to damage property], I am arguing 
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that this agent perpetrates a different kind of moral wrong than another who 
acts with an intention [to damage another person’s property].33 
 Cases that resemble (1) and (2) are, according to Duff, attacks and 
failed attacks. Duff defends an objective account of attempts liability which 
counts as attacks actions that are directed against what is actually a 
protected interest.34 So the defendants’ actions in (1) and (2) count as 
attacks because they are directed at an outcome which is (or would be) 
harmful given the actual circumstances.35 The defendants may not intend [to 
attack V’s property], but their actions are directed at an outcome (i.e. property 
damage) which in fact harms (or would harm) V’s property given that the 
property belongs to her. The context in which the defendants execute their 
intention is one where the property belongs to another, such that what 
actually happened is that the defendant in (1) did [damage property] 
belonging to another and the defendant in (2) did try [to damage property] 
belonging to another.36 From the victims’ perspectives, the defendants did 
not just damage or attempt to damage property, but rather attacked or tried to 
attack what is in fact their property.37 This is a very brief summary of Duff’s 
objective account of attempts liability, which I mention here in order to hint at 
why (1) and (2) might be thought of as (failed) attacks. I will discuss Duff’s 
view in detail in section 3. For now, I will turn to the law of attempts and its 
relation to attacks. 
 
2 Law of Attempts as a Law of Attacks 
Many jurisdictions have a general law of attempts, where it is an offence to 
attempt to commit most indictable offences (excluding inchoate offences 
such as conspiracy, aiding or abetting, etc.).38 As we have already seen, in 
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England (and many Anglo-American jurisdictions), attempts require an 
intention to commit the relevant offence. This is in contrast to a broader law 
of inchoate offences, which may require the same fault element for an 
inchoate offence as it does for the corresponding completed offence.39 This 
means, for example, that not only is it an offence to endanger and harm 
another’s property, but it would also be an offence to merely endanger 
another’s property without causing harm. Two questions are relevant here. 
First, why should a law of attempts require intention to commit an offence, 
especially when intention is not required for many completed offences that 
might be attempted? And second, given that many offences can be 
committed either intentionally or recklessly, why should we only have a law of 
attempts (which requires intent) rather than a broader law of inchoate 
offences (e.g. a law of endangerment)?40 
 One explanation for why attempts should require intention is that it fits 
with our ordinary understanding of “attempt”. To attempt to φ is to act with an 
intention as to the occurrence of φ. We would normally say that D attempts to 
damage V’s property if D acts with an intention to damage V’s property, but 
not if D merely foresees damage to V’s property as a side-effect of his 
action.41 If we take the principle of fair labelling seriously—“that the label 
applied to an offence ought fairly to represent the offender’s wrongdoing”42—
then the law of attempts should require intention to cause harm, even if the 
corresponding completed offence does not. If “attempt” was taken in criminal 
law to include both intentional and reckless harming, both offenders and 
victims could justifiably complain that the offence label distorts what they 
have done or what they have suffered. And when offence labels, rather than 
descriptions or particulars of offences, receive the most attention (as they 
often do) from the general public (including potential employers), it is in the 
offender, the victim, and the public’s interest to have elements of an offence 
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align as closely as possible to our ordinary understanding of the offence 
label.43 
 For Duff, to have a general law of attempts as opposed to a broader 
law of inchoate offences is to have a general law of attacks rather than a 
general law of endangerment.44 Given an ordinary language understanding 
of “attempt”, the agent’s action (or omission) in an attempt, much like the 
action in an attack, is directed towards a particular wrong. What differentiates 
an attack from an attempt is merely causation of the intended harm. On this 
view, attempts differ from non-consummated acts of endangerment in the 
same way that attacks differ from consummated acts of endangerment. In 
attempts and attacks, the action is intrinsically harmful since it aims at 
causing a legally relevant harm, while in acts of (non-consummated) 
endangerment the action is potentially harmful as it does not aim at, but 
rather risks as a side-effect, the occurrence of harm.45 
If we take attempts to require intention to cause harm, then our law of 
criminal attempts is a law of attacks, and it differentiates attempts from (non-
consummated) acts of endangerment as a different kind of moral wrong.46 If 
less stringent fault elements such as knowledge or recklessness were 
sufficient for attempt, then the law of attempts would become a law of 
endangerments. We would then either wrongfully label as criminal 
“attempters” those who have not tried to commit a criminal offence, or we 
would have to replace the law of attempts with a broader—and descriptively 
accurate—law of inchoate offences which includes both failed attacks and 
non-consummated endangerments. This brings us to the second question. 
Why should we only have a general law of attacks without a general law of 
endangerments? 
 On Duff’s distinction between attacks and endangerments, attacks 
are, paradigmatically, the kind of action that should be of concern to the 
criminal law. Not only are completed attacks wrongs that cause harm, but 
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what makes them paradigmatically wrongful is that they unjustifiably aim at 
legally relevant harms. An attacker, in carrying out his intention to harm 
another, relates himself, in Duff’s words, “as an agent as closely as he can to 
that harm”.47 His action, when it causes harm, is both wrongful and harmful. 
But it is still paradigmatically wrongful when it does not cause harm because 
the action was nonetheless intended to be harmful. 
In a consummated act of endangerment, the action is still both harmful 
and wrongful. However, the agent, in acting not with an intention but the 
knowledge or foresight that he may cause harm, does not relate himself as 
closely as he can to that harm. In acting with the knowledge or foresight of 
harm, the agent’s action is not directed towards the causation of harm and is, 
again in Duff’s words, potentially harmful rather than intrinsically harmful. He 
can hope that his reckless act of endangerment will not cause harm whereas 
an attacker cannot, and he can be relieved when his action does not cause 
harm whereas an attacker cannot.48 
These differences between attacks and endangerments should matter, 
again, because they convey significant differences in what an agent has 
done. Such differences matter not only for fair labelling concerns, but also for 
the purpose of punishment.49 An agent who has endangered another’s 
property has to answer for an action that is distinctly different from that of an 
agent who has attacked another’s property. The process of reform, for the 
agent who has endangered another, requires that he give sufficient attention 
and concern to the rights and interests of others. But for an attacker, the 
process of reform requires that he appreciates why we should not purposely 
violate the rights and interests of others. 
 To have a general law of attempts—i.e. a law that criminalizes failed 
attacks—is to criminalize intrinsically wrongful actions. Insofar as we have 
reasons to criminalize wrongful actions that cause harm, we have the same 
reasons to criminalize wrongful actions that try but fail to cause harm. 
Arguably, the same can be said for a general law of non-consummated 
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endangerments—that we also have the same reasons to criminalize 
potentially harmful actions, ones in which the agent recklessly risks harm. 
And that in addition to attacks, we would recognize endangerment as a 
different paradigm of criminal wrongs, one that is characterized by the 
agent’s lack of sufficient concern for the rights and interests of others.  
 Many (if not most) jurisdictions have specific endangerment offences 
but few have enacted general endangerment offences and for good reason. 
The rationale for enacting specific endangerment offences such as 
dangerous driving or possession of firearms is that these acts pose serious 
risks and, without criminalization and policing, would be prevalent enough to 
cause substantial harm to others.50 Specific endangerment offences can 
provide citizens with guidance and fair warning about the kind of conduct that 
they may or may not engage in since what is criminalized is a specific act 
which is thought to be unacceptably risky. Or, they can provide citizens with 
guidance about the kind of harm that is to be avoided, which is usually quite 
serious, such as death or serious bodily injury.51 In contrast, general 
endangerment offences would do neither and would thus have the potential 
to be overly broad and vague. 
For instance, many of our routine activities such as driving or handling 
kitchen knives can risk serious harm to others, but the chances that harm 
would occur from driving or handling kitchen knives are very low compared to 
dangerous driving and possessing firearms. These routine activities could 
come under the umbrella of a general endangerment offence, where it would 
be an offence to create a substantial and unjustifiable risk to others through 
the pursuit of these activities. Quite often though, it is impossible to judge 
whether the risk is unjustifiable, or whether the activity actually poses any 
risks until harm actually occurs. This would not only make it impossible to 
offer citizens guidance with regard to their conduct, but it also has the 
potential of being abused through selective and over-zealous enforcement. 
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  Given that many specific endangerment offences already cover 
serious cases of risk creation, we have no need for a general law of 
endangerment, especially in light of the costs of criminalisation. Later in this 
chapter, when I argue that the defendant in (2) is not guilty of an attempt to 
commit an offence (e.g. criminal damage), the question of whether he should 
be exonerated will depend on whether he should liable for a specific act of 
non-consummated endangerment, and whether we have good reasons to 
criminalize that act.  
 
3 Recklessness, Circumstances, and Attempts 
Having described the differences between attacks and endangerments, we 
can return to our scenarios from the beginning of this paper. The focus here 
will be on cases (1) and (2).  
 
(1) D1 intends [to damage property]; D1 is reckless as to ownership of the 
property; the property belongs to V1; D1 damages the property. 
(2) D2 intends [to damage property]; D2 is reckless as to ownership of the 
property; the property belongs to V2; D2 tries but fails to damage the 
property. 
 
In this section, I explain why some theorists, most notably Duff, see (1) as an 
attack and (2) as a failed attempt before offering my argument, in the next 
section, for why we should see these cases as acts of endangerment. 
 Let us start with (1), which is a straightforward case of criminal 
damage, which can be committed either intentionally or recklessly. The mens 
rea for this completed offence requires that the defendant acts with intention 
or recklessness to damaging property, and that he is at least reckless as to 
whether the property belongs to another.52 Under current English law, the 
defendant in (1) is guilty of criminal damage since he intentionally damaged 
property and was reckless as to ownership of the property. This does not yet 
tell us whether (1) is an attack or an endangerment, but it is clear that, under 
English law, D1 is guilty of the completed offence of criminal damage. 
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 Now consider scenario (2). Criminal attempts require an intention to 
commit the completed offence, but an intention to commit the completed 
offence does not require that the agent act with intention to every aspect of 
the offence. As we have seen in the introduction, the Court in Pace ruled that 
an agent acts with an intention to commit the completed offence when he 
acts with intention to the consequence element of the offence, but only with 
knowledge or belief as to the circumstance elements of that offence. And that 
in Kahn, the Court ruled that attempt (in the case of rape) requires intention 
as to the consequence element of an offence, but only reckless as to the 
circumstance element of that offence. Following the ruling in Pace, the 
defendant in (2) would not be guilty of an attempt to commit criminal damage. 
But if scenario (2) concerned an agent who tried but failed to have sexual 
intercourse while being reckless about the other person’s consent, then 
according to Kahn, the defendant would be guilty of attempted rape. 
Duff’s view of the mens rea for attempts, for any kind of offence, is 
aligned with the decision in Kahn.53 And both Duff’s view and the ruling in 
Kahn are attractive for several reasons.54 For one thing, we can contrast it 
with the doctrine that criminal attempts require intention as to every element 
of the completed offence. This more stringent doctrine would acquit the 
defendant in (2) of an attempt, whether he tried but failed [to damage 
property] or [to have sexual intercourse], since it is no part of his intention 
that the property belongs to another or that the would-be victim be non-
consenting. Proponents of Duff’s view and of the ruling in Kahn would argue 
that surely we should reject the more stringent doctrine (and perhaps the 
ruling in Pace) since we would not want the defendant to be acquitted.55 
(Indeed, this reasoning appeared to guide the decision in Khan.) The 
defendant’s conduct (especially in the case of rape) is a serious wrong and it 
is not in the interest of justice to acquit the defendant.56 
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 Duff’s view is also attractive when compared with a broader law of inchoate offences, 
which would require the same mens rea for an attempt as it would for the completed offence 
(see section 2 above).  
79 
 
The intuitive appeal of this argument disappears quickly once we 
differentiate being acquitted of a criminal attempt from being acquitted of a 
criminal offence altogether. The fact that most jurisdictions have a general 
law of attempts means that if an agent’s action is intended to cause a 
prohibited harm, he is guilty of the completed offence if he succeeds, and of 
an attempt to commit the completed offence if he fails. If an agent is reckless 
as to whether his conduct may harm others, then he is guilty of a completed 
offence if he causes harm. But the absence of a general law of 
endangerment means that, depending on the conduct in question, he may or 
may not be guilty of an offence of (non-consummated) endangerment if he 
does not cause harm. So the defendant in (2) may not be guilty of any 
offence in jurisdictions that do not have either a general law of endangerment 
or a specific endangerment offence relating to criminal damage. But the fact 
that D2 may not be convicted of any existing criminal offence should not be 
seen as a reason to convict the defendant of attempted criminal damage if 
his action is really one of endangerment. Instead, we should assess whether 
endangering property should be dealt with by a specific endangerment 
offence. 
 Returning to Duff’s view and the ruling in Kahn, where the defendant 
in (2) would be convicted of attempted criminal damage or attempted rape, 
Duff seems to think that his view is attractive for another reason. He argues 
that to convict the defendant in (2) of attempted criminal damage or 
attempted rape—i.e. to label him as someone who has attempted to damage 
another’s property or attempted to rape someone—is consistent with our 
ordinary understanding of “attempt”.57 This argument gets to the heart of 
Duff’s view on the circumstance elements of attempts. It requires detailed 
explanation and will occupy the rest of this section. Given that I think the 
offence of rape is not very clear cut, the rest of this section will focus on the 
example of criminal damage.  
 Recall that for Duff, attempts are failed attacks. To label a defendant 
as an attempter is to indicate that he attacked, but failed to harm, a protected 
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interest. This is Duff’s view with respect to our pair of cases; that (1) amounts 
to a successful attack on another’s property interest and that (2) amounts to 
a failed attack on that interest. These two cases do not represent what we 
typically think of as paradigm cases of (failed) attacks. The defendants in 
each case do not intend [to damage another’s property]. They intend [to 
damage property], which is not wrongful in and of itself, but what makes their 
actions wrongful is the ownership of the property and their recklessness as to 
that fact.  
 It is not immediately clear—at least not to me—that the actions of D1 
and D2 constitute (failed) attacks. Our ordinary understanding of “attempt” 
might offer some evidence in support of Duff’s view, for it is quite natural to 
say that D1 attacked V1’s property since he intentionally damaged V1’s 
property. However, ordinary language is unclear on this matter since it is also 
quite natural, and perhaps more accurate, to say that D1 did not attack V1’s 
property because he intentionally damaged some property which 
unfortunately turned out to belong to V1. In the next section, I offer my 
argument for why cases like (1) and (2) typically constitute acts of 
endangerment. Before then, we need to look at Duff’s principled argument for 
why (1) and (2) constitute an attack and a failed attempt. 
 We can begin by contrasting (1) and (2) with paradigm cases of 
attacks. In (1) and (2), the defendants act with a direct intention to the 
consequence element of an offence, but only with recklessness as to the 
circumstance element of that offence. In a paradigm case of an attack, the 
attacker acts with a direct intention to both the consequence and 
circumstance elements of an offence. That is, the attacker does not merely 
intend [to damage property], but [to damage another’s property]. The 
paradigmatic attacker’s action is guided by a direct intention to harm another 
person’s interests, and it is this intention that marks his action as a clear case 
of an attack. The success or failure of his action is determined not only by the 
act of damaging property, but also by the fact that what he damages is 
another’s property. If the attacker manages to damage property, he would 
count his action a success if the property belongs to another and a failure if 
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the property does not belong to another.58 In a paradigm case of an attack, 
not only does the defendant harm another’s rights or interests, but he also 
directs his action at [harming another’s rights or interests]. 
 The defendants in (1) and (2), on the other hand, do not direct their 
actions at [harming others]. They merely intend [to damage property], though 
the circumstances are such that D1 actually damages another’s property. His 
action is made criminal by the fact that the property belongs to another and 
by his recklessness as to ownership of the property. But the success of his 
action is only marked by the completed act of damaging and not by the fact 
that the damaged property belongs to another. D1 and D2 take unjustifiable 
risks that their actions will harm the property rights of others, and they take 
this risk by being reckless with respect to ownership of the property. 
However, the crucial different between their actions and the action of a 
paradigmatic attacker is that the defendants in (1) and (2) do not intend to 
attack V1 or V2 through their properties. That is, they do not intend [to harm 
another’s rights or interests].  
 Duff argues that even though the defendants in (1) and (2) do not 
intend to attack V1 or V2 through their properties, their actions can 
nonetheless amount to attacks.59 This is because, for Duff, the nature of an 
action ‘depends not just on the intentions or beliefs with which it is done, but 
on its actual connection to the world’.60 The actual facts of our world make up 
the objective dimension of an action, which along with our subjective 
intentions determine what our actions really amount to. On Duff’s view, an 
action which is not intended to attack any protected rights or interests may 
amount to an attack if certain objective facts obtain.61 In the case of (1), the 
fact that the damaged property belongs to another is enough for D1’s action 
to count as an attack. For Duff, the objective dimension of an action is 
sufficient to make that action an attack, given that D acts with intention to the 
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consequence element of an offence and recklessness as to the circumstance 
element of that offence. 
While Duff argues that an objective connection to the world is 
necessary for an attempt, his argument need not concern me here. In the 
next section, I argue that attacks require more than recklessness as to the 
circumstance element of an offence.62 This point applies whether we are 
objectivists or subjectivists about liability since what defines an attack is that 
the action is guided by an intention to cause harm. If recklessness as to 
circumstance does not suffice for the kind of intention that is required for an 
attack, then an objective dimension is not enough to make the action an 
attack. It might be worthwhile to note that my argument in the next section is 
meant to show that the defendants’ actions in (1) and (2) do not amount to 
attacks, and that if we think the law of attempts should be a law of attacks, 
we cannot hold D2 liable for attempted criminal damage if his action does not 
amount to an attack. It is a separate question, which I will not address in this 
chapter, whether D2 should be liable for endangering another’s property. As I 
mentioned earlier, we should be careful that our intuition about whether to 
hold D2 liable should not cloud our judgment about whether to hold him liable 
for an attempt.  
 
4 From Attempts to Endangerments 
The structures of cases (1) and (2) are of course not limited to property 
offences, and apply to a wide range of criminal conduct. In this section I 
argue that for many offences that conform to the structures of (1) and (2), the 
acts constitute endangerments rather than attacks. I will make this argument 
by discussing criminal damage and crimes involving bodily harm before 
turning, in the next section, to explore the case of rape. In making my 
argument, I do not take issue with Duff’s characterization of either attacks or 
endangerment. 
 Consider criminal damage first. Suppose an agent intends [to cut 
down his neighbour’s tree] and carries out his intention by cutting down a tree 
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which he knows or believes belongs to his neighbour. By acting with an 
intention [to cut down his neighbour’s tree], he directs his action at [damaging 
his neighbour’s property] (assuming his neighbour does not consent to the 
tree being cut down). The agent commits criminal damage if he cuts down 
the tree and the tree in fact belongs to his neighbour, and he commits 
attempted criminal damage if he does not succeed in cutting down the tree or 
if the tree is actually his own. The agent acts with the paradigmatic intention 
for an attack and his action is a paradigm case of an attack.63 
 Now suppose the agent acts with an intention [to cut down this tree] 
while knowing or believing that the tree belongs to his neighbour. According 
to Duff’s view (and the ruling in Pace), the agent attacks his neighbour’s 
property. He would, quite rightly, be guilty of attempted criminal damage if he 
fails to cause damage. His action does not represent a paradigmatic attack 
since he does not direct his action at [cutting down or damaging another’s 
tree]. It is removed from paradigmatic attacks because he does not intend [to 
cut down another person’s tree] and the actual ownership of the tree makes 
no difference to the success or failure of his action. 
However, the agent’s action is an attack precisely because the issue 
of ownership makes no difference to his course of action given his knowledge 
or belief. He is committed to cutting down the tree even though he knows or 
believes that it belongs to his neighbour. If attacks are actions directed 
against (what are actually) protected interests, then it is the agent’s 
willingness to cut down the tree, despite knowing or believing that it belongs 
to his neighbour, which commits him to damaging his neighbour’s property. It 
is his willingness to purposely damage what he knows or believes is 
another’s property that makes his action an attack. Given his knowledge or 
belief, he is committed to harming another’s property, and he is thus 
committed even if his belief turns out to be false.64 
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Compare the defendant who intends [to cut down this tree] and knows 
or believes that it belongs to his neighbour with the defendant who intends [to 
cut down this tree] and realises that it might belong to his neighbour. Both 
defendants can be relieved if it turns out that the tree belongs to them rather 
than their neighbours since it is no part of their intention that the tree belongs 
to their neighbours, and the success or failure of their actions do not depend 
on it. But, in comparing these two defendants, we can say that the reckless 
defendant might have refrained from cutting down the tree had he known that 
it belonged to his neighbour, whereas we cannot say the same about the 
other defendant. The reckless defendant acts with an intention which is 
situated in an uncertain context—e.g. an awareness that the tree may belong 
to his neighbour—so that as he carried out his action, he can still hope that 
the tree does not belong to his neighbour. But for the defendant who knows 
or believes that the tree belongs to his neighbour, his intention is situated in a 
specific and defined context—e.g. that the tree belongs to his neighbour.65 It 
is not possible for him to hope that the tree does not belong to his neighbour, 
and it is not possible to separate his intention [to cut down this tree] from his 
belief that the tree belongs to his neighbour. Unlike his reckless counterpart, 
the defendant who acts with knowledge or belief as to ownership acts with an 
intention [to cut down this tree] which belongs to his neighbour, and it is true 
that “he tried to cut down his neighbour’s tree” whomever the tree belongs to. 
 An agent who is reckless as to certain relevant circumstances, who 
does not have knowledge or firm beliefs regarding ownership of the tree, is 
not committed to damaging his neighbour’s property. Duff would agree that 
the action of an agent who is reckless as to ownership of the property is even 
further removed from paradigmatic attacks than the action of an agent who 
knows or believes that the property belongs to another. However, we 
disagree about whether recklessness as to circumstances still counts as an 
attack. For Duff, an agent who cuts down a tree and is reckless as to 
ownership of the tree is attacking another’s property since the action is 
directed against the tree, which is in fact another’s property. 
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The fact that the tree is another person’s property is the objective fact 
that suffices to make the agent’s action an attack, even though he is merely 
reckless as to that fact. Duff argues that should his neighbour intervene right 
before he takes an axe to the tree, the neighbour could legitimately accuse 
the agent of trying to cut down his tree—“you tried to damage my tree!”. The 
moral force of the neighbour’s accusation, according to Duff, is “qualified, but 
not negated” if the agent responds honestly “I thought the tree belongs to 
me”.66 In contrast, an agent who is truly reckless—e.g. who intends to carry 
out an extensive renovation project in his garden and realizes that his project 
may damage his neighbour’s tree—can respond to such an accusation by 
saying “I was not trying to damage your tree”. For Duff, a significant 
difference between attacks and endangerment lies in the charges we can 
legitimately make against the defendant.67 The charge “you tried to damage 
my property” is appropriately levied only against those who attack others’ 
property whereas the only charge we can appropriately levy against those 
whose actions endanger others’ property is “you might have damaged my 
property”. 
 I think Duff is in large part correct; that in clear cases of attacks and 
endangerments, the difference between the accusations “you tried to 
damage my property” and “you might have damaged my property” is the 
difference between attacks and endangerments. However, things are not so 
clear in borderline cases.68 First of all, it is not clear that we would accuse an 
agent of trying to damage another’s property if he was merely reckless as to 
ownership of the property. Secondly, even if it is appropriate for us to accuse 
this agent of trying to damage another’s property, it is just as appropriate for 
us to make demands and accusations that are typically associated with 
endangerments—e.g. “you should have taken more care because you might 
have damaged my property”. Suppose that Duff is right, that we can accuse 
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an agent who is reckless as to relevant circumstances with “you tried to 
damage my property”. If my claim is also correct, that we can also 
appropriately accuse the agent with “you might have damaged my property”, 
then it is not clear how decisive—if at all—appeals to ordinary language can 
be in borderline cases.  
 Suppose the defendant intends [to cut down this tree]; is reckless as 
to ownership of the tree; and the tree in fact belongs to another person. The 
tree belongs to the defendant’s neighbour, who intervenes just as the 
defendant swings his axe towards the tree. Of course the neighbour could 
justify his intervention and accuse the defendant of committing an attack by 
saying “I intervened because you were trying to damage my tree!”. The 
defendant could explain himself by saying, honestly, any or all of the 
following: “I did not mean to cut down your tree”; “I thought there was a 
chance that the tree belonged to me”; “I would not have attempted to cut the 
tree had I known it belonged to you”. The neighbour can accept any or all of 
these claims; he can acknowledge that the defendant did not intend [to 
damage his (the neighbour’s) tree] but merely intended [to damage this tree]. 
The neighbour can nonetheless say to the defendant “well, the tree is mine 
so you were trying to damage my tree”. I think this is what Duff has in mind 
when he argues that cases similar to this one amount to attacks, because it 
is certainly possible (and perhaps even appropriate) for the neighbour to 
accuse the defendant of trying to damage his (the neighbour’s) property 
irrespective of the defendant’s explanations. 
 There are a couple of issues with Duff’s reasoning here. First, 
although Duff is right in thinking that there is nothing inappropriate about the 
neighbour’s accusation of an attack, such an accusation, by itself, fails to 
give us a complete account of what the defendant was trying to do. Let us 
deviate from the scenario in (2) for a moment and suppose, for instance, that 
the defendant was trying [to cut down his own tree]. We can even suppose 
that this defendant was not reckless about ownership of the tree; that he 
justifiably believed that the tree belongs to him when it in fact belongs to his 
neighbour. This defendant has done nothing wrong, but it is nonetheless 
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appropriate for his neighbour to accuse him of trying to damage his (the 
neighbour’s) property. The difference between this case and a clear case of 
an attack is that the accusation—which, on the face of it, suggests that the 
defendant has attacked the neighbour’s tree—does not remain wholly 
appropriate or correct in light of the defendant’s motivations for his action. 
This defendant can explain his justified, though mistaken, belief to his 
neighbour, who can then interpret the defendant’s action as an honest 
mistake rather than an attempt to cut down his (the neighbour’s) tree. 
Likewise, the defendant in (2), who was reckless about ownership of the tree, 
can explain his recklessness and lack of concern as to ownership of tree, and 
it would be appropriate for the neighbour to interpret the defendant’s action 
as one that lacks practical concern for others’ property rather than an attempt 
to damage other’s property. What is different about clear cases of attacks is 
that there is nothing that an attacker can say that would allow the neighbour 
to interpret the attacker’s action as anything other than an attempt to cut 
down someone else’s tree. 
 The second issue with Duff’s reasoning has to do with why we should 
think, as Duff seems to think, that an accusation of an attack is the only 
appropriate response in such situations. The defendant in (2) did not intend 
[to damage another’s property] though he did in fact attempt [to damage] 
another’s property. As things turned out, he attempted [to damage] another’s 
property partly because he was reckless and did not take steps to ascertain 
ownership of the tree. It would not be inappropriate for the neighbour to 
demand of the defendant that he (the defendant) should take more care in 
the future; that the defendant should inquire about ownership of a tree before 
he makes any attempts to cut it down. The rationale behind such a demand 
targets the inherent recklessness in the defendant’s action, and the demand 
expresses the neighbour’s disapproval of the defendant’s indifference and 
carelessness towards other people’s property. This demand and its 
corresponding rationale treat the agent’s action as an instance of 
endangerment. The demand is not “you should take more care next time 




care next time because you might have damaged someone else’s (or my) 
property”, or “you should inquire about ownership before you try to cut down 
a tree because you might damage someone else’s property”.  
 The same kind of response is appropriate in cases involving physical 
harm. Suppose a hunter intends to kill a deer and sees what he thinks might 
be a deer in the woods. He knows that there are other hunters around and 
realizes that what he sees might be a person. He has no intention of killing a 
person, though he takes aim at the living thing without determining whether it 
really is a human or a deer. As it turns out, the hunter had aimed at and shot 
a human being, though luckily his shot had missed. Duff argues that the 
victim could accuse the hunter of trying to kill her since the living thing which 
the hunter tried to kill is really her. Furthermore, Duff argues that he victim’s 
accusation may be qualified though it could not be negated by the hunter’s 
response “I thought you were a deer”. 
Again, it is not obvious why the victim’s accusation would be a 
response that signals an attack (e.g. “you tried to kill me”) rather than one 
that signals an endangerment (e.g. “you might have killed me”). We can 
certainly imagine the victim rejecting the hunter’s explanation—that he 
thought she was a deer—and say to the hunter “well, I’m not a deer and you 
just tried to kill me!”. However, we can just as easily imagine a different 
response from the victim, one that addresses the hunter’s explanation with 
the legitimate demand, “why did you not check before you fired the shot?”, or 
“you should have checked before you fired at me”. The second kind of 
response—which treats the hunter’s action as a case of endangerment—is 
just as appropriate, if not more so, as the first kind of response (which treat 
the hunter’s action as an attack). The second kind of response emphasizes 
the agent’s recklessness by demanding not that “you should check next time 
because you tried to kill someone”, but rather that “you should check next 
time because you might have killed someone”.69 
 At best, our ordinary responses to borderline cases cannot help us 
determine whether such cases are attacks or endangerments. Luckily, our 
                                                     
69
 See Alexander (2010) for a similar argument, and see Duff’s (2010) reply to Alexander .  
89 
 
response to such cases—i.e. what we can appropriately accuse the 
defendants of in such cases—is only one of several considerations that 
differentiates attacks from endangerments. In Chapter 2, I argued that, all 
else being equal, culpability for purposeful actions does not vary according to 
the level of risk an agent imposes while culpability for reckless actions does. 
Purposeful actions and reckless actions constitute the paradigm of attacks 
and endangerments respectively, and what I have argued in Chapter 2 is 
applicable here. In paradigm cases of attacks—e.g. D attempts [to damage 
his neighbour’s tree]—the defendant is guided by the wrong reasons.70 Given 
the intention with which it is done, D’s action is wrongful independent of the 
risks he imposes. If D intends [to damage his neighbour’s tree] and tries to 
damage a tree which he thinks might belong to his neighbour, the risk he 
imposes on his neighbour’s property can vary depending on the means he 
employs to damage the tree or the likelihood that the tree belongs to his 
neighbour. However, his intention [to damage his neighbour’s tree] 
supersedes any of the other considerations. Should he adopt an inefficient 
means of damaging the tree, his choice of means may speak to his 
competence or lack thereof, but it does not speak to, nor detract from, the 
blameworthiness of his action. 
 Matters are different in paradigm cases of endangerment. If D is 
renovating his garden and is reckless towards his neighbour’s tree, then he is 
failing to respond to the right kind of reasons, such as taking appropriate care 
to avoid damage to others’ properties. Suppose, for instance, that in 
renovating his garden, D is choosing between two different methods of 
accomplishing a particular task. Both methods will accomplish the task, 
though they carry different levels of risk to the tree. If both methods pose 
substantial risks to the tree, then D has reasons to refrain from trying to 
accomplish that task. However, should he choose one of the two options, he 
is more blameworthy for choosing the riskier option. If he chooses the less 
risky option, his actions speaks badly of him because is not responding to 
reasons against undertaking the renovation task altogether—i.e. reasons 
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against exposing other people’s property to substantial risk of damage. 
However, if he chooses the more risky option, his actions speaks more badly 
of him since (compared to the less risky option) he imposes a higher risk on 
another’s property.71 
 Culpability in attacks is not sensitive to the level of risk imposed 
because the agent aims to accomplish something which is inherently harmful; 
his action is wrong because it specifically aims at an outcome that is harmful. 
The level of risk an attacker imposes on another is irrelevant to the 
wrongfulness of his action. Culpability in endangerments is sensitive to the 
level of risk imposed because what the agent is blameworthy for is his lack of 
proper concern for a protected interest; he is more or less blameworthy 
depending on the level of risk he imposes, as greater risk imposition reveal 
greater lack of proper concern for others. The action of a defendant who 
intends [to damage this tree] and is reckless as to ownership of the tree is not 
inherently harmful; it would be harmful if the tree belongs to another but it 
would not be harmful if the tree belongs to the defendant. What makes this 
defendant’s action wrongful is not that he tried [to damage a tree] which 
actually belongs to another, for this suggests that D’s action would not be 
wrongful if the tree did not belong to another. Instead, what makes D’s action 
wrongful is that he is reckless as to ownership of the tree, which is to suggest 
that D’s action is wrongful whether or not the tree belongs to another.72 
My view regarding (1) and (2) fits with what I have said about risk and 
culpability in attacks and endangerments. Suppose in one variation of case 
(2), the defendant thinks there is a twenty percent chance that the property 
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he intends to damage belongs to his neighbour, and in another variation the 
defendant thinks there is an eighty percent chance that the property belongs 
to his neighbour. In each variation, the defendant should make inquiries 
about ownership and determine whether the property belongs to his 
neighbour. Given that he does not make the appropriate inquiries, we think 
badly of the defendant in the first variation (where the risk is low) but we think 
worse of the defendant in the second variation (where the risk is high). The 
defendant should refrain from damaging the property regardless of whether 
he thinks there is a twenty percent chance or an eighty percent chance that 
the property belongs to his neighbour, but the defendant’s attempt to damage 
property is less objectionable in the first variation than in the second 
variation. We can say the same about the hunter. He should refrain from 
shooting the living thing if he thinks there is a chance that it is a human 
being. However, if he shoots at the living thing anyway, his action is more 
objectionable if he thinks there is an eighty percent chance the being is a 
human than if he think there is a twenty percent chance that the being is a 
human. 
 So far in this section I have argued that scenarios (1) and (2) amount 
to acts of (non-consummated) endangerment. Contrary to Duff’s view, my 
position suggests that the mens rea for attempts should at least require that 
the agent act with a direct intention to the consequence element of an 
offence and knowledge or belief as to circumstance elements of that offence. 
I mentioned earlier that an agent who acts with knowledge or belief as to 
circumstance elements of an offence does not direct his action towards harm. 
But his willingness to carry out his action knowing or believing that it will 
cause harm commits him to an attack on what he knows or believes to be 
another’s rights or interests. Thus far, this discussion has been limited to 
cases of criminal damage and assault involving bodily harm. But unlike 
criminal damage or assault, my argument that attempts require more than 
recklessness as to the circumstances of an offence may or may not apply to 
cases of rape. I admit that it is not entirely clear to me whether a defendant 




reckless as to the other person’s consent. In the rest of this chapter, I turn to 
the offence of rape and explore why rape may be different from criminal 
damage or assault in the context of this discussion.  
 
5 Recklessness and Rape 
With respect to criminal damage and assault, I have argued that when an 
agent acts with an intention [to damage property] or an intention [to cause 
injury] and is reckless as to ownership of the property or to the fact that the 
living thing is a human being, what makes such actions wrongful is not that 
the intended aim is inherently wrongful, but that the agent’s recklessness as 
to relevant circumstances surrounding his action reveals his indifference to 
the interests or well-being of others. His action is blameworthy because he 
ought to have taken more care and he ought to have made inquiries about 
ownership of the property or the status of the living thing before acting as he 
did. 
We can say similar things in the context of rape. An agent who acts 
with an intention [to have intercourse] and is reckless as to the other person’s 
consent ought to take more care and be sensitive about consent before 
attempting to have intercourse with that person. We can accuse the agent of 
taking an unjustifiable risk with regards to another person’s consent, and we 
can demand that he take more care in his sexual encounters. Perhaps 
(though I am not sure) we think badly of the defendant who is aware of a 20 
percent risk that his “partner” may be non-consenting, and think worse of the 
defendant who is aware of a 80 percent risk that the other person may be 
non-consenting. Everything I have said in the context of criminal damage and 
of causing bodily harm can be applied to the case of rape, so we at least 
have some reasons to think that recklessness as to consent constitutes an 
act of endangerment. 
The problem with rape though is that, as Duff argues, it would be odd 
and morally reprehensible if the accusations that I mentioned above are all 
that we had to say to the agent. Surely we can accuse the agent of much 
more than simply taking an unjustifiable risk as to consent, and surely we can 
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demand much more from him than simply that he take more care in his 
sexual encounters. When an agent is reckless as to another person’s 
consent, he consciously disregards a risk that his sexual “partner” may be 
non-consenting.73 He may hope that the other person does consent, but 
when he proceeds with intercourse while disregarding the risk of non-
consent, he is no longer treating the other person as a partner in what should 
be a mutually gratifying activity between consenting agents. To merely hope 
that he is having [consensual intercourse] is to take an unacceptable 
normative view of sex.74 Against this view, we should see it as a mutually 
gratifying activity between consenting agents. Neither agent is simply a 
means to the other’s end. Instead, each person’s interest in the activity is 
seen as important and each person’s autonomy is respected within the 
activity. 
Duff argues that to be reckless about consent is to see sexual 
intercourse as an activity that serves to gratify him or herself, and that the 
agent sees his or her sexual “partner” as a mere means to that gratification. 
Consent is not merely a contingent circumstance of consensual sex. Without 
it, the non-consenting agent is in fact a mere means which the defendant 
uses for his own end. One way in which recklessness about consent could 
amount to an instance of an attack then is if using others as a mere means 
constitute a species of an attack, where the object of the attack is the 
person’s sexual integrity. Recklessness as to consent suggests an 
indifference to the other person’s integrity and that defendant is willing to use 
the other person as a passive object. Such actions and attitudes are 
inherently wrongful. Even if the person does consent, she may feel violated if 
she found out that her “partner” was indifferent to her interests. And even if 
the intercourse is consensual, we may still object that the defendant has 
committed a wrong, though luckily no harm has occurred. 
What is needed here is an account of the wrongness of rape, and 
whether Duff’s normative view of sex should be adopted by the criminal law. I 
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will not address these issues here and will simply conclude by noting that 
there is a third option if we remain undecided on this issue. I mentioned 
earlier that in making the ruling in Khan, the court was partly guided by the 
recognition that if the defendant was not convicted of attempted rape, the 
alternative would be exonerating an agent who has done something that is 
clearly wrong. Intuitively, this would be an unappealing verdict, and given the 
seriousness of rape (which would have been the offence in Khan had the 
defendant succeeded in having intercourse), we may have pragmatic 
reasons for convicting the defendant of attempted rape even if we think the 
act is one of non-consummated endangerment. The defendant is just as 
culpable as someone who has committed the completed offence; and that 
when it is unclear whether the defendant has committed an endangerment or 
an attack, it would be permissible, on pragmatic grounds, to convict him of an 
attempt and to label him as an attempted rapist. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that cases like (1) and (2) constitute acts of 
endangerment rather than attacks. In both cases, the defendant acts with an 
intention [to damage property], is reckless as to ownership of the property, 
and the property belongs to another person. The defendant in (1) 
successfully damages property while the defendant in (2) fails to do so. I 
have argued that with the possible exception of rape, crimes that conform to 
the structure of (1) constitute acts of consummated endangerment while 
those that conform to the structure of (2) constitute acts of non-consummated 
endangerment. I have not commented on cases (3) and (4), where the 
property belongs to the defendant himself. As I mentioned earlier, (3) has 
generates some controversy since it is sometimes considered to be an 
impossible attempt. Given my arguments in this paper, (3) does not 
constitute an impossible attempt because, much like the defendants’ actions 
in (1) and (2), the action in (3) does not amount to an attack. If anything, (3) 
and (4) constitute acts of non-consummated endangerment. 
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 Subjectivists and objectivists about criminal liability can disagree about 
whether (3) and (4) amount to acts of endangerment. Subjectivists may 
argue that we have grounds to hold (3) and (4) liable for specific acts of 
endangerment since the defendants in these cases realise that there may be 
a risk to others’ property (which, by luck, turned out not to be the case). 
Objectivists may disagree and argue that because the property in fact 
belongs to the defendants themselves, we should not hold the defendants 
liable for anything since they have not actually created any risks to anyone’s 
property. Irrespective of deep disagreements between subjectivists and 
objectivists, we may, on pragmatic grounds, favour not criminalizing or 
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Recognition and the Significance of Formal Apologies 
 
Having looked at some philosophical questions surrounding the notion of 
luck, culpability, and the mens rea requirement for criminal attempts, 
Chapters 4 and 5 will turn to a question that must be addressed if we are to 
make progress on the problem of outcome luck. Part of the problem has to 
do with the extent to which an agent should be punished for the 
consequences of his actions, and we need a normative theory of punishment 
in order to address this issue.1 
In these last two chapters, I will defend Duff’s communicative account 
of punishment from an important criticism from instrumentalists; namely, that 
it fails to take crime prevention seriously.2 I argue that communicative 
theorists can overcome this objection by showing that the communication of 
censure entails not only special prevention (as Duff has shown) but general 
prevention as well.3 This requires that I begin, in Chapter 4, with an overview 
of communicative punishment before moving on, in Chapter 5, to the 
connection between censure and general prevention. 
In addition to giving an overview of Duff’s account, this chapter 
defends several key points in his view, including the idea that we should see 
the offender’s punishment as a formal apology.4 I do not argue that formal 
apologies are sufficiently valuable to justify our penal institutions. On the 
contrary, throughout this chapter and the next, I concede instrumentalists’ 
point that general deterrence must figure in the justification of punishment.5 
As we will see in this chapter, the idea of punishment as apology affects 
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 See Feinberg (1995). 
2
 See Tadros (2011), chapter 5.  
3
 See Duff (2001, 88-89; 107-9). 
4
 See Duff (2001). 
5
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communicative view that I defend (and Duff defends), we are interested in the latter rather 




neither the justification nor the distribution of communicative punishment. 
However, the idea should nonetheless be defended as an ideal account of 
how we should view punishment and how the community should regard 
offenders. 
 I will begin in section 1 with a brief overview of Duff’s account, and of 
the role that apologies play within it. For Duff, punishment has three 
interrelated aims: recognition, self-reform, and reconciliation.6 Talk of 
recognition often focuses on offenders’ recognition of their wrongdoing. In 
sections 2 and 3, I highlight the importance of the community’s recognition of 
the victim, and the sense in which punishment is necessary for this kind of 
recognition.7 I argue that the community’s recognition can be an important 
aim in itself, but, in the next chapter, we will also see that it is the 
community’s recognition of wrongdoing that entails general prevention. This 
emphasis on recognition does not support the idea that punishment should 
be seen as an apology; recognition (especially by the community) can be 
achieved without an apology or reconciliation. In section 4, I offer some 
reasons for why we should nonetheless see punishment as an apology and 
explain why punishment as apology does not raise any problems about 
unjustified state coercion. 
 
1 Communicative Punishment and Formal Apologies 
Central to Duff’s theory is the idea that criminal punishment should be 
understood and justified in terms of communicating deserved censure.8 
Punishment should communicate to the offender that what he did was wrong, 
to the wider political community that we take such wrongdoing seriously, and 
to the victim that the political community takes her legally protected interests 
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 Duff (2001, 107-12). 
7
 It might be thought that symbolic and non-punitive measures are sometimes sufficient for 
recognition. So the question is why or when is punishment needed for adequate recognition? 
See Duff (2001, 82-85); Matravers (2011); Narayan, (1993); von Hirsch (1993), chapter 2. 
8
 This is slightly different from what Duff says, which is that we should “understand and 
justify criminal punishment…as a species of secular penance”. Punishment is a form of 
secular penance where “a burden [is] imposed on an offender for his crime, through which, it 
is hoped, he will come to repent his crime, to begin to reform himself, and thus reconcile 
himself with those he has wronged.” Duff (2001, 106).  
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seriously.9 Censure, most distinctly, includes the backward-looking judgment 
that what the offender did was wrong, and on Duff’s account, it is 
communicated with the intention that the offender will recognize, understand, 
and accept that he has committed a wrong. Furthermore, censure also 
entails forward-looking aims such as reform and reconciliation; the offender 
should, through a genuine recognition and acceptance of his wrongdoing, be 
motivated to make a commitment not to re-offend and to apologise for his 
action.10 
 On Duff’s view, censure or moral criticism is the intrinsically 
appropriate response to criminal wrongdoing, and punishment is the 
necessary means of communicating censure adequately.11 When we 
censure an offender, we should not just express to him that what he did was 
wrong. The expression of censure does not require the offender to be 
responsive to our moral criticism.12 But if we are to treat the offender as a 
responsible moral agent, we must try to persuade him to recognize that his 
conduct was wrong, to understand why it was wrong, and to accept his wrong 
as something which he should not have done and will not do in the future.13 
And if we are to treat him as a fellow citizen, with whom we must continue to 
share our political community after the offence, he should be expected to 
                                                     
9
 Duff (2001, 80-1; 114).  
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 Ibid., 107-10. 
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 Ibid., 88-89; 82. Duff now puts more emphasis on the idea of punishment as an 
appropriate kind of apologetic reparation, which the offender owes to those whom he has 




 Ibid., 79-80.  
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 For a criticism of the communicative account, see Joshua Glasgow (2015). One of 
Glasgow’s criticisms is that of the uncommunicative offender, who is so incapacitated in his 
abilities to communicate that he cannot engage in communications with society. He is not 
capable of receiving society’s message and, for him, the aims of communication are not 
achievable. We might have the intuition that many of these offenders—especially those who 
commit serious wrongs—should be punished, but communicative punishment is not justified 
for these offenders. Glasgow’s argument assumes that an initially uncommunicative offender 
cannot become communicative throughout the penal process. This is to assume that the 
offender cannot learn to communicate through exposure to paradigmatic communicative 
practices such as victim-offender mediation; that the offender is incapable of learning from 
their social context. I think this is a contentious assumption which requires empirical support, 
and it would be premature to dismiss the communicative account based on this assumption. 
Additionally, if the offender is so incapacitated that he cannot communicate, then there might 
be questions about whether he is fit to be tried (i.e. to answer for his actions) and fit to be 




apologise for his wrongdoing and the community should be ready to reconcile 
with him after an appropriate apology has been made.14 
Communicative punishment is thus justified by its pursuit of 
recognition, reform, and reconciliation. Recognition is internal to censure, and 
reform and reconciliation follow naturally from recognition of wrongdoing. In 
order to pursue these aims, punishment is meant to perform the following 
functions.15 First, it should provide a structure within which the offender can 
focus on his wrongdoing and thus come to understand why it was wrong. 
This is not to suggest that offenders, prior to being punished, do not know 
that their conducts are wrongful.16 The idea is that punishment should appeal 
to the offender’s sense of right and wrong, and it should focus the offender’s 
attention on a deeper appreciation for the wrongfulness of his conduct.17 
As we will see shortly, punishment ought to pursue the aim of 
recognition even if we think the offender already recognizes his wrong. This 
is because genuine recognition of one’s wrong—especially for serious 
wrongs that warrant punishment—requires the performance of reformative or 
reparative acts. If the offender truly appreciates the wrongfulness of his 
conduct, he should naturally make a commitment to refrain from similar 
wrongdoing in the future. If he were to re-offend, we would typically have 
grounds to question whether he did recognise the wrongfulness of his 
conduct. Note, though, that the process of self-reform is not just about 
making a commitment to act differently in the future; it involves figuring out 
what one must do to be able to act differently. This is the second function of 
punishment. It should stimulate and help the offender through the process of 
self-reform; it should help him understand how he is to reform himself and 
what it takes to refrain from future wrongdoing.18 
Finally, the offender’s punishment should also be seen as an apology 
through which the offender can seek reconciliation with whom he has 
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 Duff (2001, 109; 113-4). 
15
 See Duff (2001, 107-9). 
16
 See Narayan (1993, 173). 
17
 Duff (2001, 91; 97-8). See also von Hirsch (1993, 11). 
18
 Duff (2001, 108-9).  
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wronged.19 This is especially pertinent if we take seriously the idea that the 
offender and the victim are to continue living with each other as fellow 
citizens after the offence. In many cases, adequate apologies are less about 
what one says and more about what one does, and we should not think that 
mere verbal apologies would be enough to repair serious wrongs. If I 
recklessly damaged your record player, it would not be enough for me to say 
that I am sorry. I ought to make it up to you, for example, by buying you a 
new record player. In order to repair the wrong that I have committed against 
you, I ought to make adequate reparations for that wrong, and a verbal 
apology alone is often not enough to constitute the kind of apologetic 
reparation that is required in response to wrongdoing.20 Here, punishment is 
meant to give weight to the apology, as an adequate response that an 
offender must make in order for reconciliation to be possible.21 
 It might be tempting to think about the aims of censure in terms of 
successive stages, where we use punishment first to achieve recognition, 
followed by self-reform, and ending in the process of reconciliation. If this 
was the case, then the same offence may warrant different levels of 
punishment when committed by equally culpable offenders.22 An offender 
who already appreciates the wrongfulness of his conduct would, in principle, 
receive a lesser sentence than another relevantly similar offender who has 
no such appreciation. It is easy enough to see why we might think of 
punishment in this way. The connection between recognition and self-reform 
is an obvious example. Recognition has to do with an offender’s response to 
the backward-looking message of censure, where the political community is 
attempting to convey to the offender the reprobation and disapproval that his 
wrongdoing warrants. If we think that genuine recognition of wrongdoing 
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 The emphasis here is that we should see the offender’s punishment as an apology. 
Communicative theorists need not argue that punishment actually is an apology. But if all the 
requisite acts of an apology have been performed, we can act as if the offender has 
apologised for his wrong. See section 4 below.  
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 Note that for Duff, it may not be enough for me to simply repair the harm that has been 
caused by buying you a new record player. The act of repairing the harm should resemble 
an apologetic reparation, which may require more or less than the mere reparation of the 
harm.  
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should motivate an offender to avoid similar wrongdoing in the future, and to 
work out what he must do to avoid such wrongdoing, then it is surely 
tempting to think of recognition as the precursor to reform. But this is not how 
we should interpret Duff’s view. 
On Duff’s account, the entire sentence should be seen as an apology 
for the wrong that has been committed, which simultaneously provides both 
the structure for recognition and the conditions for undertaking self-reform.23 
This way of interpreting the aims of punishment might have led some 
theorists to think that we are headed for communicative confusion.24 Their 
reasoning is that if punishment is meant to stimulate recognition of 
wrongdoing, then it must be imposed before the offender has recognized his 
wrong. But if punishment is meant to act as an apology, then it must be 
imposed after the offender has recognized his wrong. How is punishment 
meant to play both of these roles? Again, a tempting response would be to 
say that punishment is a process, where recognition is followed by an 
apology. But this is not the case. 
According to Duff, punishment does not just do different things to 
different offenders, such as stimulating recognition in unrepentant offenders 
but serving only as an apology for reformed offenders. Instead, punishment 
also means different things to different offenders.25 For an offender who 
already appreciates the nature of his wrongdoing, he will see his punishment 
as something which he should undertake in order to reform himself and to 
apologise for his wrong. That is what it means to truly recognise one’s wrong. 
For an offender who does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and 
feels no need to reform himself, punishment can still be seen as an apology 
which involves recognition and a commitment to self-reform.26 The offender 
may not see his punishment in this way while he is being punished, but (we 
hope) he will come to see it as an apology after his sentence. 
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 See Duff (2001, 118-21). 
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 Tadros (2011, 101).  
25
 Ibid., 121.  
26
 Again, this is not to say that punishment actually is an apology. See fn. 19. 
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 The problem with interpreting communicative punishment in terms of 
successive stages is that it fails to capture the intimate connection between 
the aims of recognition, reform, and reconciliation. A commitment to self-
reform and the need to apologise do not just follow from recognition of 
wrongdoing; they are necessary for genuine recognition.27 And the actions 
which constitute an apology also constitute self-reform and recognition of 
wrongdoing. Suppose, for instance, that you committed a wrong against your 
friend. You promised and then forgot to pick him up from the hospital after his 
operation. The appropriate response is for you to issue an apology. A fitting 
apology should include an adequate acknowledgement of the wrong you 
have committed, such as saying that you are sorry for what you have done. 
But a mere verbal apology is not enough.  
Adequate recognition often requires appropriate reparations. You 
failed to keep an important promise and you ought to do something in order 
to make it up to him. But this reparative dimension is not something in 
addition to an acknowledgement of wrongdoing. Crucially, it is the vehicle 
through which you can adequately acknowledge your wrongdoing. A failure 
to do something in order to make it up to your friend would suggest, at least 
evidentially, that you do not genuinely recognize the seriousness of your 
wrong. But we have reason to think that you do not genuinely recognize your 
wrongdoing because a failure to repair serious wrongs (in the absence of 
extenuating circumstances) actually constitutes a lack of adequate 
recognition. 
Similar things can be said about the relationship between recognition 
and reform. Suppose you make no effort to apologise to your friend, and due 
to your lack of initiative, your partner intervenes and makes you apologise, 
for instance, by making you visit him and help him around the house while he 
recovers. You may not recognize the wrongfulness of your actions, but your 
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partner certainly does. The forced apology constitutes her recognition of your 
wrong, and it constitutes what she thinks you ought to do if you did recognize 
your wrongdoing. By forcing you to visit your friend and help him around the 
house, your partner hopes that you will come to appreciate why your action 
was wrong. In this case, the wrong stems from your failure to keep an 
important promise—i.e. to treat other people’s interests with proper concern. 
Someone who does treat another’s interest with proper concern would not 
have acted so carelessly and, had they broken a similar promise, they would 
have voluntarily done the things that your partner is now making you do. 
Here, the forced apology also constitutes a process of reform. You 
ought to repair the wrong you have committed because that is what is 
required of someone who shows proper concern for other people’s interest. 
Again, assuming that you are able to visit your friend and help him around 
the house, your failure to undertake such tasks would suggest, evidentially, 
that you do not truly understand why your action is wrong. And we have 
evidence to think that you do not truly understand why your action is wrong 
because genuine recognition—barring extenuating circumstance that would 
make reform impossible or unnecessary—actually requires reformative acts. 
The process of reform, which is materially identical to an apology, is 
necessary for genuine recognition. 
Of course, you may not realize the meaning of your apology while you 
are making it, but it nonetheless suggests to your friend that you recognize 
your wrongdoing. And even though you may not realize it, your apology also 
constitutes what you must do if you are to reform yourself. What is going on 
here is not that you recognize or acknowledge the wrong you have 
committed against your friend at t1 and take steps to address the wrong and 
reform yourself at t2. The apology, which must involve (measures akin to) 
repairing the wrong you have committed, constitutes simultaneously both 
your recognition of wrongdoing and a necessary step in reforming yourself as 
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someone who had acted wrongly.28 Again, the reparative act is not just a 
means of self-reform, but a necessary element of genuine recognition. 
 Duff’s account of punishment captures what an offender should do in 
the aftermath of an offence. He should make an apology that would be 
sufficient to redress the wrong he has committed. And in performing the 
requisite acts for an apology, the offender both recognizes the wrong he has 
committed and takes the necessary steps to reform himself. For an offender 
who already recognizes and regrets his wrongdoing, he will see his 
punishment as embodying both his recognition of the wrong and the 
necessary steps he needs to take for self-reform and reconciliation. For an 
offender who does not recognize or regret his wrongdoing, his punishment 
embodies the community’s recognition of his wrongdoing and the necessary 
steps for reform. But such things are imposed on him, with the hope that he 
will come to understand his punishment as an appropriate response to his 
wrongdoing. 
 Many critics find it difficult to reconcile the value of an apology with the 
nature of punishment (as something that is imposed on offenders). If we think 
that apologies are valuable because they convey the offender’s remorseful 
recognition of their wrongdoing, then the forced nature of punishment would 
seem to undermine the sincerity of that recognition. I will say more about this 
in section 4. For now, it would be worthwhile to note that although apologies 
are central to Duff’s account, the idea of punishment as apology and the aim 
of reconciliation have no impact on either the justification or distribution of 
communicative punishment.29 
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 In this sense, punishment is less like criminal trials where the sentencing stage follows the 
fact-finding stage, and more like political demonstrations where forceful expressions of 
disapproval for a certain state of affairs is, at the same time, an attempt to alter that state of 
affairs. The expression of disapproval itself includes a desire for change, and the act of 
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 On Duff’s account, reconciliation is an aim of censure and a part of the justification for 
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preventive grounds, which is entailed by the aim of recognition. Whether or not punishment 




 The notion of an apology has no impact on the distribution of 
punishment because the same kind of burden is involved in the apology (i.e. 
the aim of reconciliation), the process of self-reform, and the recognition of 
wrongdoing.30 The entire sentence is meant, simultaneously, to act as an 
apology and aid in the process of self-reform, which is necessary for genuine 
recognition. In the previous example, the act of visiting your friend may be 
enough to serve as an apology, but it is also what you must do in the process 
of self-reform. Even if you have already apologised (verbally) to your friend 
and reconciled with him, you still need to repair the wrong you have 
committed because that is what is required of you as someone who shows 
proper concern for another’s interests. It is not the case that, by getting rid of 
the apology, you only need to repair half of the wrong you have committed. 
Our decision to pursue the aim of reconciliation—or not, as the case may 
be—does not affect how we ought to pursue the aims of recognition and 
reform. Genuine recognition still requires a commitment to self-reform. And 
while adequate means of self-reform can constitute an apology, they do not 
require anything more or less than what an adequate apology would require.  
 In the next chapter, we will also see that the aim of reconciliation does 
not affect the justification of communicative punishment. There, I argue that 
the aims of communicative punishment entail general prevention, but it will 
be clear that recognition—without reconciliation—is sufficient to entail 
general prevention. Nonetheless, in section 4 I will try to convince critics that 
we should see punishment as a formal apology. For those who remain 
unconvinced, they can simply see communicative punishment as an 
appropriate means of recognition and self-reform. 
Before I defend punishment as an apology, I want to comment on the 
aim of recognition. Both critics and proponents of the communicative account 
often discuss the aim of recognition in terms of the offender’s recognition of 
his wrongdoing. This is especially the case when the discussion focuses on 
the idea of punishment as apology, which is meant to convey the offender’s 
remorseful recognition for his offence. But as we have seen in the previous 
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example, a forced apology does not just convey the offender’s recognition of 
his wrongdoing. It also conveys the recognition of the party who is imposing 
the punishment. That is, punishment can convey the community’s moral 
criticism of the offender’s conduct. In the next two sections, I will highlight 
why such recognition is valuable and explain why punishment is necessary 
for recognition. 
 
2 The Content of Recognition 
Whether recognition is an important aim of punishment depends on exactly 
what we think should be recognized and by whom. For instance, 
instrumentalists may think that an offender’s recognition of wrongdoing is 
important because it leads to self-reform or special deterrence. In this case, 
the value of recognition would be contingent on its deterrent effects. In the 
next chapter, I argue that recognition entails general prevention, but it is 
specifically recognition by the political community that entails general 
prevention. In this section here, I will discuss what the political community 
can and should recognise through punishment.  
 One of the things that a community should recognise is the victim. She 
has been wronged through the offence and it is important for the state or 
community to recognise the wrong she has suffered. Many theorists have 
acknowledged the importance of recognizing the victim.31 It is, for instance, 
present in Duff’s account of crime and punishment. According to him, crimes 
are public wrongs. They are public in the sense that the wrongdoing 
concerns the public; it is not merely a private matter between the wrongdoer 
and the victim. The political community shares the wrong that the victim has 
suffered, and in this sense, the community owes it to the victim to recognize 
her suffering by censuring the offender.32 Several German legal theorists 
have also noted this point, and they seem to share Duff’s view that 
punishment is able to recognise the wrong that the victim has suffered by 
censuring the offender for his offence.33 
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The interest that victims have in being recognised as having been 
wronged is something that a theory of punishment should take seriously. This 
is not to say that the aim of recognition is enough to justify our penal 
institutions. Not all victims require recognition, especially if the wrong she has 
suffered is relatively minor. And we should not think that recognition of the 
victim’s suffering is always worth pursuing in light of the costs and harms that 
are associated with punishment. But it would be wrong to think that this kind 
of recognition could not contribute to the justification of individual tokens of 
punishment. In some cases, especially cases involving egregious wrongs, 
recognition is paramount for the victim (and those who identify with the 
victim). It is more significant than any preventive or retributive aims that 
punishment could pursue because victims have an interest in telling the truth 
about what has happened to them and having that truth recognize by their 
community. It is, as some theorists put it, an existential need for victims to 
receive public confirmation about the wrong they have suffered and the 
responsibility of those who perpetrated the wrong.34 
We should not think of victims’ need for recognition as some kind of 
irrational preoccupation, which we might lump together with our retributive 
urges as something that should be overcome.35 Recognition is important to 
our identity. It is important to the narrative we tell ourselves about our lives 
and what has happened to us. By addressing the offender and his conduct, 
recognition offers a satisfactory closure to the victim’s ordeal and allows her 
to move on with her life. It publicly confirms what the victim considers to be 
an important truth about her, and it shows victims that the political community 
is in solidarity with her. Victims can pursue their case through various means 
other than (and in addition to) the criminal justice system, such as tort law 
and public inquiries, which can give some recognition of the wrong she has 
suffered. I will discuss this point in the next section. But if the victim is 
continuously ignored through all available means, we should not be surprised 
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 Narayan, for instance, identifies one of the roles of censure as satisfying the victim’s 
animus against wrongdoers (1993, 170). 
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if she comes to feel that she is insignificant in the eyes of the state or the 
political community.   
 For some theorists, including Duff and Roxin, it is quite clear that 
recognition of the victim’s suffering is tied to recognition of the offender’s 
wrongdoing.36 But this point has not always been made clearly, and other 
theorists seem to suggest that it is possible to recognize (1) the victim’s 
suffering without recognizing (2) the offender’s wrongdoing.37 Victor Tadros, 
for instance, argues that we can affirm the victim without censuring the 
offender.38 He starts from the premise that the state has a duty to protect its 
citizens, and that when it fails to do so it ought to affirm the rights of the 
citizen as a victim of criminal wrongdoing. Otherwise she might come to 
believe that the state does not take her wellbeing seriously. One way for the 
state to affirm her rights is, as Duff and other theorists have pointed out, to 
censure the offender for what he has done. Through punishment, we 
communicate to the offender that his conduct was wrong and that he should 
have treated the victim differently. But Tadros rejects this option. Instead, he 
argues that we can affirm the victim by showing her that adequate measures 
were taken to protect her, and that appropriate responses will be taken to 
protect her in the future, such as incapacitating the offender.39 
 The problem with this suggestion is that it fails to appreciate why 
victims may come to feel insignificant, and why censure is the appropriate 
means of affirming their significance. What makes many criminal acts wrong 
is precisely the fact that the offender does not treat the victim with a degree 
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of moral significance that they should grant to other people.40 Part of what it 
means to recognize an offender’s wrongdoing is to recognize that he treated 
the victim as if she was less significant. This point is quite obvious when we 
consider recognition by the offender. If he truly appreciates the wrongfulness 
of his conduct, he should understand that he treated the victim as if she was 
less significant. And if he appreciates that he failed to treat the victim with a 
sufficient degree of moral significance, then he should understand that his 
conduct was wrong.  
 If the state had failed to take very basic steps to protect its citizens, 
then it would be partly to blame for the wrongs that its citizens have suffered. 
Here, the state has committed a wrong for failing to carry out its duty towards 
its own citizens. If the state is to blame for the victim’s suffering, then the 
state should take steps to protect her in the future, and it would help to show 
her that such steps have been taken. This would be an appropriate response 
to its prior failure to protect its citizens because it offers adequate redress for 
its wrongdoing. The state recognizes its prior failing by making a commitment 
not to do so in the future. But in cases where the state has done its duty, the 
offender alone is at fault for his wrong against the victim. The state can of 
course show citizens that appropriate measures were taken to protect her, 
but this would not do anything to address the offender’s wrong, which is what 
manifests a denial of the victim’s significance. 
Censure is the appropriate response because it conveys, to the victim, 
that the political community recognizes the offender’s conduct as wrongful. 
That is the appropriate way to show victims that they are morally significant. 
Why should victims be satisfied with knowing that the state took adequate 
measures to protect her prior to the offence? When we are wronged, our 
indignation is against the wrongdoer for what he has done. It is not against 
those who have an obligation to protect us, especially if such an obligation 
has been met. But we may come to feel indignant against the political 
community when they fail to censure the offender because it would suggest 
that the polity does not take the wrong we have suffered with the seriousness 
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that it deserves. Barring extenuating circumstance that might militate against 
the use of punishment, lack of censure suggests that the polity is willing to 
condone such wrongdoing41, which is what would make victims feel as if they 
lacked moral significance.42 
At this point, critics like Tadros may accept that recognition of the 
victim requires censuring the offender, but they will nonetheless deny that 
punishment is necessary for censure. They argue that censure can be 
communicated or expressed through non-punitive measures; that we can 
censure the offender (and thus recognize the victim) through formal 
convictions, symbolic punishments, civil judgments and remedies, public 
inquiries, restorative justice, etc. The next section examines this line of 
argument. I will show why such arguments are mistaken and explain the 
sense in which “non-punitive” measures are insufficient for adequate 
recognition.  
 
3 Punishment and Recognition 
We need to start by noting the difference between punishment and what we 
tend to think of as non-punitive measures. Punishment necessarily involves 
the communication or expression of censure and the imposition of hard 
treatment.43 Both of these elements require justification because each one 
involves the purposeful infliction of something unpleasant by the state on its 
citizens.44 Non-punitive measures will typically include either the expression 
of censure or the imposition of hard treatment, but not both. Formal 
convictions, symbolic punishments, and public inquiries are non-punitive in 
the sense that they aim to express censure or assign blame without imposing 
                                                     
41
 See Chapter 5.2 for a discussion on the kind of things that impunity may imply.  
42
 Perhaps it is possible to recognize the victim without censuring the offender when 
recognition is given by those who do not have the standing to censure the offender. We often 
see something like this in the international context. For example, suppose Country A has 
committed a serious wrong against Country B. A neighbouring country, Country C, does not 
have the standing to censure Country A, but it can recognize Country B’s suffering through 
other measures, such as the creation of memorials. This, of course, falls short of the kind of 
recognition that victims are interested in, which is that of the offender and the community to 
which they belong (including, in this case, countries other than Country C).  
43
 See Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation of these two elements. 
44
 See Chapter 5.1 for a brief discussion of the need to justify both the censuring and hard 




hard treatment.45 And civil remedies may impose hard treatment in the form 
of damages without censuring those who have committed a wrong. 
Legal theorists and lay people often think of restorative approaches to 
justice as an alternative to punishment, along with probations. But insofar as 
these measures include hard treatment and are imposed in response to 
criminal wrongdoing (e.g. following a criminal conviction), they constitute a 
form of punishment rather than an alternative to punishment.46 Restorative 
approaches to justice are often optional and undertaken in addition to an 
offender’s court imposed sentences, but there is no reason to think that 
victim-offender mediations cannot be imposed as a mode of punishment. The 
mediation process, much like Community Payback/Service Orders, extract 
time from offenders and force them to confront their wrongdoing by at least 
listening to (and hopefully engaging with) victims and their community. 
Irrespective of any reparative actions that may result from such mediations, 
the process is itself a form of hard treatment, especially if it is imposed on 
offenders who have no options but to participate in (or be confronted by) the 
process.  
 So what does it mean to say that punishment is necessary for 
censure? For starters, it means that hard treatment punishment is the best or 
only way to communicate or express censure adequately.47 Accordingly, 
punishment is the best or only way to recognize the wrong that the offender 
has committed against the victim. This is not to say that punishment is the 
best or only way to communicate censure for all criminal wrongdoing. Formal 
convictions and symbolic punishment may be enough to communicate 
censure for very minor offences, although I suspect reasonable minds can 
disagree about which offences are included in this category. But for serious 
offences, non-punitive measures would not be enough to communicate the 
appropriate level of censure that is warranted for such wrongdoing. 
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 See Duff (2003c; 2001, 92-106).  
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 Critics who deny the necessary connection between punishment and 
censure are thus committed to the thesis that it is possible for us to 
communicate censure for serious offences through non-punitive measures. 
Such measures include formal convictions, symbolic punishment, civil 
remedies, and public inquiries; and they exclude fines, probations, 
community service, and victim-offender mediations. Each of these non-
punitive measures fails, in different ways, to fully communicate the level of 
censure that is warranted for an offence.48 
Civil judgments may impose damages, which could equal the kind of 
hard treatment that would be involved in criminal punishment, but such 
judgments do not include a censuring element. Tort remedies can offer 
compensation to victims for the wrongful harm they have suffered, but it does 
not blame the offender for wrongfully harming the victim. The judgements 
issue a finding of liability rather than fault, i.e. an agent or party is found 
responsible but not deserving of moral criticism for their conduct.49 If we think 
that full recognition of the victim requires the imposition of censure, then tort 
remedies fail to achieve full recognition because it lacks the censuring 
element of criminal punishment. There will be a significant portion of cases 
where adequate recognition is not possible because censure, rather than 
compensation, is the appropriate form of redress for the kind of wrong that 
has been committed. But we might also think that for some types of wrongs, 
tort remedies may be able to give some (and even adequate) recognition to 
victims because compensation, rather than censure, is enough to remedy the 
wrong they have suffered. 
Public inquiries differ from civil judgements in that the former can issue 
both a finding of wrongdoing and a judgment of fault. They can also 
recommend reform measures, which are meant to help prevent similar harm 
or wrongdoing in the future. When such recommendations are implemented, 
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the measures may be onerous for those who have been found guilty of 
wrongdoing. But unlike punishment, the measures are not intended to be 
onerous, nor will they necessarily be onerous. Nonetheless, in these cases, 
public inquiries can offer full recognition of the victim in the same way that 
criminal punishment recognizes the victim, by censuring the offender 
(through hard treatment) for their wrongdoing. Quite often though, when the 
recommendations are not implemented, public inquiries are more akin to 
formal convictions than punishment, and they fail to censure the offender in 
the same way that formal convictions fail to censure the offender. 
Formal convictions and symbolic punishment are intended to convey 
censure, but they do not include the use of (additional) hard treatment. Moral 
criticism would be expressed through words alone (i.e. formal convictions) or 
through the creation of new conventions which would express our criticism 
(i.e. symbolic punishment). We can tell offenders just how wrong their 
conduct was at the sentencing hearing, or we can start a new convention, 
such as giving offenders weeds or scarlet letters, which would symbolise our 
criticism of their wrongdoing.50 
Critics often suggest that this is possible; that hard treatment is 
unnecessary for censure, which can be expressed adequately through these 
non-punitive measures. These suggestions betray a lack of appreciation for 
the complexities of our moral communication, and how such communications 
evolve over time. Differences in the level of moral criticism we want to 
communicate for murder and minor assault are not something we can 
capture through mere words alone. It is not enough to say to those who 
commit murder that their conduct was most seriously wrongful, however 
vehemently we say it and however clear we are in explaining why the 
conduct was wrong. The adequate communication of certain judgments—
including moral criticism—requires actions. For instance, think about 
expressions of gratitude or apologies.51 
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Suppose you needed a kidney transplant and your colleague donates 
one of his kidneys to you. It is not enough for you to say a quick “thank you” 
as you might do to a stranger who holds the door for you, nor would it be 
enough for you to passionately say that you are eternally grateful for his 
generosity. Perhaps your verbal communication may be enough for your 
colleague, who is not expecting anything for his generosity. But would you 
really think that mere verbal expressions are enough to convey your deep 
gratitude?52 Or suppose I have deliberately and unjustifiably caused severe 
bodily harm to you, which requires you to undergo extensive treatment. You 
would surely think that the wrong you have suffered is not being taken 
seriously if the court merely disciplined me verbally and was willing to close 
the matter after I issued you a verbal apology. In the case of serious 
wrongdoing, formal convictions without punishment suggest to us that the 
courts do not consider such wrongdoing to be so serious after all. It conveys 
to us a false recognition of the wrong that has been committed. 
That is how we communicate the range of our moral judgments or 
sentiments—often through actions rather than words alone. Critics agree that 
certain actions such as the giving of gifts, the undertaking of burdens, or the 
imposition of punishment are central to how we in fact communicate 
gratitude, remorse, and moral criticism. And they rightly point out that our 
way of communicating such sentiments is shaped by social conventions, 
which can change overtime. What they argue is that, when it comes to 
censure and punishment, we should hasten the evolution of our social 
conventions so that the giving of weeds or scarlet letters may be enough for 
us to communicate the full range of moral judgments. So rather than letting 
social conventions evolve organically, they argue that we ought to be active 
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in establishing new conventions of communicating censure, one that would 
be less harmful and costly than punishment.53 
 I think critics are right to suggest that we have reasons to establish 
new conventions for communicating censure54, but it is nonetheless 
unrealistic to think that we can adopt drastically different conventions such as 
the giving of weeds or scarlet letters as adequate means of communication. 
Before I defend this point, we also need to note that, by suggesting we find 
new conventions for communicating censure, critics have already conceded 
that punishment is necessary for us to communicate censure adequately.55 
Those who argue that punishment is necessary for censure do not argue that 
punishment will always be necessary for expressing censure. Many of us 
would argue that capital punishment is unnecessary for expressing our moral 
criticism for the most egregious wrongs,56 but it does not mean that it was 
always unnecessary. Similarly, hard treatment punishment may be necessary 
for us to express censure, but it may not be necessary for more expressively 
advanced societies. It is quite possible for us to one day use non-punitive 
measures to communicate censure adequately. But this possibility does not 
show that punishment is unnecessary within our current legal system. 
 For critics then, a revised claim would be that punishment is 
necessary within our current legal system as a matter of convention, but we 
ought to establish new conventions so that punishment would no longer be 
necessary for censure. The plausibility of this suggestion depends 
significantly on the kinds of new conventions that critics argue should replace 
our current forms of punishment. The giving of weeds and scarlet letters are 
examples of drastically different conventions, and to think that we can 
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replace punishment with such conventions is to fail to appreciate how society 
actually moves forward.  
Moral progress does not take place within a theoretical vacuum and it 
certainly does not occur when philosophers will it to occur. To paraphrase 
Paul Robinson, even if good instrumentalist academics are themselves ready 
to adopt new social conventions, the world is not made up of good 
instrumentalist academics.57 The critics’ suggestion that we can learn to 
communicate our moral sentiments through drastic new social conventions 
ignores the fact that moral progress is tied to socioeconomic, political, 
cultural, and technological advances. Philosophers can help speed up moral 
progress through intellectual discourse, public engagement, or social, 
political activism. We can advocate for more humane and meaningful ways of 
engaging with offenders. But genuine moral progress requires rational agents 
to actually be part of such progress; it requires time and often intellectual, 
social, and political struggles. The fact that, at this moment, many lay people 
compare restorative approaches to justice—which is arguably a form of 
punishment—to a slap on the wrist for offenders shows how difficult it will be 
to move away from our penal conventions. The sudden imposition of different 
conventions, which may be out of sync with the rest of society, will likely be 
met with confusion and backlash rather than moral progress.58 
 Some theorists who defend the necessary connection between 
punishment and censure assign critics the task of coming up with new social 
conventions for the expression or communication of censure. This task 
should not be shouldered by critics alone; those who work on the philosophy 
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of punishment must seriously consider both alternatives to punishment and 
alternative forms of punishment. But we need to appreciate how we should 
attempt to change social conventions, which are often deeply entrenched and 
widely shared among the general public. 
 
4 The Significance of Formal Apologies 
So far I have argued that the political community’s recognition of the victim’s 
suffering is an important aim, and that this is to be pursued by censuring the 
offender. I have also explained the sense in which punishment is necessary 
for censure. Formal convictions and symbolic punishments cannot convey an 
adequate range of moral judgements, while tort remedies and public inquiries 
(often) do not impose censure, which is what would be required for 
recognition in cases of serious wrongdoing. In this section, I discuss why we 
should see punishment as a formal apology. If what I have said in section 1 is 
correct—that the aim of reconciliation does not affect either the distribution or 
justification of communicative punishment59—then we need to consider why it 
is important to see punishment as an apology, especially given all the 
criticisms that have been raised against it. What reasons do we have for 
pursuing the aim of reconciliation if it appears to be negligible within our 
account of punishment? 
The reason I want to explore here has to do with the kind of penal 
institutions that we should pursue. As Duff points out, too many instances of 
punishment are, in fact, exclusionary. It divides our society into them (the 
offenders), whom the state needs to punish or segregate in order to protect 
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us (the law abiding citizens) from harm.60 Even after serving their sentences, 
ex-offenders are portrayed as an outside group, who often do not enjoy the 
same privileges as the rest of the polity. Against this exclusionary practice, 
we should strive for an inclusionary institution where offenders, regardless of 
their offence, are still part of the political community. To this end, the offender 
should take steps to reconcile with those whom he has wronged, and this 
requires that he make an appropriate apology, one that is enough to repair 
the damage that his wrongdoing has caused to their relationship as fellow 
citizens. In return, the victim and the political community should also be ready 
and willing to accept his apology and reconcile with him if they are to treat 
him as a fellow citizen, with whom they must continue to live after the 
offence.61 
 I suspect that Duff’s idea about reconciliation and inclusionary 
punishment resonates with many of his critics, but these critics nonetheless 
find the idea of punishment as apology odd and difficult to accept. One of the 
criticisms that I mentioned earlier revolves around the nature of an apology 
(as a voluntary acknowledgement of one’s wrongdoing) and its apparent 
conflict with the nature of punishment (as an unwanted burden that is 
imposed on an offender). An appropriate apology—one that is adequate for 
reconciliation—should address the wrong that has been committed rather 
than merely compensating any harm that has been caused.62 And in order to 
address the wrongdoing, the apology should convey recognition and regret 
for that wrong and a commitment to avoid such wrongdoing in the future.63 
Critics argue that we typically consider a sincere apology to be valuable 
because it conveys such sentiments and commitments, but it is doubtful that 
such judgments can be expressed through punishment. The fact that 
punishment is imposed on offenders, who have no choice but to serve their 
sentences, gives us reason to doubt the sincerity of the apology. Rather than 
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constituting an adequate apology, punishment undermines the sincerity of 
the apology which it is meant to convey.64 
 Duff’s response to this line of criticism relies on the kind of relationship 
which the apology is meant to repair.65 The offender and the victim are fellow 
citizens who owe each other certain levels of concern and respect. Whatever 
other relationships they may have with each other, criminal law and 
punishment are only interested in their civic relationship, which is formal and 
impersonal. This kind of relationship can of course be repaired by a sincere 
apology, but sincerity would not be necessary. It would be sufficient for the 
offender to issue a formal apology, to play his part, as a repentant offender 
would, and to go through the motions of an adequate apology (i.e. to carry 
out the kind of penal burdens that would be required for a fitting apology).66 
Punishment serves as an apologetic ritual, in which the offender is 
required to participate. The victim and the community are likewise required to 
play their role in this ritual, which is to accept the offender’s formal apology. 
The apology may not be sincere and the offender may not genuinely 
recognize or regret his offence. But out of a concern for his privacy, we 
should neither insist on nor inquire about his sincerity.67 The victim and the 
political community should treat the offender as if he regrets his wrong and to 
treat the damage to their civic relationship as having been repaired. As Duff 
puts it, we should act as if the apology is sincere.68 
 But in order for the apology to remedy the wrong that has been 
committed—i.e. in order for us to act as if the apology is sincere—it must be 
appropriately weighty. If I had damaged your bike and merely said to you that 
I am sorry for the damages, my apology would be insufficient because it fails 
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to address the seriousness of the wrong. The penal burdens that offenders 
bear are meant to give adequate weight to their apology, as an appropriate 
normative response that would suffice to repair the damages that result from 
the wrong.69 Just as punishment is necessary for censure, penal hard 
treatment is in the same sense necessary for adequate apologies. 
 Critics object that it is not clear how suffering penal burdens can add 
weight to an apology, or how it is meant to deepen a verbal apology.70 And 
why should we think that the (apparent) sincerity of an apology would depend 
on the suffering of penal burdens rather than a commitment not to 
reoffend?71 The second point is right. A sincere apology requires a genuine 
recognition of one’s wrongdoing, and genuine recognition requires a 
commitment to self-reform. As for the first point, rather than trying to convince 
critics that punishment can deepen an apology, I will simply point out that the 
offender would receive the same form and level of punishment whether or not 
he makes an apology. Punishment is meant to help the offender appreciate 
why his conduct was wrong, and to help him work out what he needs to do in 
order to reform himself. His punishment may constitute an apology, but the 
state does not impose any additional punishment for the purpose of an 
apology. The burdens that are necessary for recognition and reform just 
happen to be the same burdens that would figure in an adequate apology.72 
  Some critics nonetheless worry about the sort of attitude that 
offenders are required to take if punishment is meant to act as an apology. 
These critics argue that it would be inappropriate for the state or the 
community to force offenders to apologise, which involves taking a particular 
attitude towards his wrongdoing which he may not agree with. Duff’s 
response to this objection is that offenders are not asked to mean what they 
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say since that would indeed be unjustifiably intrusive. And proponents of the 
apology ritual certainly do not require (or even ask) offenders to issue any 
kind of verbal apology, which would force them to say things that they may 
not want to say.73 
I am not sure if this kind of response would be enough to satisfy 
staunch critics. Even if offenders are not asked to do anything for an 
apology—e.g. to issue a verbal apology, or take a particular attitude towards 
his offence, or bear additional burdens for the sake of an apology—the fact 
that punishment is meant to convey an apology implicitly suggests that we 
would assume certain things about the offender which may not be true. We 
would, for instance, assume that the offender regrets his wrongdoing, or that 
he disowns his conduct as something that he should not have done and will 
not do in the future. All of these things may be false. Should we not refrain 
from making such assumptions? 
I think these kinds of assumptions are exactly the ones that a 
community should make; it should assume that an offender regrets his 
wrongdoing unless he announces otherwise.74 This is not an issue about 
what the offender must do or say. The idea that punishment constitutes an 
apology depends on how the political community chooses to interpret the 
offender’s punishment. And we should interpret his punishment as an 
apology because that is what is required of us by an inclusive penal 
institution which aims to reconcile the offender with his community.75 If we 
have any confidence in the effectiveness of our penal practices, then we 
should think that an offender has recognized his wrongdoing after serving his 
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 See Bennett (2008), chapter 7. 
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 Duff suggests that we should also give offenders an opportunity to say explicitly that they 
do not undertake their punishment as an apology. Irrespective of questions about what kind 
of forum we should give to offenders to allow them to make such declarations, the option not 
to apologise must be made available. Many conducts are in fact (and will be) unjustifiably 
criminalized in many jurisdictions. A subset of these crimes includes conducts that are not 
wrongful, and those who engage in such conducts should be allowed to say to their 
community that they have not committed any wrongs. Another subset includes actions that 
are morally right. Ag-gag laws in some US jurisdictions, which prohibit whistleblowing within 
the agriculture industry, are an example. We need to allow those who commit acts of civil 
disobedience to disown the apology. See Duff (2001, 110-1).  
75
 See Duff (2001, 123-4).  
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sentence.76 If we have any confidence in our penal practice, we should treat 
him as if he would not offend in the future, and as if he has done all that is 
necessary to apologise for his wrong.77 
People’s behaviours are to a large extent shaped by their 
communities. The way we treat other people affects both their character and 
our own. It also affects those who share their lives with us, whose worldviews 
we can influence through our actions. Our attitudes thus speak to the kind of 
punishment and community that we wish to maintain. It can tell ex-offenders 
that they are still part of our community and that they should abide by our 
norms.78 Furthermore, it tells members of our community that we should treat 
him with the same level of concern that is due to any citizens. By treating ex-
offenders as if they have apologised, we treat them with an attitude of 
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 Of course, we could have very little confidence in our corrections system, but if that is the 
case, surely the appropriate response is to look for more effective practices rather than 
subjecting offenders to ineffective ones. 
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 There is a separate question here about dangerous offenders—for whom we have good 
evidence that they will reoffend—and how we should treat such offenders. I do not address 
this issue in this thesis.  
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Censure and Prevention in Communicative Punishment 
 
In this chapter, I defend the communicative account of punishment against 
instrumentalists’ objection that communication alone is not enough to justify 
punishment. Instead, crime prevention—specifically general deterrence—
must be part of the normative justification, especially in light of the costs that 
are associated with our penal institutions. Against this objection, I will show 
that communicative punishment does have an essential preventive 
dimension. Unlike instrumentalist accounts, where punishment is intended (in 
part) as a set of prudential disincentives that are meant to deter potential 
offenders from committing crimes, communicative punishment reinforces the 
moral reasons against wrongdoing. And by reinforcing the moral reasons 
against wrongdoing, communicative punishment aims at general prevention 
through moral dissuasion rather than prudential calculation.  
 I begin in section 1 by giving a brief overview of Duff’s communicative 
account of punishment, especially of the justifications for censure and hard 
treatment. Unlike instrumentalist accounts—or accounts that feature 
instrumentalist aims—the hard treatment element of punishment, on Duff’s 
view, is justified by its communicative rather than deterrent function. Then, in 
section 2, I explain exactly what is communicated through punishment, and 
show how general prevention is part of the communicative aims of 
punishment. What I have to say in section 2 will not be enough to satisfy 
instrumentalist critics, since they can still argue that moral dissuasion can 
only amount to an ineffective means of crime prevention. This is an empirical 
point, which I will leave largely unaddressed in this chapter and the thesis, 
but I argue in section 3 that, irrespective of the efficacy of different modes of 
prevention (i.e. moral dissuasion vs. prudential disincentives), we may have 
good reasons, which go beyond the justification of punishment, to favour a 




incomplete, but it will highlight a point for further discussion in the philosophy 
of punishment.  
 
1 Censure and Hard Treatment 
The consensus among legal theorists is that punishment, as a conceptual 
matter, necessarily involves the expression of censure and the imposition of 
hard treatment.1 When a supposed offender is punished, he is both censured 
and subject to treatment that is materially burdensome. Without reprobation, 
the impositions of hard treatment or material burdens would not be 
punishment but more akin to taxation, and without hard treatment, 
reprobation is not sufficient to amount to punishment.2 Both of these 
elements require justification if we are to justify the use of punishment.3 
Quite often though, normative theories of punishment—i.e. theories 
about what can justify the use of punishment—tend to focus on hard 
treatment without commenting much on censure.4 Two explanations come to 
mind for why this might be the case. First, hard treatment, rather than 
censure, is seen as being more in need of justification, presumably because 
we find it more objectionable for the state to impose hard treatment on its 
citizens. Second, many normative theories put forth instrumentalist 
justifications, where punishment is justified (at least in part) as a means to 
crime prevention, and the preventive function of punishment is typically 
associated with the use of hard treatment rather than the expression of 
reprobation. But given that censure can be painful for the person who is 
being censured—even if the pain of censure may be much less than that of 
hard treatment—some kind of justification is nonetheless required when the 
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 See Feinberg (1965).  
2
 On Duff’s view, where hard treatment is necessary for censure, we cannot have adequate 
reprobation without hard treatment.  
3
 See Narayan (1993). 
4
 Theories that tend to focus on the hard treatment element include self-defence or duty 
views of punishment and public health or quarantine models of punishment. See Caruso 
(Forthcoming). For self-defence views, see Tadros (2011); Farrell (1989).  
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state censures its citizens.5 Otherwise, the normative justification would be 
incomplete.6 
 In contrast to instrumentalist theories, expressivist theories typically 
justify punishment as the best or only means of expressing or communicating 
the censure, condemnation, disapproval, or reprobation an offender deserves 
for his wrongdoing.7 For expressivists, hard treatment has an expressive or 
communicative function; it is the necessary vehicle for the adequate 
expression of different degrees of censure. Critics and proponents of 
expressivist theories alike have argued (or at least concede) that the value of 
expressing deserved censure is not enough, by itself, to offer a positive 
justification of punishment. Punishment inflicts a great deal of pain on 
offenders, who must suffer the hard treatment that is inherent in the 
punishment. But it also comes at a cost to offenders’ families, who may 
depend on the offender for support; to those who work within our corrections 
system, who are tasked with administering punishment on a daily basis; and 
to citizens who pay for the maintenance of our corrections system either 
directly through taxation or indirectly, because part of the state’s resources 
are being allocated to corrections rather than to some other worthwhile social 
services. Critics argue that given the associated costs, punishment must 
produce some socially beneficial effects (such as crime prevention) in order 
to be justifiable. 
A noteworthy feature of punishment is that however it is designed and 
whatever its aims may be, it will most likely have some deterrent effect. 
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 Narayan (1993, 167).  
6
 If a supposed justification of punishment does not provide a justification for either censure 
or hard treatment, then it will be incomplete. But we can remedy the incompleteness by 
offering a justification for the missing element. However, if the normative theory denies that 
one of these elements can be justified, then the theory cannot amount to a justification of 
punishment—it is rather denying that punishment can be justified. This, I think, is the case 
with public health or quarantine models of “punishment”. See Caruso (Forthcoming), who 
offers a justification of hard treatment as a means of crime prevention but denies that agents 
can be deserving of praise and blame. On his account, offenders may be segregated from 
the community until they have reformed, but they do not deserve reprobation for their 
wrongdoing. This undoubtedly is a proposal for how we might respond to criminal offending, 
but the proposal is not a punitive response. Punishment presupposes responsibility and 
blameworthiness. A justification for using hard treatment to respond to crime does not 
amount to a justification of punishment if it denies that agents can be responsible and 
deserving of blame for their conduct. 
7




Insofar as punishment involves the use of hard treatment, even purely 
retributive institutions will deter a significant number of otherwise would-be 
offenders. The fact that rational agents are motivated to avoid pain, and that 
the use or threat of hard treatment can discourage some rational agents from 
offending, gives punishment a natural preventive function.8 For those who 
defend non-instrumentalist accounts of punishment, the question then is not 
whether their proposed penal institution will lead to prevention, but whether 
the institution is justified if it did not produce any preventive effects. 
In response to this thought, some theorists have developed a hybrid 
view where punishment should be used within a censuring framework, but its 
use is justified to the extent that it acts as an effective general deterrent.9 
That is, the level of punishment we inflict on offenders must be proportionate 
to the level of censure he deserves for his offence, but we should abolish our 
penal institutions if they cannot or need not be used for preventive 
purposes.10 For these expressivists, the hard treatment element of 
punishment is not only the necessary vehicle for expressing various degrees 
of censure, but it also acts as a prudential disincentive against criminal 
offending. If the criminal law communicates to citizens through moral 
persuasion, then punishment is meant to act as a prudential supplement to 
the moral voice of the law. 11 
Duff’s communicative account is a type of expressivist account, where 
the communication of censure is justified as an intrinsically appropriate moral 
response to the offender for the wrong he has committed.12 But it is not a 
hybrid view since communication is meant to provide a complete justification 
for punishment. Censure or moral criticism is what we ought to communicate 
to the offender if we are to treat him as a responsible agent, who is capable 
of understanding the moral reasons against his wrongdoing. We ought to 
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 See von Hirsch (1993), chapter 2; Narayan (1993).  
9
 See Hart (1959); Rawls (1955); von Hirsch (1993, 14); Narayan (1993).  
10
 von Hirsch and Narayan maintain that, on their accounts, crime prevention is meant to be 
pursued within a censuring framework, such that the state is not permitted to inflict 
disproportionate punishment for the sake of prevention. But they also argue that punishment 
cannot be justified on the basis of censure alone, and that we ought not to use punishment if 
it cannot or need not be used to prevent crimes. 
11
 See von Hirsch (1993), chapter 2, and von Hirsch (2003).  
12
 Duff (2001).  
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hold him to account for his wrongdoing if we are to treat him as someone 
who is still a fellow member of our political community after the offence.13 
Duff’s view agrees with other expressivist views about the relationship 
between censure and hard treatment; the latter is needed to give weight to 
the former so as to convey the degree of moral criticism that is warranted in 
response to the offender’s wrong. But on Duff’s view, hard treatment is 
justified in terms of its communicative function only; it is justified as the 
necessary means of communicating appropriate degrees of censure, and as 
constituting an appropriate reparative apology that the offender owes to 
whom she has wronged, irrespective of its preventive function.14 
Two popular lines of criticism have been raised against Duff’s account, 
and both converge on the objection that communication alone is not enough 
to justify punishment. Something else, specifically crime prevention, is 
needed to justify an institution that is as costly and harmful as criminal 
punishment. The first line of criticism, which is typically raised by 
instrumentalists (and is also applicable to other expressivist theories), denies 
that hard treatment is necessary for censure. Critics who take this line ague 
that hard treatment punishment is only one possible means of 
communicating censure, which we can do just as well through symbolic 
punishment or formal convictions.15 These critics may still see censure as an 
appropriate moral response to wrongdoing, which may play a role in 
adjudicating between different forms of punishment. However, if censure can 
be communicated through less harmful means, then communication is not 
enough to justify the hard treatment element of punishment and it alone 
cannot provide a complete justification for punishment. The use of hard 
treatment must be justified by some other function, which instrumentalists 
take to be that of crime prevention or general deterrence.16 
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 See the discussion in Chapter 4.4. 
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 See Duff (2001). 
15
 See Tadros (2011), chapter 5.  
16
 The first line of criticism can also lead to an abolitionist argument—e.g. censure is the only 
appropriate response to wrongdoing, and we can abolish punishment since it is not 




In the previous chapter, I defended the view that hard treatment is 
necessary for the communication of censure. It might be possible for 
communicatively advanced societies to convey censure without the use of 
hard treatment, but this does not mean that hard treatment is not necessary 
for us to communicate censure adequately. Given the discussion in the 
previous chapter, I will not dwell on this issue, except to point out that 
instrumentalists can accept the necessity of hard treatment for censure and 
still argue that the communication of censure is not enough, by itself, to 
justify the use of hard treatment and consequently the use of punishment. 
This takes us to the second line of criticism, which is usually raised by 
expressivists who endorse some kind of a hybrid account, where punishment 
is distributed within a censuring framework, but is only justified to the extent 
that it acts as an effective general deterrent.17 These critics typically agree 
with Duff that the censuring element of punishment is justified as an 
appropriate response to wrongdoing, which must be communicated through 
hard treatment (though they may disagree about the message of censure 
and how that message should be expressed or communicated). But given the 
costs that are associated with hard treatment punishment, effective crime 
prevention—even if it is not an essential justifying aim of punishment—must 
be a condition or side-constraint on the use of hard treatment and thus of 
punishment. So rather than justifying hard treatment wholly in terms of its 
censuring function, these critics agree with instrumentalists that hard 
treatment (and consequently punishment) should also be justified by their 
preventive function. 
 Both criticisms point to Duff’s reluctance to assign a normative role to 
general deterrence (or deterrence of any kind) in his justification of 
punishment. The notion of deterrence that is in play throughout much of the 
literature on punishment revolves around the idea that the use or threat of 
hard treatment can discourage some rational agents from offending. It 
involves offering rational agents prudential reasons to refrain from criminal 
wrongdoing. The aim of general deterrence involves punishing offenders in 
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 See von Hirsch (1993); Narayan (1993).  
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order to deter other rational agents from committing an offence, while special 
deterrence involves punishing offenders in order to deter them from re-
offending. As a mechanism of crime prevention, deterrence is in contrast to 
moral dissuasion, where (potential) offenders are made aware of the moral 
reasons for refraining from various conducts. The kind of crime prevention 
that Duff is aiming for is moral dissuasion rather than deterrence. 
 Note that on Duff’s account, the communication of censure entails 
special prevention in the sense that punishment communicates to individual 
offenders the moral reasons they have for refraining from future 
wrongdoing.18 Censure or moral criticism is communicated to an offender 
with the hope that he will come to a genuine recognition of his wrongdoing 
and make a commitment not to reoffend.19 The criticisms that are raised 
against Duff is not that crime prevention of any kind is missing from his 
communicative account, but that a compelling justification for hard treatment 
punishment should include deterrence (i.e. an appeal to prudential 
disincentives) since a system of pure moral dissuasion would be 
unacceptably ineffective. And in order for our penal institution to be justified, 
especially given its associated costs, it must act as an effect general 
deterrent.  
 In section 3, I will say more about the alleged ineffectiveness of a 
penal system that is modelled purely on moral dissuasion. For now, we can 
simply note the intuitive appeal of the above line of criticism against Duff. 
That is, we generally share the intuition that punishment should (at least in 
part) perform a preventive function. As we have seen, the goal of crime 
prevention is so important that many expressivists (and self-professed 
retributivists) see it as an essential part of their justification of punishment.20 
For those who do not share this intuition, instrumentalists would ask them to 
consider the following hypothetical. 
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 On Duff’s view, this kind of special prevention follows from censure and is part of the 
communicative justification for punishment. 
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 See Duff (2001, 88-89; 107-9). 
20
 See Husak, (1992); von Hirsch, (1993), chapter 2. For Duff’s view on this, see his debate 
with von Hirsch in Duff (2003a; 2003b) and von Hirsch (2003), specifically von Hirsch (2003, 




 Suppose that punishment has both a preventive function and a non-
preventive function (e.g. a communicative, expressive, or retributive 
function), and that when we abolish our penal institutions we inevitably lose 
both a preventive tool and a communicative, expressive, or retributive tool.21 
Instrumentalists argue that if we were to abolish punishment, surely we would 
be much more concerned about losing its preventive effects than about its 
censuring or retributive function. And if we are more concerned with 
prevention, it would seem to suggest that punishment should primarily be 
justified on preventive rather than non-preventive grounds.22 
 I believe instrumentalists are right that punishment must have a 
preventive function if it is to be justified. But their point does not imply (i) that 
preventive aims must take precedence over communicative aims, nor does it 
imply (ii) that punishment must aim at prevention since a purely 
communicative account may be justified as long as it can give us prevention 
as a side-effect. Furthermore, it does not imply (iii) that we should be 
satisfied with crime prevention of any kind. Instrumentalists and expressivists 
appear to agree that the use of hard treatment can lead to general prevention 
by offering rational agents prudential disincentives against criminal 
wrongdoing. But some also appear to believe that the communication or 
expression of censure bears little or no relation to general prevention. This 
second point is false. In the next section, I will illustrate the intimate 
connection between censure and general prevention, and show how the 
expression of censure can entail general prevention as a matter of moral 
dissuasion. If I am right, then communicative theorists can respond to 
instrumentalist critics by pointing out that general prevention is part of the 
communicative justification for punishment, and that it is possible to pursue 
general prevention without conceptualising punishment as a set of prudential 
disincentives. In section 3, I will comment on the criticism that a system of 
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 Although, as I have noted above, the kind of communication that Duff aims for does 
include a preventive purpose—i.e. punishment aims to communicate to the offender that his 
past conduct was wrong and to persuade him that he ought not to engage in similar 
conducts in the future. (And, as I will argue in the next section, the communicative aim of 
punishment also includes a general preventive purpose.)  
22
 Tadros (2011), chapter 5.  
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pure moral dissuasion would be unacceptably ineffective and explain why we 
should nonetheless aim for a system of moral dissuasion even if it proves to 
be ineffective within our society.  
 
2 Censure and Prevention in the Justification of Punishment 
In arguing for the expressive function of punishment, Feinberg pointed out 
that punishment can perform various acts, some of which are only possible if 
punishment did in fact express reprobation. He highlighted four such acts, 
most of which can help reveal the connection between censure and general 
prevention. These include authoritative disavowal, where, by punishing and 
condemning an offender for an action, the state publicly disavows that action 
and recognizes it as being wrongful; symbolic non-acquiescence, where 
punishment conveys a shared attitude among citizens that they do not 
endorse or condone the action in question; vindication of the law, where 
punishment “emphatically reaffirms” the moral judgements that are laid down 
in the law; and absolution of others, where the conviction and punishment of 
one supposed offender absolves other suspects (and sometimes the victim) 
of any blame.23 
 The first three acts share a common theme, which is that punishment 
is a well-understood and established means of reaffirming norms and 
disowning violations of such norms. When the state does not punish an 
offender, it could signal that the state or his fellow citizens condone his 
conduct, or that his conduct is not really judged to be wrongful. Punishment 
can play a role in either reaffirming or repudiating provisions of the criminal 
law, and it can do so through moral dissuasion (as well as prudential 
dissuasion). The connection between censure and general prevention rests 
on the moral message that is communicated to citizens through punishment. 
And in order to illustrate this connection, we need to clarify exactly what is 
being communicated and to whom.  
 Within the interests of this chapter, the question of what is being 
communicated and to whom is not a normative question about what 
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punishment should communicate, and to whom it should be communicated. 
Nor is it a question about the specifics of what various legal theorists have 
had to say about the message of censure, and what that entails. The 
question is about a broad, common sense notion of censure, one that 
ordinary, reasonable people would accept. This ordinary notion of censure is 
common to expressivist accounts of punishment, though different theorists 
will have different things to add to it. In showing that general prevention is 
entailed by an ordinary common sense notion of censure, I will also show 
that the connection between censure and prevention is not specific to any 
particular expressivist account of punishment. 
 Within the Anglo-American context, punishment typically expresses 
judgements of wrongdoing and blame. Punishment can, of course, express 
other judgements and sentiments, including ones which many of us would 
consider to be inappropriate, such as sentiments that are associated with 
pure retribution and revenge. And depending on how punishment is carried 
out, we may (mistakenly) interpret it as expressing certain sentiments even 
when it is not intended to express such sentiments. Regardless of what else 
might be expressed through punishment, and how we might interpret the 
content of penal expression, I think we can agree that punishment, at the 
very least, expresses judgements of wrongdoing and blame. 
 Generally speaking, when the state punishes an offender for a 
supposed offence, it expresses the condemnatory judgment that the conduct 
in question is wrong, and that the offender deserves moral criticism or blame 
for having engaged in that conduct. Most citizens, I think, see punishment as 
expressing judgments of wrongdoing and blame regardless of why an 
offender is being punished. An offender may be punished for retributive or 
instrumentalist reasons, but in punishing the offender, the state publicly 
recognizes that he has acted wrongly and criticizes him for having done so. If 
punishment did not express judgements of wrongdoing and blame, the state 
would not be able to use it to disavow the offender’s conduct, nor would it be 
able to use punishment to give official recognition to victims for the wrongs 
they have suffered. 
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Assuming a legal system in which the state, on behalf of its citizens, 
dictates a set of shared norms, whose violations are punished by the state, 
which is again acting on behalf of its citizens, the judgements that are 
expressed through state punishment are often expressed implicitly by its 
citizens who make up the political community.24 This is true at least in non-
controversial cases where there is shared agreement among citizens 
regarding the wrongfulness of a conduct. If punishment did not typically 
express judgements of wrongdoing and blame, the political community would 
not be able to use punishment to show solidarity with victims. As Feinberg 
argues, punishment is a conventional way for the community to show that 
they do not endorse or condone the offender’s conduct. It is possible for the 
community to show, through punishment, that they do not condone the 
offender’s conduct precisely because punishment includes judgements of 
wrongdoing and blame.  
 So when the state punishes an offender, it expresses judgments of 
wrongdoing on behalf of its citizens; it censures the offender on behalf of 
citizens, who, in sharing the victim’s wrong, have a legitimate interest in 
holding the offender to account.25 But censure is also communicated to 
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 There are ways for citizens to show disagreement with what the state expresses (e.g. 
protests or speaking publicly against what punishment is meant to express). When citizens 
show no sign of dissent, especially when various means of dissent are available and 
tolerated within the political community, citizens implicitly express the judgments that are 
expressed through state punishment. This point is more salient when citizens have an 
obligation to voice their disagreement with the state’s decisions and actions.   
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 I take this to be a fairly uncontroversial description of what is going on in serious and 
paradigmatic criminal wrongs, e.g. murder, rape, assault, fraud, etc. There is agreement 
between the state and an overwhelming majority of citizens that such conducts ought to be 
criminalized, and we have a legitimate shared interest in such cases when they occur. Some 
theorists have sketched a slightly different, idealized view of our legal system. See e.g. Duff 
& Marshall (2016). On their idealized view, offenders should see their punishment as an 
active fulfilment of their civic duty rather than an inconvenient burden or an imposition which 
they must endure passively. Offenders ought to make an apology and commit to a process 
of self-reform rather than seeing punishment as an apologetic ritual which is imposed on 
them. This requires a certain conception of the law, as a common law, one that “free and 
equal citizens can make their own” (Duff & Marshall (2016, 39)). Such a conception of the 
criminal law requires a set of shared norms, not as something imposed on citizens by the 
state, but as something that citizens can accept as theirs upon critical reflection—as 
something that reflects their shared values. This conception obviously does not apply to non-
paradigmatic wrongs, or controversial criminal prohibitions, where the state acts more like a 
separate sovereign which imposes certain norms on its citizens, rather than speaking on 
behalf of its citizens. I would not expect the connection between censure and general 




citizens, who have a legitimate interest in seeing that the offender is held to 
account. There is nothing odd about a political community who 
communicates censure to itself. We often do this in our daily activities. I can 
censure myself for being tempted to do something that I believe I ought not to 
do, thereby preventing myself from doing something wrong. And I can 
censure myself after the fact for having done something that I believe I 
should not have done. Likewise, when I see another person doing something 
that I believe he ought not to do, I can tell myself (and perhaps him) that his 
action is wrong and that he should not have acted thus. By telling myself that 
his action was wrong, I also confirm to myself that I should not act as he did. 
So far we see that censure can be communicated or expressed to a 
specific individual or the general public. It is expressed to a specific individual 
when it addresses and criticizes the offender as the agent who is responsible 
for the wrong that has been committed. And censure is expressed to the 
general public when it addresses the community, who have a legitimate 
interest in the offender’s wrongdoing.26 Not only is censure often expressed 
both to individual offenders and the general public, but the message of 
censure also contains both general and specific judgments. In blaming the 
offender for his offence, censure applies a general norm (i.e. that φ is wrong) 
to a specific individual as the agent who is blameworthy for an instance of φ. 
And in communicating censure, we are simultaneously saying that the 
conduct in question is wrong and that the offender is responsible and 
blameworthy for that particular wrongdoing.  
The general claim includes the criminal law’s declaration that certain 
conducts are wrong. It also includes the judgement that those who engage in 
such conducts have done something wrong and deserve moral criticism for 
what they have done. Judgements of wrongdoing and blame are reinforced 
by the criminal law’s declaration about wrongful conducts. And in punishing 
and censuring an offender for his offence, the message of censure reiterates 
                                                                                                                                                      
controversial, but the disconnect between censure and general deterrence has more to do 
with the nature of the conduct than the conceptual relationship between censure and 
prevention.  
26
 At the very least, the community is capable of hearing the communication, which is made 
in public.   
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to citizens the moral reasons not to engage in those conducts (i.e. that such 
conducts are wrong), and conveys the message that the state really does 
consider such conducts to be wrongful. When the state punishes offenders, 
this message is conveyed publicly so that it can be heard by citizens. But it is 
also communicated to citizens, who have a legitimate interest in how we 
respond to the offender. By reiterating the message of the law to citizens, 
communicative punishment aims at general prevention in a way that is similar 
to that of the criminal law.27 
 Before we get to general prevention, it will be useful to start with the 
connection between censure and special prevention. Censure entails special 
prevention when the state communicates the message of censure to the 
offender. When censure is communicated to offenders, the state or political 
community engages in a moral dialogue with the offender, who is expected to 
participate in the communicative process. This is in contrast to mere 
expressions of censure, which do not require offenders to play any role in the 
penal process. When censure is merely expressed against the offender, he 
need not engage with or even be aware of the moral criticism that is directed 
against him. For expressivists, censure need not be expressed with the hope 
that the offender will acknowledge or atone for his wrong; it can be expressed 
purely for the sake of the expresser, who wishes to convey his disapproval or 
condemnation of the offender’s conduct. 
 On Duff’s account, the communication of censure has implications for 
what the offender should do. Through the communicative process, he should 
gain an appreciation for why his conduct was wrong. He should accept his 
wrongdoing as something that he should not have done and make a 
commitment not to reoffend in the future. For Duff, the communication of 
censure aims to dissuade the offender from reoffending by bringing him to a 
deep moral appreciation for the wrongfulness of his conduct. Here, the 
distinction between communication and expression is significant. The 
communication of censure entails special prevention while expression does 
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not because the former requires active participation by the offender, as 
someone who (at some point during the communicative process) will be 
receptive to the message of censure. 
 The connection between censure and general prevention rests on the 
communication of censure to the wider community. The message of censure 
is essentially the same whether it is communicated to the offender, the victim, 
or the community. It concerns the wrongfulness of the conduct in question 
and the offender who is responsible and blameworthy for that conduct. In 
communicating this message to the community, censure entails general 
prevention in the same way that it entails special prevention, as a matter of 
moral rather than prudential dissuasion. Except in the case of general 
prevention, moral dissuasion is directed at the political community rather than 
any individual offender. When it comes to special prevention, an offender 
could not come to a deep appreciation for the wrongfulness of his conduct 
(which is necessary for motivating a process of self-reform) if he is not 
receptive to the message of censure. We might therefore think that the 
difference between communicative and expressivist accounts of punishment 
is significant for the connection between censure and general prevention. If 
an entire political community is deaf to the message of censure, then censure 
could not entail general prevention either. But expressivist accounts of 
punishment need not exclude the kind of communication that is required for 
general prevention.  
 Expressivist accounts of punishment presuppose a community that is 
at the very least aware of and interested in how and whether we respond to 
offenders. For expressivists, we punish offenders in part to express our 
strong disapproval for what they have done. If the community had no interest 
in or awareness of how the state responds to offenders’ wrongdoing, then the 
expression of censure could not entail general prevention since the 
expression of censure would not be heard by the community. But to the 
extent that expressions of censure are heard by citizens, it is possible for 
censure to bear some relationship to general prevention on expressivist 
accounts of punishment. 
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 Note that earlier in section 1, I distinguished between two conceptions 
of crime prevention: that is, prevention through moral dissuasion and 
deterrence through prudential disincentives. The idea that censure is 
necessarily communicated through hard treatment coupled with the fact that 
hard treatment has a natural preventive effect makes it difficult to pinpoint 
whether prevention comes from moral or prudential appeals. There are 
empirical questions here about the extent to which censure can have a 
preventive effect, and about the socio-economic and political conditions that 
would be necessary for censure to have any preventive effect. Without 
getting into the empirical research, it is possible to illustrate the connection 
between censure and prevention by considering the implications of not 
punishing offenders. Specifically, we need to consider what the state fails to 
communicate to citizens when it fails to punish offenders.  
 When the state does not punish an offender, one of the things that it 
fails to do is to recognize the offender as being blameworthy for his 
wrongdoing.28 And depending on whether the state chooses to adopt any 
other remedies, by not punishing an offender, it fails to affirm—after the 
fact—that the offender’s conduct was wrongful and that the offence should 
not occur in the future.29 Impunity can imply many things, and depending on 
the reasons for not punishing offenders, impunity can imply that the state 
does not take the wrongdoing seriously or that it is not sufficiently wrongful to 
warrant criminalisation and punishment.30 
 In light of the natural preventive effect of hard treatment, when the 
state repeatedly withholds punishment, the prudential disincentives against 
criminal wrongdoing start to disappear. For anyone who sees punishment in 
part as a set of prudential disincentives, their prudential reasons against 
offending disappears when the state fails to punish offenders on a consistent 
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basis. But given that punishment can also reiterate the moral reasons against 
criminal wrongdoing, impunity also erodes the clarity with which the criminal 
law communicates the moral reasons against offending.  
 The state can choose not to punish offenders on many levels. There 
are (at least) two types of cases that can illustrate the link between censure 
and prevention. These involve situations where the state chooses not to 
punish anyone who commits a particular offence, and where it does not 
punish certain groups of offenders for certain offences. An example of the 
first case would be if a jurisdiction decided not to enforce a particular criminal 
prohibition—e.g. no one who commits drug possession offences are 
convicted or punished. If the state never punishes those who commit φ, then 
it never communicates to its citizens, through punishment, that φ is a criminal 
wrong, or that it is sufficiently wrongful to concern the criminal law. The state, 
by not punishing any instances of φ, does not communicate clearly and fully 
to citizens that they ought not to φ, or that those who φ ought not to do so in 
the future.  
Insofar as there is still a criminal prohibition on φ, there is still an 
official declaration that φ is wrong and is of concern to the criminal law. But 
when that prohibition is not being enforced through the courts or corrections, 
the state implicitly sends the message that it is not really concerned with φ or 
those who engage in φ.31 Without punishment, the state is no longer 
communicating to citizens a clear message that φ is a criminal wrong and 
that they should not engage in it. For citizens who are capable of responding 
to the moral voice of the law, the moral case against φ is no longer being 
made clearly by the state; it is no longer trying to persuade citizens not to 
commit φ. If everything else about punishment remains the same—i.e. if 
punishment is still imposed on those who commit other offences, but just not 
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wrongful conducts suggests that the law is merely paying lip service to morality. Note though 
that my point about the state sending a message of condonation through impunity only holds 
if (1) prohibitions are normally enforced, and (2) punishment is normally seen as sending a 
condemnatory message. In our current system, the percentage of crime that results in guilty 
verdicts is extremely low, but it is reasonable to think that we at least have the perception 
that (1) and (2) holds at least in serious offences. See Feinberg (1965). 
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on those who commit φ—we would start to think that the state no longer 
considers φ to be a prohibited conduct, and that it is now permissible to φ. 
 Depending on citizens’ attitudes toward φ, whether the state chooses 
to punish those who commit φ will have implications for crime prevention that 
go beyond the general deterrent effect of censure. If citizens believe that φ is 
not a wrong which should concern the criminal law, then the state’s choice 
not to punish those who commit φ will be supported by its citizens. However, 
if φ is a rather serious moral wrong—e.g. murder, rape, assault, fraud, etc.—
or if citizens believe that the state should be concerned with φ, then 
widespread impunity for φ can erode citizens’ respect for the law, which can 
in turn affect citizen’s responsiveness to the state’s attempt to morally 
dissuade them from other criminal wrongs.32 
 We can now turn to the second type of cases where the 
consequences of impunity can help highlight the connection between 
censure and general prevention. Here, the state does not punish certain 
groups of offenders for a subset of criminal wrongs, but it nonetheless 
punishes other groups of offenders for those wrongs. There are situations 
where the state may have legitimate reasons to withhold punishment for 
deserving offenders. These reasons may stem from social policy 
considerations such as serious negative social or political consequences that 
can result from punishing a particular offender. They can also include 
considerations having to do with old age or assisting with other criminal 
investigations.33 When the state has legitimate reasons to withhold 
punishment, it is not treating the offender’s conduct as if it is not wrongful and 
as if it is not in need of censure. Instead, the conduct is still treated as being 
wrongful, but not one that warrants the imposition of censure all things 
considered. In contrast to these scenarios, the type of cases I have in mind 
involves illegitimate reasons for not punishing offenders. 
Suppose that a particularly serious offence, say rape, is normally 
punished with a prison sentence upon conviction. However, for a particular 
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group of convicted offenders, say white, middle-class, varsity football players, 
the sentence is, more often than not, community service. Community service 
can constitute a form of punishment, but it is hardly a fitting sentence for the 
offence in question, and compared to the prison sentence that other rapists 
would normally receive, we cannot, in all seriousness, say that the privileged 
group has been punished for their offence. When we object to the state’s 
failure to punish offenders in such cases, our objection has to do with the 
state’s apparent willingness to condone serious criminal wrongs when they 
are perpetrated by certain groups. We object because the state sends the 
message that the wrong, which has been perpetrated against and suffered by 
the victim, is not so serious when it is committed by a member of the 
privileged group. 
In a sense, instrumentalists are right that without punishment, we 
would be concerned with the absence of a preventive mechanism. In the 
cases I have just described, we would be concerned that impunity would lead 
other members of the offender’s group to commit similar crimes since the 
prudential disincentives against doing so are no longer in place. But without 
punishment, we should also be concerned with the absence of another 
preventive mechanism, one that is intimately connected to punishment’s 
censuring function. Impunity also erodes this second kind of preventive 
function because the message of censure is no longer communicated to 
those who identify with the offender.  
 One of the reasons we have for objecting to the state’s failure to 
punish offenders from the privileged group stems from our sense of justice. 
Not only is it unfair to apply the law in a discriminatory manner, but the 
injustice comes from our judgement that the wrongs which have been 
perpetrated are in fact wrongful and that the state should treat them as such. 
By not punishing the offenders, the state fails to show sufficient concern for 
the victims by not recognising the wrongs they have suffered. And in doing 
so, it fails to uphold a norm which we believe should be upheld and applied to 
everyone within our political community. By not punishing the offenders, the 
state fails to communicate to them that what they did was wrong, that they 
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ought not to repeat such wrongdoing in the future. This is why impunity 
suggests an implicit condonation of the wrong that has been perpetrated. For 
the privileged group, impunity weakens the message of the criminal law; it 
suggests to them that certain prohibitions are only wrong when committed by 
other people, but it is not (seriously) wrongful when they themselves commit 
those wrongs.34 
What I have said so far does not imply that impunity of any kind will 
weaken the message of the criminal law, or that impunity always implies 
condonation or endorsement of the wrong that is in question. Suppose, for 
instance, that I believe it is wrong to eat meat. When I choose not to censure 
strangers in a restaurant for eating meat, it does not imply that I condone 
their dietary choices. This is true even if I have good reasons to think that my 
fellow patrons will appreciate the moral case against eating meat (and 
consequently be motivated to make different choices in the future). On the 
contrary, it would be a different matter if I never censured my partner, my 
close friends, or my fellow ethicists for eating meat.35 
Whether impunity implies condonation of a wrong depends on the 
relationship between the party who censures and the party who is being 
censured and the obligations they have toward each other. I have an 
obligation toward my partner, my close friends, and perhaps my fellow 
ethicists to hold them to a certain ethical standard, but I do not have an 
obligation to hold strangers to the same standard. I also have an obligation to 
my partner and my close friends to be truthful about how I choose to live my 
life and an obligation to my fellow ethicists to speak my mind on what I think 
are important ethical issues. A consistent failure to censure those whom we 
have an obligation to censure would imply condonation of the wrong that is in 
question. If I censured my friends for eating meat but never my partner, it 
would suggest (to my friends and to outside observers) that I condone meat 
eating when it is done by my partner but not my friends. 
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Political communities presuppose a set of shared standards and an 
obligation on members to hold each other accountable for actions that violate 
those shared standards. The state, on behalf of its citizens, has an obligation 
to holds citizens to account for certain wrongs. When it fails to fulfil this 
obligation on a consistent basis and in the absence of extenuating 
circumstances (e.g. during wartime), it could imply condonation or 
endorsement of criminal wrongdoing. In light of this obligation, if the state 
decided not to punish any offenders, it could suggest that the state no longer 
sees itself as having an obligation to hold citizens to account, or that it no 
longer sees punishment as an appropriate means of holding citizens to 
account.36 And if the state decided not to hold citizens who commit certain 
types of wrongs to account, impunity could suggest state condonation of that 
wrong. Furthermore, if the state decided not to hold certain groups of citizens 
to account when they commit criminal wrongdoing, impunity again could 
suggest state condonation of wrongdoing when it is committed by particular 
groups. Whether impunity actually does imply these things depends in large 
part on how citizens perceive the state’s decision not to punish.  
One instance where impunity need not suggest condonation of 
wrongdoing relates to the opportunity principle of prosecution in common law 
jurisdictions. On an opportunity model of prosecution, the police and 
prosecutors are allowed discretion in deciding which cases to prosecute and 
which cases to divert away from criminal court hearings. Decisions are often 
made by considering factors relating to cost or availability of resources, 
public interest, seriousness of the offence, and proportionality. This is in 
contrast to many civil law jurisdictions which, in theory, operate on the 
mandatory principle of prosecution, which is intended to be fairer and to 
prevent matters of justice from political motivations and discriminatory 
practices.37 There are two questions here. One has to do with the issue of 
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justice and whether an opportunity model of prosecution is in any sense 
unjust for allowing unelected officials to decide which offenders are held to 
account for which offences.38 Another question has to do with the impact of 
selective prosecution on prevention, and whether decisions not to prosecute 
some cases lead to a weakening of the moral voice of the law. 
 In the two scenarios I discussed earlier, I argued that impunity 
suggests condonation of wrongdoing, which can both weaken the moral 
message of the law and erode citizens’ respect for the law. The first type of 
scenario is defined by the state’s decision not to punish a particular offence 
on a consistent basis. And the second type of scenario is defined by the 
state’s decision to privilege certain groups of citizens. Neither of these 
features is entailed by the opportunity principle of prosecution. It is certainly 
possible for jurisdictions that operate on the opportunity principle to end up in 
one of these scenarios, but the scenario will not occur by necessity. On the 
contrary, allowing prosecutors the discretion to determine which cases to 
pursue could give the perception of a fair and just legal system, where 
wrongs that garner more of the community’s attention are prosecuted and 
censured.39 
 Given what I have argued thus far, we see that censure can be a 
means of crime prevention. Punishment reiterates the message of the 
criminal law, and in communicating to citizens the moral reasons against 
offending, censure aims at general prevention through moral persuasion. If I 
am right about the connection between censure and prevention, we need to 
rethink current disagreements between instrumentalists and expressivists. 
For one thing, it no longer makes sense for instrumentalists to ask, with 
respect to abolition, whether we would be more concerned about losing the 
preventive or censuring function of punishment since prevention comes in 
part from the expression of censure. In addition, when instrumentalists 
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challenge expressivists on whether they would still use punishment if it was 
ineffective or unnecessary for crime prevention, we need to consider the 
possibility that punishment may be ineffective or unnecessary because 
censure has not been communicated adequately or because there are non-
punitive means of expressing censure.40  
 
3 Censure and Prevention in the Distribution of Punishment 
The conception of crime prevention that I have been discussing throughout 
this chapter is one of pure moral dissuasion. And as I mentioned in section 1, 
this is to be distinguished from prevention through prudential disincentives 
(i.e. general deterrence). Instrumentalists and hybrid expressivists like von 
Hirsch and Narayan—all of whom see punishment as offering prudential 
disincentives against criminal wrongdoing—will argue that what I have 
offered in this chapter amounts to an unacceptably ineffective means of 
crime prevention. They would argue that, if we take prevention seriously, we 
must use prudential disincentives to deter potential offenders since too many 
of us would be unmoved by moral dissuasion alone.  
 The disagreement over how we should conceptualize punishment—
i.e. as a system of moral dissuasion only or a set of prudential 
disincentives—runs much deeper than the issue of prevention. It rests on 
disagreements about human nature and about how the political community 
should address potential offenders. These disagreements cannot be resolved 
here, but I can raise a couple of points in defence of a system of moral 
dissuasion. The first point goes back to the idea that punishment necessarily 
involves the imposition of hard treatment. As we have seen in chapter 4, 
many paradigmatic modes of communicative punishment (such as victim-
offender mediations, fines, probations, community payback orders) involve 
treatments that are materially burdensome. This aspect of punishment is 
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necessary for the adequate communication of censure (i.e. moral 
dissuasion), but there is nothing to prevent those who wish to see 
punishment as a set of prudential disincentives from seeing such material 
burdens as a means of prudential rather than moral dissuasion. 
 Critics may argue that it is not enough to simply see the material 
burdens that are involved in communicative punishment as a set of prudential 
disincentives since they may not be severe enough to act as an effective 
deterrent. The aims of censure may dictate different levels of punishment 
than the aim of general deterrence, and when the latter calls for a higher 
level of punishment than what is required for the former, how we 
conceptualize the hard treatment element of punishment would no longer just 
be a matter of perception. Censure dictates that we must punish an offender 
to the extent that is necessary to communicate the moral criticism that is 
warranted in response to his offence. If the punishment is too lenient, then he 
will not receive the full message. And if the punishment is too harsh, he will 
receive more criticism than is appropriate, which may drown out any 
legitimate moral criticism that could have been communicated to him. But in 
order for punishment to act as an effective deterrent, it might have to be set 
at a level that would drown out the moral message of censure.41 
The empirical research on prevention seems to suggest that the aims 
of censure and prevention need not pull in different directions. What matters 
for deterrence has less to do with the sentencing levels and more to do with 
offenders’ perception of the risk or certainty of being detected and punished. 
Punishment can have a deterrent effect when offenders believe there is a 
substantial risk of being detected and punished, but there is limited evidence 
in support of any correlation between crime rates and the severity of 
punishment.42 At best, there are limited cases in which sentencing levels 
affect crime rates if offenders are aware of the sentence involved and believe 
that there is a substantial risk of being detected. But even in such limited 
cases, increases in penalty will eventually be met with diminishing returns. 
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So it would seem that, in practice, there is a fairly weak case for raising 
sentencing levels for the sake of deterrence.43 
 In theory though, we can still ask what we should do if there is ever a 
conflict between the aims of censure and deterrence. Do we give up on 
censure in favour of prevention, or vice versa? This issue partly concerns the 
two conceptions of prevention and which one we should adopt. But an 
adequate treatment of this issue also requires us to look beyond legal theory. 
On the issue of moral vs. prudential dissuasion, Duff maintains that the 
criminal law should communicate to citizens in a moral voice; it ought to offer 
citizens moral reasons to refrain from criminal wrongdoing. To use 
punishment as a prudential supplement to the moral voice of the law—
especially if the prudential disincentives are severe enough to replace the 
moral voice of the law—is to fail to treat citizens with the respect that is due 
to them as rational moral agents.44 There is something to be said for Duff’s 
reluctance to conceptualize punishment as a set of prudential disincentives, 
but it does not depend on his point about treating citizens with due respect.  
 Many have argued that the state does not automatically fail to treat 
citizens with due respect when it offers them prudential disincentives against 
criminal wrongdoing.45 If the state is justified in punishing D for φing, it does 
not treat D with disrespect if it warns D in advance that he will be punished if 
he φs. To warn D in advance of the punishment he would receive for φing is 
to treat him as a rational agent, who is capable of exercising his autonomy in 
light of the consequences of φing. This line of argument is meant to show 
that the state can use punishment as a prudential disincentive without 
treating its citizens with any lack of respect. But even if this is true, there is 
still a significant difference between prudential appeals and moral persuasion 
which pushes us in favour of Duff’s view.  
 To see punishment as an attempt at pure moral persuasion is to 
supply citizens with moral reasons against offending in the hope that moral 
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reasons alone would be enough to dissuade them from committing crimes. In 
other words, citizens refrain from wrongdoing not out of a concern for their 
self-interest, but because it is the right thing to do. On the other hand, to see 
punishment as a prudential supplement to the moral voice of the law is to 
admit that some members of the society may not be persuaded by moral 
reasons alone, and that for these citizens, prudential disincentives are 
necessary to deter them from wrongdoing. Prudential disincentive 
presupposes that rational agents are motivated to avoid pain, but moral 
persuasion presupposes (and requires) much more. For instance, it 
presupposes that citizens will be responsive to moral reasons, and it requires 
that the state has legitimate standing to ask citizens to follow the moral voice 
of the law. We may not be treating these citizens with any disrespect when 
we offer them prudential reasons against wrongdoing, but there are deeper 
issues about why these citizens would not be dissuaded by moral appeals 
alone. Here, questions about the justification of punishment connect to 
questions in social and political philosophy. 
Before we say anything about what we should do when moral 
persuasion is not enough to dissuade citizens from offending, we should at 
least understand why it is not enough. If citizens are committing theft 
because the state has failed to meet its basic obligations to provide for 
citizens, then the appropriate response is not to increase prudential 
disincentives against theft, but for the state to do something about its failure 
to care for its citizens. In the real world, where society is far from being 
perfectly just, crimes are often a symptom of wider socio-economic and 
political inequalities. A society in which pure moral persuasion is enough to 
convince citizens to refrain from wrongdoing is more likely to be a just 
society, where the state treats every citizen with equal concern and provides 
every citizen with an opportunity to live a good life. Indeed, effective moral 
persuasion may require such a society. 
This is not to say that within just societies, all citizens would be 
responsive to the moral reasons against criminal wrongdoing or that the 




extent to which criminal wrongdoing is a product of deeper systemic 
injustices and problematic worldviews should factor into our approach to 
punishment. To try to build a system of punishment in which we 
communicated to offenders and the general public in a moral voice is not to 
be any less concerned with crime prevention. It is to care about the kind of 
prevention that we may achieve. Even when we have good evidence that 
moral dissuasion alone may not be as effective as prudential disincentives, 
we should not be ready to give up on moral communication so easily. Before 
we give up on it, we should examine and address the systemic injustices and 
problematic worldviews that make people ignore the moral reasons against 
criminal wrongdoing.46 
 The point here is that, if we recognize criminal wrongdoing as a 
symptom of deeper, structural problems, we should address the structural 
problems rather than simply treating the symptoms. This is the same kind of 
criticism that is often raised against those who try to deal with global poverty 
through effective altruism rather than dismantling inherently exploitative 
practices that lead to poverty; or against those who advocate for safeguards 
to protect women from harassment and exploitation without dismantling the 
patriarchal structure that tend to promote harassment and exploitation; or 
against those who try to solve our environmental problems by advocating for 
electric cars without addressing deeper problems about overconsumption. Of 
course, our attempts to deal with the symptoms of structural problems are 
compatible with addressing those structural problems. We can donate to 
charities while addressing exploitation, and we can protect women from 
harassment while dismantling the patriarchy. Likewise, we can use 
punishment to deter potential offenders while addressing the structural 
inequalities that tend to promote criminal wrongdoing. But until we make a 
concerted effort to address those structural inequalities, we cannot so easily 
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dismiss moral dissuasion as an ineffective means of crime prevention. And 
while we work to eliminate the kind of criminogenic inequalities that exist 
within our society, we can strive toward a system of moral dissuasion both as 
a reminder of the work we should be doing to address various structural 
problems and as a step towards the cohesive society that we want to build, 
where we communicate to our fellow citizens primarily in a voice moral. 
For instrumentalists who advocate what I think is an admirable idea—
i.e. that punishment is only justified as an effective preventive tool or not at 
all—it is important for them to tell us why we are concerned with general 
deterrence. That is, to what end are we concerned with general deterrence? 
Instrumentalists would surely agree that it matters not just that there is less 
crime in society, but why there is less crime, and the means by which we 
build a society in which there is less crime. For instance, we can have a 
perfectly safe or secure society in which potential offenders are deterred by 
draconian laws and intrusive policing practices, but that is not the kind of 
society that instrumentalists would want to build. Their view of society is 
somewhere in between a secure community maintained by draconian means 
and a peaceful and cohesive community where the moral reasons against 
offending are enough to dissuade citizens. Their view of society fits with what 
our society actually looks like. But, as I’m sure they would agree, we should 
work towards the kind of peaceful and cohesive society where moral 
dissuasion would be an effective means of prevention. Again, contrary to 
instrumentalists’ criticisms, a reluctance to prioritize general deterrence in the 
justification of punishment is not to care any less about crime prevention. It is 
to care about the kind of prevention and the kind of society that we would 
want. We ought to strive toward Duff’s view of punishment, where moral 
communication is the only kind of prevention we need, because it is more in 
line with the kind of society that we ought to build, where citizens are treated 




















In the Introduction, I stated that this thesis should not be treated as offering 
any solutions to the problem of outcome luck, but rather as an attempt to 
address some of the foundational questions that are implicated in that 
problem. Having examined some of the foundational questions in 
metaphysics and legal theory, I can now offer a brief commentary on how we 
might treat the problem of outcome luck in light of some of the positions I 
defend in this thesis. 
 Most of what I have to say stem from my views on punishment—i.e. 
our rationale for using punishment as a response to criminal wrongdoing. In 
Chapters 4 and 5, I defended an account of punishment where we punish an 
offender in order to communicate to him the moral criticism he deserves for 
his offence. The severity of his punishment should be graded in proportion to 
the level of criticism or censure that is warranted by his offence. Furthermore, 
the aims of communication is meant to provide a complete justification of 
punishment such that other considerations like retribution or deterrence are 
not relevant for either the justification or distribution of punishment.  
 So far, this is not enough to tell us how we should punish an offender. 
Should he be censured for what he has actually done (such that the 
consequences of his actions are relevant to sentencing) or simply for what he 
has tried to do regardless of the actual consequences? But if we take 
seriously the idea of punishment as apologetic reparations, through which the 
offender can adequately recognise his wrongdoing and take steps to reform 
himself, then outcomes constitute an essential component of that for which 
the offender needs to apologise. A reckless driver who luckily caused no 
injury to anyone has less to apologise for than a similarly culpable driver who 
did cause bodily injury to another. And the second driver has less to 





 As I pointed out in Chapter 2, the mere fact that some degree of luck 
was involved in the actual outcome does not necessarily mean that it would 
be unfair to allow luck to influence our judgments of culpability or liability. 
When we criticise an agent and ask him to apologise for the harm that he has 
wrongfully caused, our criticism is often legitimate—unless the outcome was 
a sheer matter of luck, in which case the agent would not have committed a 
wrong.1 For instance, suppose I purposely throw your delicate vase on the 
ground. If the vase shatters, you can legitimately ask me to apologise for 
what I have done, in part, by getting you a new vase. I purposely broke your 
vase, something that I should not have done, and it would be appropriate for 
me to buy you a new vase.  
But if, luckily, you caught the vase before it hit the floor and, despite 
my efforts, your vase is still intact, it would be illegitimate for you to demand 
that I get you a new vase. I should still apologise for what I tried to do, and I 
can still be asked to apologise for it, but the apology need not including 
getting you a new vase. It would still require other actions, such as verbally 
apologising for what I have done, or making a promise not to attack your 
property again. The verbal apology and the promise would also be 
appropriate in addition to buying you a new vase if I did in fact damage your 
vase. But to demand that I get you a new vase when I failed to damage it 
would be to demand an apology that is disproportionate to the wrong that has 
been committed. 
I explained in Chapter 4 that, at least in the context of criminal law, the 
apology that an offender is seen to undertake through his punishment is also 
meant to constitute an adequate recognition of the wrong he has committed 
and serve as a process through which he can reform himself. For the victim 
who has been wronged and harmed—as well as the community who takes 
an interest in the wrong that she has suffered—what needs to be recognised 
is not just the wrong that the offender tried to perpetrate against her, but also 
the harm that was caused to her. We would not consider it sufficient or 
appropriate for a rapist to merely acknowledge that he tried to rape the victim 
                                                     
1
 See Duff, (1996), chapter 12.  
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when he in fact raped the victim. And for the would-be rapist who, by chance, 
failed to penetrate his victim, it would simply be wrong for him to 
acknowledge that he had raped her. The false recognition would be in excess 
of what he has actually done and it would distort both his action and what the 
victim has suffered.  
 The occurrence or non-occurrence of harm is also relevant for the 
process of self-reform. An offender who has caused harm experiences 
something significantly different from another similarly culpable offender who 
has not caused any harm. The actual outcomes of our actions, even when 
they are down to luck, are an essential part of our experience in the world. It 
is part of who we are and the narrative we tell ourselves about our lives. The 
harmful offender knows what it is like to have wronged and harmed 
someone, an experience that the non-harmful offender cannot fully 
appreciate. We might think that, having harmed someone, the harmful 
offender can reform himself in a shorter process than the offender who has 
not harmed anyone. After all, the harmful offender knows how terrible it is to 
have harmed another agent, and that, in itself, should be enough to make 
him appreciate the wrongfulness of his action and make him refrain from 
similar actions in the future. 
 Even if this is true, the harmful offender is nonetheless in greater need 
of the self-reformative process. He has in fact harmed someone and, in doing 
so, has done something worse than the offender who has not caused harm. 
The latter understands his action as one of trying and failing to cause harm. 
He can reflect on why it was wrong to try to harm others, but there is less 
need for him to reflect on any actual harm that has been caused (since none 
were caused in his case). But for the harmful offender, even if he fully 
appreciates (and is sensitive to) the terribleness of what he has done, he 
should still reflect on those things. As Duff reminds us, we may appreciate 
the wrongfulness of our actions immediately after the fact, but, as fallible 
agents, it is easy to forget such things and to carry on as if nothing has 
happened.2 If we truly appreciate the wrongfulness of what we had done, we 
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should voluntarily commit ourselves to an adequate period of reform, and to 
give ourselves enough time and space to make sure that we do not repeat 
our past wrongs. For the harmful offender, his appreciation of the terribleness 
of what he done—if he appreciates it—only confirms (to himself) the need for 
a greater process of self-reform. 
  What I have said here suggests that, insofar as we subscribe to a 
communicative theory of punishment, outcomes should be relevant to the 
severity of an offender’s sentence. But that is not yet to say anything about 
how severe the sentence should be, or how much of a difference there 
should be between agents who have caused harm and those who have not. 
As I indicated in Chapter 2, some theorists have argued that we should not 
think that the answer to this question will be the same across purposeful 
actions and reckless actions. What is needed here is an examination of the 
kind of wrong that is perpetrated in purposeful and reckless actions, and how 
they relate to the issue of punishment. These questions are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but, once again, they highlight further areas of research 
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